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"Public opinion being what it now is, few will protest the convic-
tion of these Communist petitioners. There is hope, however, that
in calmer times, when present pressures, passions and fears sub-
side, this or some later Court will restore the First Amendment
liberties to the high preferred place where they belong in a free
society."
Justice Hugo Black, dissenting in Dennis v. United States, June 4,
1951.1
"[W]hatever reasons there may primarily once have been for regarding the
Soviet Union as a possible, if not probable military opponent, the time for
that sort of thing has clearly passed."
George F. Kennan, testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, April 4, 1989.2
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I. INTRODUCTION
George Kennan's ringing declaration of peace, hardly surprising
now in light of the recent political upheavals in the Soviet Union,
underscores the fact that these are surely the "calmer times" to
which Justice Black looked hopefully four decades ago. Kennan was,
at that time, one of the architects of the policy of "containment" of
Soviet expansionism, widely considered an external threat to Ameri-
can security. Justice Black's words were uttered in connection with
America's postwar preoccupation with internal security, and specifi-
cally with regard to the conviction of eleven leaders of the Commu-
nist Party of the United States (CPUSA) of conspiring to advocate
the forcible overthrow of the U.S. government. That case, Dennis v.
United States,' was decided at a point in American constitutional
history when the law of freedom of speech and association was still
in its formative years and remarkably undeveloped. By upholding
those convictions, Dennis stunted that development, and blocked (at
least temporarily) the evolution of the prevailing "clear and present
danger" test for evaluating the constitutionality of laws regulating
political speech. In addition, Dennis spawned a decade of case law
modifying and building upon its central premise. Dennis also marked
the beginning of the end of any meaningful national political pres-
ence of the Communists in America.
Dennis appears in every major American constitutional law
casebook,4 typically accompanied by its spiritual companion cases,
Yates v. United States5 and Scales v. United States,' and is thus
familiar to every student of American constitutional law. Yet these
enormously important judicial opinions, raising and debating ques-
tions that go to the very heart of our system of freedom of speech,
come across as abstract, dry, and dated-resulting from the total
absence in Dennis of any consideration of the facts upon which the
prosecution was based. The instant academic juxtaposition of these
distant holdings with the more recent, and liberating, opinion in
Brandenburg v. Ohio,7 invites the student to conclude, all too easily,
that Dennis is a mere historical relic-a decision of questionable va-
lidity and doubtful authority.
As a teacher of constitutional law, I found myself wanting to know
more. What was the background against which Dennis had come
about, and what was the nature of the evidence presented at the
3. 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
4. E.g., G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1042 (12th ed. 1991); E. BARRETT,
W. COHEN, & J. VARAT, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 1222 (8th ed.
1989).
5. 354 U.S. 298 (1957).
6. 367 U.S. 203 (1961).
7. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
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trial? What happened to the American Communists thereafter?
Other questions speak to the present significance of Dennis with re-
spect to freedom to engage in radical political advocacy and associa-
tion. How confidently can one conclude that Dennis is no longer a
precedent of any viability, either because it has been supplanted by
later case law, or because it is almost surely a decision confined to
special circumstances at a special time? Most importantly, how con-
fidently may one conclude that the decision in Dennis was, from the
beginning, wrong as a matter of constitutional law?
The story of the American Communists, during the years between
approximately 1949 and 1967, parallels closely the evolution of the
law of freedom of speech in this country during that same period; an
enormous percentage of the decisional work of the United States Su-
preme Court in the areas of speech and association during those two
decades was the product of the various official responses to the per-
ceived "Communist threat" in this nation. To explore the legal expe-
rience of the CPUSA is to study, in large part, the development of
first amendment law in the 1950's and '60s.
Books have been written about the prosecutions of the leaders of
the CPUSA,8 and much has been written about the major Supreme
Court decisions of the Cold War era.9 But no book or article, to my
knowledge, has examined in chronological sequence, the evolution of
first amendment law in tandem with the experience of the CPUSA.
This article makes such an examination, and suggests answers to the
questions posed above.
II. WHAT HAPPENED TO THE AMERICAN COMMUNISTS?
A. The Early Years
The CPUSA came into being in September 1919, first as two sep-
arate parties that merged into one more than a year later.1" A care-
ful student of the origins of the Party thought it "safe to assume that
the American Communist movement started out with a minimum of
25,000 and a maximum of 40,000 enrolled members" in the latter
part of 1919.11 The members were overwhelmingly foreign-born. 2
8. E.g., P. STEINBERG, THE GREAT "RED MENACE": U.S. PROSECUTION OF AMER-
ICAN COMMUNISTS, 1947-52 (1984); M. BELKNAP, COLD WAR POLITICAL JUSTICE: THE
SMITH ACT, THE COMMUNIST PARTY, AND AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES (1977).
9. E.g., H. KALVEN, A WORTHY TRADITION (1988); T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION (1970).
10. T. DRAPER, THE ROOTS OF AMERICAN COMMUNISM 178, 218-19 (1957).
11. Id. at 190. Roughly in accord is H. KLEHR, THE HEYDAY OF AMERICAN COM-
Almost immediately, repression set in at both the state and federal
levels, in the form of arrests, prosecutions, and deportations. In 1919,
twenty-seven states enacted "red flag" laws, sixteen states enacted
"criminal syndicalism" laws, and twelve states enacted anarchy and
sedition laws,13 of the kind upheld against first amendment chal-
lenges in cases such as Gitlow v. New York 4 and Whitney v. Cali-
fornia.15 At the federal level, the only available tools to combat po-
litical radicalism were the wartime sedition statute, 6 which was
repealed in 1921, and the deportation laws." In January of 1920,
operating under the latter authority, Attorney General A. Mitchell
Palmer arrested approximately 10,000 persons believed to be alien
members of the two American Communist parties, ultimately de-
porting many while turning others (who turned out to be American
citizens) over to local authorities for prosecution under state laws.18
During the next two years, "so many Communists were indicted all
over the country that everyone in the movement regarded himself as
a potential political prisoner or fugitive from the law.""' During that
period, estimates of membership in the "underground" Communist
Party fell to approximately 5,000.20
Reacting to the atrophying effects of its "underground" status, the
American Communists created the Workers Party of America "as a
legal party front" 21 in December of 1921. In April of 1923, the
Communist Party officially dissolved, leaving the legal Workers
Party in its place.2 In the meantime, "[a]s America subsided into
the comfortable normalcy of the Coolidge era," popular and govern-
mental concern with radicalism declined. Membership in 1923 may
MUNISM: THE DEPRESSION DECADE 4 (1984). See also, I. HowE & L. COSER, THE AMER-
ICAN COMMUNIST PARTY: A CRITICAL HISTORY (1919-1957) 91 (1957). Each of these
sources suggests that the Communist Party itself consistently exaggerated the extent of
its membership.
12. H. KLEHR, supra note 11, at 4; see also T. DRAPER, supra note 10, at 391-93.
13. R. GOLDSTEIN, POLITICAL REPRESSION IN MODERN AMERICA FROM 1870 TO
THE PRESETrr 147 (1978). See also M. BELKNAP, supra note 8, at 9-10. See infra text
accompanying notes 50-53.
14. 268 U.S. 652 (1925). See infra text accompanying notes 206-08.
15. 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
16. The sedition provisions, enacted in 1918 as an amendment to the Espionage
Act of 1917, were repealed in 1921 (41 Stat. 1359). See Abrams v. U.S., 250 U.S. 616
(1919) (the only case under the 1918 Act to reach the Supreme Court).
17. See infra text accompanying notes 67-70.
18. R. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 13, at 156; Tilner, Ideological Exclusion of Aliens:
The Evolution of a Policy, 2 GEO. IMMGR. L.J. 1, 47 (1987).
19. T. DRAPER, supra note 10, at 204.
20. Id. at 207; see generally id. at 202-07, 272; accord, J. HowE & L. COSER,
supra note 10, at 91-92.
21. H. KLEHR, supra note 11, at 4.
22. T. DRAPER, supra note 10, at 389-90; see also I. HowE & L. COSER, supra
note 11, at 103.
23. M. BELKNAP, supra note 8, at 10. See also R. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 13, at
172, 178.
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have been as high as 15,000, but it plummeted to half that number
shortly thereafter.24 In 1924 the Workers Party appeared on the
presidential ballot in thirteen states and garnered over 33,000 votes
for its candidates; these candidates, William Z. Foster and Benjamin
Gitlow, placed a distant sixth behind the incumbent Calvin Coo-
lidge.2" In 1928, as the candidates of the recently renamed Workers
Party of America, the same ticket appeared on the ballot in thirty-
four states, placing fourth with nearly 49,000 votes.2 6 In 1929, the
Party changed its name to the Communist Party, U.S.A.17 As the
1920's came to a close, however, the Party's membership was small
and its accomplishments minimal. One student of the era has ob-
served: "For ten years, American Communists had used more energy
fighting among themselves than fighting against capitalism. '28 Stud-
ies of the CPUSA during this era yield an overwhelming impression
of endless internal theoretical struggle, always dominated and re-
solved by the Soviet-controlled Comintern.29
In the 1930's, as the American Communists became heavily in-
volved in attempting to organize both employed and unemployed
workers, 30 legal action against them by the states surged anew.31 The
Party's presidential ticket, William Z. Foster and James Ford, drew
nearly 103,000 votes in the 1932 election.3 2 Shortly thereafter, a
handful of states enacted laws barring from the ballot parties which
advocated the forcible overthrow of the government.33 Thousands of
people joined the Party each year during this period, but most of
24. H. KLEHR, supra note 11, at 4-5; T. DRAPER, supra note 9, at 391.
25. I. HOWE & L. COSER, supra note 11, at 140.
26. Id. at 175-76.
27. T. DRAPER, supra note 10, at 390.
28. H. KLEHR, supra note 11, at 10. On the factionalism of the American Commu-
nists during the 1920's, see generally T. DRAPER, supra note 10, and I. HowE & L.
COSER, supra note 11, at 38-72, 144-74.
29. The "Comintern," the popularly-used shorthand designation for the Commu-
nist International, was the association of world Communist parties, founded in 1919,
headquartered in Moscow, and dominated by the Soviet Union. See generally T.
DRAPER, AMERICAN COmMuNIsM AND SOVIET RUSSIA (1960).
30. See generally H. KLEHR, supra note 11, at 28-68, 118-52.
31. M. BELKNAP, supra note 8, at 11-12; R. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 13, at 202-06.
32. I. HOWE & L. COSER, supra note 11, at 235.
The Party's main demand, for unemployment and social insurance, was quite
specific and unrevolutionary. Most of its 5 other demands ...were equally
practical, calling for opposition to wage cuts, farm relief, equal rights and self-
determination for Negroes, resistance to "capitalist terror," and defense of the
Chinese people and the Soviet Union.
H. KLEHR, supra note 11, at 88.
33. R. GOLDSTEIN, supra. note 13, at 232.
them did not stay very long.s Its membership climbed to the 18,000
level immediately after the 1932 election, but declined again the fol-
lowing year before reaching 26,000 members in 1934.35 As one stu-
dent of this era has observed: "The first years of the Depression had
brought few concrete results. Strident calls for revolution had suc-
ceeded only in isolating the Party. Despite all the objective condi-
tions any revolutionary could hope for, the Communists had been
unable to make a significant dent in American capitalism. ' 36
In 1935, the Party performed an extraordinary flip-flop, shifting
from its former virulence toward the Roosevelt Administration, to a
position of enthusiastic support of Franklin Delano Roosevelt
(FDR). The change was dictated by the Comintern as part of a
worldwide strategy that was spurred by Soviet concerns about the
rise of fascism. This strategy included coalescing with progressive
forces in "popular fronts" united against fascism and isolationism,
maximizing good relations between the United States and the Soviet
Union, and placing efforts to work steadfastly toward proletarian
revolution on the back burner.37 The 1936 presidential candidacy of
Earl Browder, Party leader since 1933, was not truly intended to
hinder FDR's reelection and had the effect of gaining the Commu-
nists a hitherto-unknown measure of respectability in the United
States.3" Membership surged, possibly approaching 100,000 by
1939.39 Moreover, the Party attained greater geographical breadth
(although New York was still dominant) and by 1936 a majority of
the American Communists had been born in this country.40 Further-
more, it was a different Party, by virtue of its altered stance and new
34. I. HOWE & L COSER, supra note 11, at 225. See also H. KLEHR, supra note
11, at 91-92. That the Communist Party should have a greater attracting power than
holding power is not surprising. Many desperate people saw it as an alternative during
the Depression. Once they had some contact with it, they drifted away." See also Id. at
153-59, making the same point and describing the unattractiveness of Party activity:
A Party organizer complained in 1930: "Today we still have the situation
where the agenda of a unit meeting . . . lasts 3 to 4 hours most of which is
spent on details of relatively small importance . . . ." One disgruntled member
described a typical unit meeting: "We argue. We discuss. We get excited...
No results. We leave the question for another meeting."
Id. at 154-55.
35. H. KLEHR, supra note 11, at 91, 153.
36. Id. at 85. Professor Klehr has also noted that the Party in the early 1930's was
disproportionately concentrated in New York and Chicago. Id. at 164 ("Most of the
country was terra incognita.").
37. On the "Popular Front" period and the reasons for it, see generally H. KLEHR,
supra note 11, at 97-117, 167-222, 349-85; I. HOWE & L. COSER, supra note 11, at 319-
86.
38. H. KLEHR, supra note 11, at 191-96. "The Communists were becoming an
acceptable ally in all kinds of movements where they had heretofore been shunned, rang-
ig from the labor movement to insurgent state Farmer-Labor parties." Id. at 200.
39. Id. at 365-67; I. HOWE & L. COSER, supra note 11, at 385-86.
40. H. KLEHR, supra note 11, at 379-81.
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membership, from the Party of a decade earlier; many who joined
during the "Popular Front" era desired socialism, but "[flighting
fascism and struggling for reforms took precedence."
4'
The signing of the Nazi-Soviet nonaggression pact in August of
1939 changed everything. Stunned by this action, the American
Communists nonetheless fell into line, dramatically shifting from
emphatic support of FDR's foreign policy to a shrill policy of isola-
tionist opposition to any American involvement in the "imperialist"
war in Europe. 42 The costs, in terms of Party membership and exter-
nal goodwill, were predictably severe. 43 At the same time, govern-
mental legal actions, reflecting concerns about the Party, intensified
anew. Of course, antipathy to the Communists in America had never
fully subsided. A congressional committee had recommended in 1931
that the CPUSA be outlawed, 44 and in 1938 the congressional inves-
tigative committee headed by Rep. Martin Dies (later to become the
House Committee on Un-American Activities, or HUAC) began its
public-relations assault on the CPUSA.45 After 1939, however, life
clearly worsened for the Party. State criminal syndicalism prosecu-
tions blossomed again,46 several additional states enacted laws bar-
ring the Communist Party from the ballot,47 and, at the federal
level, the Party became the target of close scrutiny by the FBI.4s
The same era saw the enactment, in 1940, of the Alien Registration
Act, better known as the Smith Act, that would ultimately be used
to prosecute and convict the leaders of the CPUSA.
B. Communists and the Court in the 1930's
In terms of constitutional law, the 1930's proved a hospitable dec-
ade for the American Communists. Following the easy assumption
made in Gitlow v. New York, that freedom of speech was protected
41. Id. at 218.
42. See generally id. at 386-409.
43. Id. at 400-01.
44. Id. at 38.
45. R. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 13, at 240-44.
46. Id. at 255-60; M. BELKNAP, supra note 8, at 24.
47. R. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 13, at 256-59; M. BELKNAP, supra note 8, at 24. On
the Party's unhappy showing in the 1940 presidential campaign, partly due to its exclu-
sion from the ballot in 15 states, see H. KLEIHR, supra note 11, at 406-07.
48. R. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 13, at 251-54. In the same overall time frame, sev-
eral Communists, including Party leader Earl Browder (who was convicted and jailed),
were prosecuted for passport violations, and the government began its effort to denatural-
ize California Party leader William Schneiderman. Id. at 248-49; M. BELKNAP, supra
note 8, at 24.
by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment against in-
fringement by the states,49 the Supreme Court began in the 1930's to
strike down state laws, either facially or as applied, under the first
and fourteenth amendments. One of the first such victories was
Stromberg v. California,50 which invalidated, as unconstitutional on
its face, a California statute making it a felony to publicly display a
red flag, inter alia, "as a sign, symbol or emblem of opposition to
organized government. . . ." In what was arguably the Court's first
facial overbreadth ruling, Chief Justice Hughes found the law inva-
lid because it "might be construed to include the peaceful and or-
derly opposition to a government as organized and controlled by one
political party by those of another political party equally high
minded and patriotic, which did not agree with the one in power."'"
Another victory on fundamental grounds came in DeJonge v. Ore-
gon52 in 1937. DeJonge had been charged, under Oregon's criminal
syndicalism law, with assisting in the conduct of a meeting "which
was called under the auspices of the Communist Party, an organiza-
tion advocating criminal syndicalism. ' ' 53 He was not indicted for any
advocacy, for membership in the Party, or for helping to organize
the Party. Chief Justice Hughes observed, for a unanimous Court,
that DeJonge's sole offense "was that he had assisted in the conduct
of a public meeting, albeit otherwise lawful, which was held under
the auspices of the Communist Party. ' 54 Thus, the conviction could
not stand. In language that surely seems unexceptional today, the
Chief Justice continued:
The right of peaceable assembly is a right cognate to those of free speech
and free press and is equally fundamental ... It follows [that] peaceable
assembly for lawful discussion cannot be made a crime. The holding of
meetings for peaceable political action cannot be proscribed ... The ques-
tion ... is not as to the auspices under which the meeting is held but as to
its purpose ... We are not called upon to review the findings of the state
court as to the objectives of the Communist Party. Notwithstanding those
objectives, the defendant still enjoyed his personal right of free speech and
to take part in a peaceable assembly having a lawful purpose, although
called by that Party.55
In 1937, a divided Court also ruled in favor of a black communist
organizer in Georgia who had been c6nvicted in 1933 of "at-
tempt[ing] to incite to insurrection" under Georgia law. 6 The in-
dictment charged the defendant with "calling and attending public
49. Gitlow v. N.Y., 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
50. 283 U.S. 359 (1931).
51. Id. at 369.
52. 299 U.S. 353 (1937).
53. Id. at 357.
54. Id. at 362.
55. Id. at 364-66.
56. Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937).
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assemblies and . . . making speeches for the purpose of organizing
and establishing groups and combinations of white and colored per-
sons under the name of the Communist Party of Atlanta for the pur-
pose of. . ., by force and violence, over-throwing. . . the authority
of the state."
57
Herndon, the organizer, had been in possession of a considerable
amount of Party literature, much of which addressed itself to the
"Right of Self-Determination of the Negroes in the Black Belt." 58
Most of that literature, as described in Justice Roberts' majority
opinion and Justice Van Devanter's dissent,5 9 consisted of pretty
tame political proselytizing, sprinkled with vague references to "rev-
olutionary struggle" and "National Rebellion." But there was no evi-
dence that Herndon had distributed any of these writings, and no
evidence that he had ever advocated forcible subversion. In essence,
all he had done was recruit for the Party. The Court held that the
State had failed to produce evidence of punishable incitement and
consequently, the conviction violated the first amendment because:
In its application the offense made criminal is that of soliciting members for
a political party and conducting meetings of a local unit of that party when
one of the doctrines of the party, established by reference to a document not
shown to have been exhibited to anyone by the accused, may be said to be
ultimate resort to violence at some indefinite future time against organized
government . . . . In these circumstances, to make membership in the
party and solicitation of members for that party a criminal offense . . . is
an unwarranted invasion of the right of freedom of speech.60
As a second ground for the result, Justice Roberts stated that the
Georgia statute, "as construed and applied," did not furnish "a suffi-
ciently ascertainable standard of guilt." 61 Justice Roberts seemed to
be disturbed by the fact that a conviction was possible under this
law, even though the jury might think that forcible subversion would
not occur until "some time in the indefinite future. ' 62 Thus, the stat-
ute suffered from a vagueness problem that was deemed fatal under
the fourteenth amendment. Justice Roberts might have addressed
this problem of Georgia law more directly as failing to satisfy a test
of "clear and present danger" under the first amendment, but he did
not.
The dissenters - Justices Van Devanter, Butler, Sutherland, and
57. Id. at 245.
58. Id. at 251.
59. Id. at 250-53, 270-74.
60. 301 U.S. at 260-61.
61. Id. at 261.
62. Id. at 262.
McReynolds - were much more impressed by the inciteful quality
of Herndon's literature, and thought the evidence allowed the infer-
ence that Herndon had distributed such literature to Party recruits.6 3
"That the constitutional guaranty of freedom of speech and assem-
bly does not . . . afford protection for acts of intentional incitement
to forcible resistance to the lawful authority of a state" Justice Van
Devanter stated, "is settled by repeated decisions of this Court," cit-
ing, among other cases, the Gitlow and Whitney decisions of the
1920's."
In terms of constitutional theory, DeJonge and Herndon were not
difficult cases, given the weakness of the evidence therein concerning
advocacy of forcible revolution. But the rulings were notable be-
cause, for the first time, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of active
Communist operatives convicted under state anti-sedition laws. The
Court thereby showed that it could be sensitive to the first amend-
ment rights of leftist radicals.
What might have been the result in 1937, had Georgia charged
Herndon with being an active, knowing member of an organization
committed to the forcible overthrow of the government, and sharing
the specific intent to bring about that result? Although the majority
opinion in Herndon can be read so as to suggest that such a convic-
tion would be unconstitutional, that question was simply not directly
posed.
With the subsequent enactment of the Smith Act, the anti-sedition
focus shifted from the state to the federal level for the next three
decades.
C. Federal Legislation Directed at Subversives
1. Prior to World War II
The 1918 amendment to the Espionage Act of 1917, making it a
crime to utter language "intended to bring the form of government
of the United States . . into contempt, scorn, contumely, or disre-
pute," was repealed in 1921.65 The Smith Act, passed in June of
1940, was the next federal law directly regulating political speech.66
63. Id. at 274-75.
64. Id. at 276-77. For further discussion of the details and history of the Herndon
case, see Martin, The Angelo Herndon Case and Southern Justice, in AMERICAN POLI--
CAL TRIALS 177-99 (M. Belknap ed. 1981). See also H. KALVEN, supra note 9, at 169-
75.
65. Act of May 16, 1918, Pub. L. No. 65-150, § 3, 40 Stat. 553 (repealed 1921).
66. However, with respect to federal employees, the Hatch Act, enacted in 1939,
prohibited them from belonging to organizations which advocated the overthrow of the
government by force. Hatch Act, Pub. L. No. 76-252, § 9A(l), 53 Stat. 1147-48 (1939)
(current version at 5 U.S.C. § 7311 (1980)). In 1940, the Civil Service Commission
defined the CP as coming within the purview of the statute. P. STEINBERG, supra note 8,
at 23. See also H. CHASE. SECURITY AND LIBERTY: THE PROBLEM OF NATIVE CoMMU-
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Federal legislation providing for the exclusion of subversive aliens,
however, dates back to 1903.67 In 1917, Congress provided for the
deportation of any alien who, at any time after entry into the United
States, was "found advocating . . . the overthrow by force or vio-
lence of the Government of the United States . . .. ",8 The follow-
ing year, the law was amended to provide for the exclusion or depor-
tation of any aliens who "believe in or advocate" forcible overthrow,
or who were members of "any organization that advocates the over-
throw by force or violence of the Government of the United
States."6 9 The weight of "judicial . . . authority held that this gen-
eral language embraced membership in the Communist Party.
' 70
The Smith Act effectively "overrode" existing case law by providing
that past beliefs, advocacy, or membership, of the kind that qualified
one for deportation under the 1918 immigration law, even if discon-
tinued prior to the initiation of deportation proceedings, still sub-
jected an alien to deportation. 1
But, the key provision of the Smith Act provides that a person
who
[K]nowingly or willfully advocates . . . the duty, necessity, desirability, or
propriety of overthrowing. . . the government of the United States. . . by
force or violence; or. . . organizes or helps . . . to organize any. . . group
. . of persons who teach, advocate, or encourage the overthrow. . . of any
[government in the United States] by force or violence; or becomes or is a
member of, or affiliates with, any such group, . . . knowing the purposes
thereof-[s]hall be fined. . . or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or
NisTs, 1947-1955, 40 (1955).
67. Tilner, supra note 18, at 29-30.
68. Id. at 41; Act of Feb. 5, 1917, ch. 29, § 19, 39 Stat. 874, 889-90. On the
history of deportation of subversives, see generally, E. HUTCMNSON, LEGISLATIVE HIS-
TORY OF AMiERICAN IMmIGRATION POLICY 1798-1965, 443-46 (1981).
69. Tilner, supra note 18, at 44; Act of Oct. 16, 1918, Pub. L. No. 65-221, 40
Stat. 1012. These restrictions were essentially restated in the Act of June 5, 1920, ch.
251, 41 Stat. 1008, described in Tilner, supra note 18, at 49-50.
70. Latva v. Nicolls, 166 F. Supp. 658, 661 (D. Mass. 1952).
71. Alien Registration Act of 1940, ch. 439, § 23, 54 Stat. 670, 673. R. GOLD-
STEIN, supra note 13, at 245; Tilner, supra note 18, at 53. The "overruled" case was
Kessler v. Strecker, 307 U.S. 22 (1939). Furthermore,
The Nationality Act of October 14, 1940, provided for the denaturalization of
former alien communists, and provided that no persons could thereafter be nat-
uralized who had, within a ten-year period preceding their filing a naturaliza-
tion petition, belonged to any organization advocating, or wrote or circulated
material advocating, the violent overthrow of the government. The bill further
provided that no persons could be naturalized unless they had been and still
were "attached to the principles of the Constitution of the United States and
well disposed to the good order and happiness of the United States."
R. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 13, at 246.
both .... 72
Thus, advocacy, organizing and "knowing" membership were made
crimes, as was conspiracy to commit any of these offenses.1 3 As one
commentator has persuasively observed, the Smith Act was "an
anachronism" at the time of its passage; "[w]hatever the problems
of internal security may have been in 1940, they did not arise from
any public advocacy that the government be overthrown by force or
violence."74 Indeed, in light of the "mainstream" posture of the
CPUSA in the years immediately preceding the Second World War,
any judicial inclination to defer to Congressional judgment with re-
spect to the need for the Smith Act's prohibition of seditious advo-
cacy would appear to be highly questionable.
The Voorhis Act,75 also enacted in 1940, requires registration with
the Attorney General by "[e]very organization, the purpose or aim
of which. . . is the. . . overthrow of a government. . . by the use
of force . . .," or which was "subject to foreign control [and] en-
gage[d] in political activity." Contrary to expectations, the CPUSA
never registered under this statute;7 6 instead, it formally disaffiliated
from the Comintern in November 1940.77
Not until 1948 was the Smith Act used against the Communist
Party.
2. After World War 1I
In March of 1947, President Truman issued an executive order
establishing a sweeping federal-employee loyalty program designed
to exclude persons disloyal to the United States.78 It was pursuant to
this executive order that the infamous "Attorney General's list" of
subversive organizations, first published in December 1947 came into
being. Membership in organizations designated by the Attorney
General as "totalitarian, fascist, communist, or subversive" was
72. 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1982).
73. On the background and legislative history of the Smith Act, see generally M.
BELKNAP, supra note 8, at 16-19, 21-27. See also E. HUTCHINSON, supra note 68, at
257-58.
74. T. EMERSON, supra note 9, at 111; accord, H. CHASE, supra note 66, at 25.
75. 18 U.S.C. § 2386 (1982).
76. Sutherland, Freedom and Internal Security, 64 HARV. L. REv. 383, 386, n. 13
(1951). "This statute, despite its threatening tone, has neither produced any registrations
of importance, nor has it subdued left-wing agitation. It is quite completely a dead let-
ter." Id. at 408.
77. H. KLEHR, supra note 11, at 409.
78. Exec. Order No. 9,835, 3 C.F.R. 129 (1947). On the federal loyalty program
generally, see R. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 13, at 277-79, 299-305, 329-30, 337-39; T.
EMERSON, supra note 9, at 215-20; H. CHASE, supra note 66, at 37-49; A. HARPER, THE
POLTICS OF LOYALTY: THE WHITE HOUSE AND THE COMMUNIST ISSUE, 1946-1952 20-53
(1969); P. STEINBERG, supra note 8, at 21-29; D. CAUTE, THE GREAT FEAR: THE ANTI-
COMMUNIST PURGE UNDER TRUMAN AND EISENHOWER 268-74, 276-92 (1978).
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among "the activities and associations of an applicant or employee
which may be considered in connection with [a] determination of
disloyalty.
79
Also in 1947, in the Taft-Hartley amendments to the National
Labor Relations Act (NLRA), Congress acted to eliminate Commu-
nists from labor union leadership positions. Section 9(h) of the Act
was amended to provide that essential protections of the NLRA
would be unavailable to a union unless each officer of that union filed
an affidavit with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) stat-
ing "that he [was] not a member of the Communist Party or affili-
ated with such party, and that he [did] not believe in, and [was] not
a member of or support[er] [of] any organization that believes in or
teaches, the overthrow of the United States Government by
force .... -80 In 1959, Congress replaced section 9(h) with section
504, which simply made it a crime for a member of the Communist
Party to be an officer of a labor union."
But the most comprehensive and detailed piece of federal legisla-
tion directed against the CPUSA was the Internal Security Act of
1950, also known as the McCarran Act, 2 that was enacted over
79. Exec. Order No. 9,835, 3 C.F.R. 129 (1947). "The list is evidence only of the
character of the listed organizations in proceedings before loyalty boards to determine
whether 'reasonable' grounds exist for belief 'that the employee under consideration' is
disloyal to the Government of the U.S." Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. Mc-
Grath, 341 U.S. 123, 191 (1951) (Reed, J., dissenting). There were reportedly 197 orga-
nizations on the list by November 1950. R. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 13, at 311. See gener-
ally id. at 308-11; T. EMERSON, supra note 9, at 222-23; P. STEINBERG, supra note 8, at
27-31; D. CAUTE, supra note 78, at 169-70.
80. Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-101, § 9(h), 61
Stat. 136. See American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950). On the
legislative history of § 9(h), and the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act over President
Truman's veto, see H. CHASE, supra note 66, at 56-57 and P. STEINBERG, supra note 8,
at 43-46. Although the Communist role in labor unions - especially in the CIO - was
significant in the immediate postwar period (see I. HOWE & L. COSER, supra note 11, at
457-69), one student of the era has stated that "[t]he assumption of a [Communist]
threat to vital industry was highly questionable." P. STEINBERG, supra note 8, at 44.
Another commentator observed that the Congressional hearings on Communist infiltra-
tion of organized labor were "inconclusive and unsubstantial." H. CHASE, supra note 66,
at 57. It was also noted that, in the Congressional debate over § 9(h), "[t]here was no
discussion of civil liberties questions." P. STEINBERG, supra note 8, at 44. On the enforce-
ment of § 9(h), see id. at 46-47; H. CHASE, supra note 66, at 57-61.
81. 29 U.S.C. § 504 (1982). Section 504 was ultimately held unconstitutional, as a
bill of attainder, in U.S. v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965).
82. 50 U.S.C. §§ 781-858 (1982). The act had its origin in bills considered in 1948
by the House Committee on Un-American Activities and sponsored by Reps. Karl E.
Mundt and Richard M. Nixon. On the legislative history of the Act, see generally A.
HARPER, supra note 78, at 149-62; T. EMERSON, supra note 9 at 129-33; P. STEINBERG,
supra note 8, at 104-06, 199-204; D. CAUTE, supra note 78, at 38-39; Sutherland, supra
President Truman's veto.83 The heart of the Act was a registration
requirement applicable to "Communist-action" and "Communist-
front" organizations, as defined by the Act; such organizations were
subject to serious penalties if they failed to register. The Act also
created a Subversive Activities Control Board (SACB) to determine
which organizations were subject to the Act. Registration was to be
accompanied by disclosure of the names and addresses of officers,
and in the case of a "Communist-action" organization such as the
CPUSA, of its members as well. Serious disabilities befell the mem-
bers of organizations required to register, including prohibitions on
federal employment, public communications, and access to pass-
ports.8 4 However, the Act explicitly provided that neither being an
officer nor a member of any "Communist organization" would itself
constitute a violation of any criminal statute.85
The 1950 Act also amended the federal immigration laws, explic-
itly excluding aliens who were or had been members of the CPUSA
or any other Communist party, as well as advocates of "doctrines of
world Communism" or of forcible overthrow of the government. 6
The Act further required the deportation of such aliens (i.e., past or
present Party members) within the United States,8 7 and barred the
note 76, at 393. Testifying in support of his bill in 1948, Rep. Nixon stated that the
Smith Act provided inadequate protection because "the Communists have developed
techniques for taking over governments without using force and violence." P. STEINBERG,
supra note 8, at 105. Interestingly, Attorney General Tom Clark testified in 1948 that
the proposed law was unconstitutional. Id. at 106.
83. President Truman's veto message, dated Sept. 22, 1950, appears at 96 Cong.
Rec. 15,629 (1950), reprinted in A. HARPER, supra note 78, at 277-91.
84. See the lengthy description of this registration scheme by Justice Frankfurter
in Communist Party v. SACB, 367 U.S. 1, 4-19 (1961). The Act contained other provi-
sions as well, including an "internal security emergency" detention provision, 50 U.S.C.
§§ 811-26 (1982), and § 783(a) making it unlawful "for any person knowingly to...
conspire . . . with any other person to perform any act which would substantially con-
tribute to the establishment within the United States of a totalitarian dictatorship." 50
U.S.C. § 783(a) (1982). The former provision was repealed, unused, in 1971, Pub. L.
No. 92-128, 85 Stat. 347-48 (1971), and the latter has never been employed. See gener-
ally T. EMERSON, supra note 9, at 144-45. On the statute overall, see R. GOLDSTEIN,
supra note 13, at 322-23 (calling it "one of the most massive onslaughts against freedom
of speech and association ever launched in American history."). Section 783(a) was
sharply criticized as an abridgment of civil liberties in H. CHASE, supra note 66, at 29.
85. 50 U.S.C. § 783(0 (1982). Nor would the fact of registration by any person be
admissible in evidence against that person in any criminal prosecution. Id.
86. Subversive Activities Control Act, § 22, Pub. L. No. 81-831, 64 Stat. 987,
1006 (1950); 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (a)(28) (1982). See generally E. HUTCHINSON, supra note
68, at 293-94; Tilner, supra note 18, at 60-61. Congress subsequently instructed the At-
torney General that "membership," within the meaning of the Act, should be interpreted
to include only voluntary membership. Id.; 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (a)(28)(E) (1982).
87. Subversive Activities Control Act, Pub. L. No. 81-831, § 22, 64 Stat. 987,
1008 (1950); 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(6) (1982). Proof of membership in the Party alone was
not a sufficient basis for deportation prior to 1950. Deportation could be based upon
proof, in each case, of membership in an organization devoted to the forcible over-throw
of the government. Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 535 (1952); Galvan v. Press, 347
U.S. 522, 529 (1954).
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naturalization of such aliens.88
The Congress of the early 1950's was not done, however, with the
task of fighting domestic Communism, especially since the McCar-
ran Act accomplished so little. In the face of mounting domestic
pressures to "do something" about Communism, a group of Demo-
cratic senators, including Hubert Humphrey, proposed to make it a
federal crime to be a member of the Communist Party.89 (Under the
Smith Act, of course, it was in effect already a crime to be a CP
member, "knowing" the illegal purposes thereof.) But, President Ei-
senhower opposed this bill,90 and the resulting compromise, the
Communist Control Act of 1954, was a bit cryptic and strange. In it,
at the conclusion of a long introductory paragraph entitled "Findings
of Fact," Congress declared: "Therefore, the Communist Party
should be outlawed." ' The closest Congress came, in this legisla-
tion, to actually giving effect to that moral imperative was to pro-
vide, with majestic unclarity, that the CPUSA was
[N]ot entitled to any of the rights, privileges, and immunities attendant
upon legal bodies created under the jurisdiction of the laws of the United
States or any political subdivision thereof; and whatever rights, privileges,
and immunities which have heretofore been granted to said party . . . by
reason of the laws of the United States or any political subdivision thereof,
are hereby terminated.
2
What Congress had in mind, in its reference to "rights, privileges,
and immunities," was the subject of considerable speculation. It
88. Subversive Activities Control Act, Pub. L. No. 81-831, § 25, 64 Stat. 987,
1013 (1950); 8 U.S.C. § 1424(a) (1982). All of these provisions of the 1950 Act were
incorporated, in expanded form, in the McCarran-Walter Act, ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163
(1952) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1524 (1982)), which comprehensively
recodified American immigration law in 1952. See Tilner, supra note 18, at 62-71.
89. H. CHASE, supra note 66, at 32; T. EMERSON, supra note 9, at 148; see also
Chase, The Libertarian Case for Making It a Crime to be a Communist, 29 TEMP. L.Q.
121 (1956).
90. H. CHASE, supra note 66, at 33. The proposal was enacted by the Senate, but
not by the House of Representatives. Barber, The Legal Status of the American Com-
munist Party: 1965, 15 J. Pun. L. 94, 102 (1966).
91. 50 U.S.C. § 841 (1982) (emphasis added). This declaration was reportedly
later described as "merely an expression of policy" by Rep. Celler, Chairman of the
House Judiciary Committee. Barber, supra note 90, at 103.
92. 50 U.S.C. § 842 (1982).
93. See Barber, supra note 90, at 103; Auerbach, The Communist Control Act of
1954: A Proposed Legal-Political Theory of Free Speech, 23 U. CHI. L. REv. 173, 175-
77 (1956); Comment, The Communist Control Act of 1954, 64 YALE L.J. 712, 716-22
(1955). On the legislative history of the Act, see id. at 713-14. Prof. Emerson, writing in
1970, regarded § 842 as "plainly invalid." T. EMERSON, supra note 9, at 149. But see In
re Albertson's Claim, 202 N.Y.S.2d 5, 168 N.E.2d 242 (1960), rev'd sub nom. Commu-
nist Party v. Catherwood, 367 U.S. 389 (1961). Catherwood, the only case under the
1954 Act to reach the U.S. Supreme Court, held, on wholly statutory grounds, that the
seemed relatively clear, however, that at a minimum Congress in-
tended to keep the Party off of both federal and state election
ballots."'
The 1954 Act also amended the 1950 Act in two theoretically im-
portant respects: it specifically provided that "knowing" members of
the CPUSA were subject to all of the provisions and penalties of the
1950 Act,95 thereby potentially obviating, in part, the need for an
SACB determination that the CPUSA was in fact a "Communist-
action" organization;98 and it created a new category, the "Commu-
nist-infiltrated" organization. Meaningful sanctions would be im-
posed on labor unions found by the SACB to be "Communist-infil-
trated"-namely, the loss of all benefits conferred upon unions under
the National Labor Relations Act.9 7 Later that year, Congress en-
acted the Expatriation Act, making a Smith Act conspiracy convic-
tion a renunciation of United States citizenship. 8
While some states explicitly outlawed the Communist Party,9 9 the
federal government, strictly speaking, did not. 00 As we shall see, the
elaborate federal legislation of the 1950's ultimately had little effect
outside of the immigration context. Moreover, in 1956, state sedition
laws were held to be preempted by the federal Smith Act,' 10 at least
Party retained its status as an "employer," under the New York Unenmployment Insur-
ance Law, despite the 1954 Act. Justice Harlan noted the total absence of legislative
history concerning the "vague terminology" of § 842. Id. at 392-93.
94. Comment, supra note 93, at 738; Auerbach, supra note 93, at 175. On the
questionable constitutionality of such an application of the Act, see Comment, supra
note 93, at 729-30, 738-44; see also generally Auerbach, supra note 93, at 183-204. But
see Salwen v. Rees, 16 N.J. 216, 108 A.2d 265 (1954). See also Mitchell v. Donovan,
290 F. Supp. 642 (D. Minn. 1968) (granting preliminary injunction based on "grave
doubts" about the constitutionality of the Act). As of 1958, thirty-five states had report-
edly enacted statutes barring from the ballot political parties or persons which advocated
the forcible overthrow of the government; eighteen of them also explicitly barred the
Communist Party from the ballot. Barber, supra note 90, at 103, n. 92.
95. 50 U.S.C. § 843 (1982).
96. But the meaning of this provision was uncertain, and the ongoing SACB pro-
ceedings, begun in 1950, were apparently uninfluenced by it. Auerbach, supra note 93, at
178-80. Apparently this provision was never utilized. T. EMERSON, supra note 9, at 150.
97. 50 U.S.C. §§ 782(4A), 792a (1982). See Comment, supra note 93, at 759-63.
On other provisions of the Act, See id. at 745-58.
98. 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(9) (1982). See H. CHASE, supra note 66, at 33. For a
consideration of its constitutionality, see Barber, supra note 90, at 105-06.
99. Auerbach, supra note 93, at 176, n. 12; T. EMERSON, supra note 9, at 152; R.
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 13, at 350; M. KoNvITZ, EXPANDING LIBERTIES 141-42 (1966).
For a discussion of the state of other state and local legislation - including loyalty
programs, registration schemes, ballot exclusions, and employment bans - regarding the
Communist Party, see generally R. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 13, at 348-60; D. CAUTE,
supra note 78, at 70-81, 339-45; Sutherland, supra note 7, at 388-89.
100. Yet one commentator, writing in 1966, could understandably observe: "[O]ne
could say that the party is not illegal. It is, however, doubtful if one would be justified in
going further and saying that the party is legal." M. KONVITZ, supra note 99, at 110.
101. Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956). The decision struck down a
conviction under the Pennsylvania Sedition Act, which closely paralleled the Smith Act.
To Chief Justice Warren, writing for the majority, "the conclusion [was] inescapable
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insofar as those state laws addressed the potential overthrow of the
federal government. 102 This preemption effectively freed the CPUSA
from direct regulation by the states.
But the Smith Act itself had become a major problem for the
CPUSA by 1948.
D. The Law Applied: An Overview
1. The Smith Act Prosecutions
Although the Smith Act was enacted in 1940, eight years passed
before it was used against its ideologically natural target, the
CPUSA. The invasion of Russia by Nazi Germany in June of 1941
turned the American Communists around once more, hurling them
into support for the Allied war effort.1 03 With Russia and America
as allies against Germany, Americans developed a favorable feeling
about Russia that, until very recently, was difficult to imagine during
most of the postwar era.104 The American Communists almost cer-
tainly benefitted from that altered sentiment toward the pillar of
world Communism.10 5 Meanwhile, the very first Smith Act prosecu-
tion for conspiracy to advocate the overthrow of the government by
force and to organize a group which so advocated, was successfully
brought against members of the Socialist Workers Party in Minne7
sota in 1941.10°
In June of 1943, reportedly as a "demonstration of solidarity with
its allies, °7 the Soviet Union dissolved the Comintern. Apparently
believing themselves freer to pursue a more distinctively American
approach toward a socialist society and desiring to adopt a less con-
frontational posture, the CPUSA under Earl Browder's leadership,
officially dissolved itself in May of 1944, and formed in its place the
that Congress . . . intended to occupy the field of sedition." Id. at 504. The opinion
suggests that state laws punishing membership in the CP were also preempted, for Chief
Justice Warren observed that some state laws "even purport to punish mere membership
in subversive organizations which the federal statutes do not punish where federal regis-
tration requirements have been fulfilled." Id. at 508.
102. Cf. Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72, 76 (1959), stating that, consistently with
Nelson, "a State could proceed with prosecutions for sedition against the State
itself...."
103. See I. HOWE & L. COSER, supra note 11, at 395-424.
104. See id. at 431-36; R. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 13, at 288.
105. See M. BELKNAP, supra note 8, at 37-38.
106. Dunne v. U.S., 138 F.2d 137 (8th Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 790
(1943). For a description of wartime sedition cases, see also R. GOLDSTEIN, supra note
13, at 268-71.
107. M. KONVITZ, supra note 99, at 112.
Communist Political Association, which would work within the
mainstream of American political life.108 The absence of the Party
was brief. Just as the war in Europe was ending in April 1945, a
message was conveyed to the American Communists through an ar-
ticle by French Communist leader Jacques Duclos, that their new,
cooperative approach to American politics was "revisionist" heresy.
The article was believed to represent the views of Joseph Stalin, and
the American Communists, ever obedient, reacted accordingly; the
new policy of reformism was repudiated, Browder was forced out,
and the CPUSA was reconstituted in July of 1945.109 William Z.
Foster, long the leading voice of militance in the American Commu-
nist Party, reclaimed its leadership.
The next three years were a time of mounting public concern
about international and domestic Communism, marked by the "fall"
of governments in Eastern Europe to Communism and the discovery
of Soviet espionage within the United States. This heightened con-
cern was reflected by the newly established federal employee loyalty
program, persistent hearings on domestic Communist "infiltration"
(and proposed legislation to deal with it), by the House Committee
on Un-American Activities (HUAC), and extensive investigation of
the CPUSA by the FBI. 110 In July of 1948, the first Smith Act in-
dictment was filed in New York, against members of the
CPUSA-in this case, against most of the top leaders of the Party,
including William Z. Foster, Eugene Dennis, and Gus Hall." The
defendants were charged with conspiring to advocate the forcible
overthrow of the government and, because of their leadership in re-
forming the CPUSA in July 1945, with conspiring to organize a
108. Id.; P. STEINBERG, supra note 8, at 61-63; H. KLEHR, supra note 11, at 410-
11; I. HOWE & L. COSER, supra note 11, at 428; M. BELKNAP, supra note 8, at 37, 44.
109. See generally P. STEINBERG, supra note 8, at 64-67; I. HOWE & L. COSER,
supra note 11, at 437-53; J. STAROBIN, AMERICAN COMMUNISM IN CRISIS, 1943-1957, 78-
106 (1972).
110. On the HUAC, see R. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 13, at 306-08, 343-46; P.
STEINBERG, supra note 8, at 37-39; D. CAUTE, supra note 78, at 88-89; and M. KON-
vITZ, supra note 99, at 113-15. On FBI scrutiny of the CP in the years leading up to the
Smith Act prosecutions, see P. STEINBERG, supra, at 4-14, 90-100; D. CAUTE, supra, at
111-21. On the complexion and evolution of American public opinion concerning Russia,
before and after World War II, see T. PATERSON, MEETING THE COMMUNIST THREAT:
TRUMAN TO REAGAN (1988).
111. U.S. v. Foster, 80 F. Supp. 479 (S.D.N.Y. 1948). For a detailed discussion of
the background of the indictment, and the allegedly political motivations of the Truman
Administration in seeking it, see M. BELKNAP, supra note 8, at 43-45, 48-51, 53. (A
condensed version of that study appears at M. Belknap, Cold War in the Courtroom:
The Foley Square Communist Trial, in AMERICAN POLITICAL TRIALS 233, 237-38 (M.
Belknap ed., 1981) [hereinafter Belknap, Trial]). An even more detailed account of the
events leading up to the indictment, with an emphasis upon the involvement and influ-
ence of the FBI under J. Edgar Hoover, can be found in P. STEINBERG, supra note 8, at
39-42, 95-111. See also M. KONVITZ, supra note 99, at 115-16; D. CAUTE, supra note
78, at 25-34.
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group that so advocated." 2 Foster was never tried because of his
poor health, but the remaining eleven defendants were convicted,
and their convictions were upheld, against a constitutional challenge
to the Smith Act, by the United States Supreme Court in the Dennis
decision in 1951.113 Oddly, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in
the Dennis case only with respect to the constitutionality of the
Smith Act "as construed and applied," 114 and not with respect to the
sufficiency of the evidence to establish a constitutionally punishable
conspiracy. Thus, the Smith Act's conspiracy-to-advocate and con-
spiracy-to-organize provisions were held constitutional, but the Court
passed no judgment on the facts upon which the conviction rested. In
any event, the top leaders of the CPUSA were by then either in
prison or in hiding." 5
Similar conspiracy prosecutions--of persons often characterized as
"second string" Communist leaders-followed in the early-to-mid-
1950's, in such diverse cities as New York," 6 Los Angeles, 117 Balti-
more, 1 8  Pittsburgh,"9  Honolulu,120  Detroit,' 2' Seattle, 2 2  St.
Louis, 2 3 Philadelphia' 4 Cleveland,' 2  New Haven,'126 Denver,
27
and Boston. 28  The great majority of those indicted were
112. The indictment is set out in full in U.S. v. Foster, 9 F.R.D. 367, 374-75
(S.D.N.Y. 1949).
113. Dennis v. U.S., 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
114. Id. at 495-96.
115. Belknap, Trial, supra note 111, at 253-54.
116. U.S. v. Flynn, 216 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 909
(1955) (conviction in Jan. 1953).
117. Yates v. U.S., 225 F.2d 146 (9th Cir. 1955), rev'd, 354 U.S. 298 (1957)
(conviction in August 1952).
118. Frankfeld v. U.S., 198 F.2d 679 (4th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 922
(1953) (conviction in April 1952).
119. U.S. v. Mesarosh, 223 F.2d 449 (3d Cir. 1955), rev'd on other grounds, 352
U.S. 1 (1956) (conviction in August 1953).
120. Fujimoto v. U.S., 251 F.2d 342 (9th Cir. 1958) (conviction in June 1953).
121. Wellman v. U.S., 253 F.2d 601 (6th Cir. 1958) (conviction in Feb. 1954).
122. Mollan, Smith Act Prosecutions: The Effect of the Dennis and Yates Deci-
sions, 26 U. PiTr. L. REV. 705, 709, n. 18 (1965) (convictions and one acquittal in Oct.
1953).
123. Sentner v. U.S., 253 F.2d 310 (8th Cir. 1958) (conviction in May 1954).
124. U.S. v. Kuzma, 249 F.2d 619 (3d Cir. 1957) (conviction in Aug. 1954).
125. Brandt v. U.S., 256 F.2d 79 (6th Cir. 1958) (convictions and acquittals in
Feb. 1956).
126. Silverman v. U.S., 248 F.2d 671 (2d Cir. 1957) (convictions and acquittals in
March 1956).
127. Bary v. U.S., 248 F.2d 201 (10th Cir. 1957) (conviction in May 1955).
128. U.S. v. Russo, 155 F. Supp. 251 (D. Mass. 1957) (never tried); see Mollan,
supra note 122, at 710, 732.
convicted. 2
In 1957, however, the Supreme Court reversed the convictions of
the fourteen defendants in Yates v. United States,130 for reasons that
were of enormous importance to defendants around the country.
First, as a matter of statutory interpretation, the Court held that the
CPUSA had been "organized" in 1945; thus, the governing three-
year statute of limitations31 had expired sometime in 1948 with re-
spect to the Smith Act indictments for conspiring to "organize" the
CPUSA.1' 2 Therefore, no CPUSA leader would again be prosecuted
for "organizing" or conspiring to "organize" the CPUSA. Only the
original eleven Dennis defendants were punished for that offense.
Second, the Court found that the jury instructions given by the
trial judge failed to distinguish between advocacy of forcible over-
throw "as an abstract principle" (which was not punishable) and
"advocacy of action" (which was), 33 as the Smith Act required. 34
Reversal was thus necessary. But, in light of its second ground for
reversal, the Court deemed it appropriate to review the evidence in
the case to determine "whether the way should be left open" for a
new trial of all or some of the petitioners.135 Looking to see "whether
there are individuals as to whom acquittal is unequivocally de-
manded,"11 6 the Court decided that, for five of the fourteen defend-
ants it was. In these five instances, the evidence could not support a
finding of the necessary "advocacy of action." As to the other nine,
the Court was not prepared to say that such a finding "would be
impossible. 13 7 In reaching these results, the Supreme Court, for the
first time, reviewed the evidence in a Smith Act prosecution and
thereby provided guidance to the lower federal courts as to what
speech amounted to punishable advocacy of action.
Yates was, therefore, enormously important, and it effectively en-
ded the Smith Act "advocacy" prosecutions. The ruling in Yates
that conspiracy-to-organize indictments were time-barred meant, at
129. "Of the 126 men and women indicted on conspiracy charges, only ten were
acquitted. . . . [O]f those defendants who actually had their fate decided by a trial
court, just under 89 percent were convicted." Belknap, Trial, supra note 111, at 255; see
also Mollan, supra note 122, at 709-10, notes 17-19. On the early round of "second-
level" trials, see generally P. STEINBERG, supra note 8, at 232-51. See generally Note,
Post-Dennis Prosecutions Under the Smith Act, 31 IND. L. J. 104 (1955); M. BELKNAP,
supra note 8, at 152-66, linking prosecutions to contemporary politics.
130. 354 U.S. 298 (1957).
131. 18 U.S.C. § 3282 (1982) (amended in 1954 to 5 years, 68 Stat. 1145 (1954)).
132. 354 U.S. at 312.
133. Id. at 318, 320.
134. Justice Harland addressed the issue as one of statutory interpretation, but
noted that "[i]n doing so we should not assume that Congress chose to disregard a con-
stitutional danger zone so clearly marked ... " 354 U.S. at 319.
135. Id. at 327.
136. Id. at 328.
137. Id. at 332.
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the very least, that all pending cases required new trials.138 Follow-
ing the Supreme Court's lead, the federal courts of appeals then re-
viewed the evidence in each case to determine whether new trials
were warranted. Most of those courts decided that the evidence was
sufficient.13 9 Others held that acquittals were required. 140 Ultimately,
notwithstanding its victories, the government gave up, apparently
recognizing its inability to secure a conviction under the Yates
criteria.' 4 '
As one student of these prosecutions observed, "The Yates ruling
did nothing for the [Dennis case] Eleven, though. By the time the
Supreme Court handed down its decision, most of them had already
completed their sentences."' 42 It may be doubtful whether the evi-
dence of illegal "advocacy" in Dennis was any stronger than that in
the later prosecutions. It is true, however, that the conspiracy-to-or-
ganize count was a viable one with respect to those Dennis
defendants.
But the Smith Act was not dead. Prosecutions under the "mem-
bership" clause of the Act had been launched in late 1954, in New
York, Chicago, and North Carolina, and these prosecutions resulted
in convictions in 1955 and 1956.113 For a combination of reasons,'
the Supreme Court did not rule on any of these cases until 1961, at
which time it affirmed the membership-clause conviction in the
Scales case by a 5-4 margin. The gist of the government's case is
138. E.g., Bary, 248 F.2d at 208-09, 214; Kuzma, 249 F.2d at 621; Sentner, 253
F.2d at 311; Brandt, 256 F.2d at 82; Wellman, 253 F.2d at 604; Mesarosh, 223 F.2d at
449.
139. E.g., Mesarosh, 223 F.2d at 452; Bary, 248 F.2d at 209-13; Sentner, 253
F.2d at 311; Brandt, 256 F.2d at 81; Wellman, 253 F.2d at 605; Kuzma, 249 F.2d at 622
(ordering acquittal for some but not all defendants).
140. E.g., Silverman, 248 F.2d at 686-87, U.S. v. Jackson, 257 F.2d 830, 832 (2d
Cir. 1958) (follow-up to Flynn, 216 F.2d 354 discussed supra at note 116); Fujimoto v.
U.S., 251 F.2d 342 (9th Cir. 1958).
141. The government dismissed its prosecution in Yates itself in December 1957.
Fujimoto v. U.S., 251 F.2d 342 (9th Cir. 1958); Mollan, supra note 122, at 732. It has
been reported that the government made only one further attempt at such a prosecution,
without ultimate success. Belknap, Trial, supra note 111, at 257. See also U.S. v. Jack-
son, 257 F.2d 830, 832, n. 6 (2d Cir. 1958). A panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals opined, in dismissing one such case: "One may as well recognize that the Yates
decision leaves the Smith Act, as to any further prosecution under it, a virtual sham-
bles. . . ." Fujimoto, 251 F.2d at 342. All of these post-Yates developments are re-
viewed in Mollan, supra note 122, at 730-40.
142. Belknap, Trial, supra note 111, at 257.
143. Scales v. U.S., 367 U.S. 203 (1961); Noto v. U.S., 367 U.S. 290 (1961); U.S.
v. Blumberg, 207 F.Supp. 28 (E.D. Pa. 1962); U.S. v. Lightfoot, 228 F,2d 561 (7th Cir.
1956); Mollan, supra note 122, at 720, n. 64.
144. Scales, 367 U.S. at 206, n. 2.
best conveyed by these words from Justice Harlan's opinion for the
Court:
The jury was instructed that in order to convict it must find that ... (1)
the Communist Party advocated the violent overthrow of the Government,
in the sense of present "advocacy of action" to accomplish that end as soon
as circumstances were propitious; and (2) petitioner was an "active" mem-
ber of the Party, and not merely "a nominal, passive, inactive or purely
technical" member, with knowledge of the Party's illegal advocacy and a
specific intent to bring about violent overthrow "as speedily as circum-
stances would permit."" 5
Interpreting the Smith Act to require both "specific intent" and"active" membership, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the
membership clause. Furthermore, the Court reviewed the sufficiency
of the evidence and held that the evidence was sufficient to establish
that the CPUSA had engaged in punishable "advocacy of action."
(Had the government given up too soon, then, on its "advocacy"
prosecutions?) In a companion case,146 however, the Court held that
the evidence of illegal Party advocacy was insufficient; the Court
scrupulously insisted that illegal Party advocacy be proven anew in
each "membership" prosecution.147
2. The Registration Requirements
Meanwhile, the Party had been contending with the Internal Se-
curity Act of 1950 as well. Pursuant to the Act's registration provi-
sions, in late 1950, the Attorney General petitioned the SACB for an
order requiring the CPUSA to register as a "Communist-action or-
ganization." Hearings were held in 1951, and in April of 1953 the
Board ruled that the Party was a "Communist-action organization"
within the meaning of the Act, and ordered the Party to register.
The Party appealed, and a long series of procedural scuffles en-
sued, 148 until finally the dispute came before the Supreme Court in
1961. By a 5-4 margin, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the
registration requirement, thus requiring that all members of the
Party file their names and addresses with the SACB.149 Significantly,
the majority of the Court deemed many of the Party's challenges to
145. Id. at 220.
146. Noto v. U.S., 367 U.S. 290 (1961).
147. Id. at 299: "It need hardly be said that it is upon the particular evidence in a
particular record that a particular defendant must be judged, not upon the evidence in
some other record or upon what may be supposed to be the tenets of the Communist
Party." Id.
A few additional membership-clause indictments were dismissed, "on Yates eviden-
tiary grounds." Mollan, supra note 122, at 720, n. 64. One additional conviction was
reversed due to the insufficiency of the government's evidence of the defendant's specific
intent to overthrow the government. Hellman v. U.S., 298 F.2d 810 (9th Cir. 1961).
148. The procedural history of the case is described in Communist Party of U.S. v.
Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 19-22 (1961).
149. Id. at 82-115.
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be premature, and therefore refused to address (a) the Party's legal
argument that compelled registration would effectively compel the
Party's officers to incriminate themselves, or (b) the constitutionality
of any of the consequences of registration, such as disqualification
from government employment and denial of passports. " '
Thus, as of mid-1961, Smith Act prosecutions, especially under
the "membership" clause, were potentially viable, but apparently
were never pursued against CPUSA members again. The SACB's
order that the CPUSA register under the 1950 Internal Security Act
was affirmed by the Supreme Court, and this regulatory avenue was
pursued by the Kennedy and Johnson Justice Departments."5
When the Party was ordered to comply with the SACB order,
however, its officers refused, asserting their fifth amendment right of
freedom from compulsory self-incrimination. Their understandable
concern was the prospect of prosecution under the Smith Act "mem-
bership" clause. The district court rejected this argument, and con-
victed the Party of non-compliance under the McCarran Act. 152 But
the court of appeals reversed and remanded. 53 In Judge Bazelon's
view, because the availability of someone who could sign the Party's
registration forms was an element of the crime of non-compliance,
and the officers' claims of privilege against self-incrimination were
valid, the government had the burden of proving that a volunteer
was available.
The government pursued the matter of Party registration, winning
a second conviction for non-compliance with the SACB order.154 At
the same time, the government asserted, under the Act,5"" that the
officers and members of the CPUSA were required to register as
individuals, because the Party had been ordered to register but had
not done so. The SACB then ordered various individuals to register,
but the Supreme Court unanimously reversed, upholding their claims
of privilege against self-incrimination. 5 ' In light of that ruling, the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in 1967
again reversed the conviction of the Party for non-compliance with
150. Id. at 71-81.
151. See R. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 13, at 418.
152. 64 Stat. 993 (1950) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 786 (1982)), repealed by, Pub.
L. No. 90-237, 81 Stat. 766 (1968).
153. Communist Party of United States v. U.S., 331 F.2d 807 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
154. Communist Party of United States v. U.S., 384 F.2d 957, 958-59 (D.C. Cir.
1967).
155. 50 U.S.C. § 787 (1982), repealed by, Pub. L. No. 90-237, 81 Stat. 766
(1968).
156. Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 382 U.S. 70 (1965).
the SACB order."' 7
Thus, after seventeen years of litigation, the provisions of the Mc-
Carran Act requiring the registration of "Communist-action organi-
zations" or their officers and members turned out to be constitution-
ally incompatible with the preexisting "membership" clause of the
Smith Act. However, orders of the SACB, finding groups to be
"Communist-action" or "Communist-front organizations,". had been
made.15 Under the McCarran Act, certain consequences flowed
from that fact alone.
One was the denial of passports to members of groups identified
by the SACB as "Communist-action organizations." 159 In late 1961,
following the Supreme Court opinion in the SACB case, the Board
revoked the passports of Herbert Aptheker, editor of Political Af-
fairs, "the 'theoretical organ' of the Party in this country,"16 0 and
Elizabeth Gurley Flynn, the chairperson of the Party. Aptheker and
Flynn brought suit challenging this provision of the Act, and pre-
vailed before a divided Supreme Court.' 1 In the Court's eyes, the
essential flaw in the statutory scheme was its application of the pass-
port ban to all members of the Party, thus lumping together "know-
ing" and "unknowing," and "active" and "inactive," members. As
such, the restriction had not been adequately justified, and was thus
overbroad on its face. "The prohibition against travel," wrote Justice
Goldberg, "is supported only by a tenuous relationship between the
bare fact of organizational membership and the activity Congress
157. Communist Party of United States v. U.S., 384 F.2d 957 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
158. For descriptions of the government's experience in trying to compel "Commu-
nist-front" organizations to register under the 1950 Act, see T. EMERSON, supra note 9,
at 141-44; M. KoNvsrz, supra note 99, at 152-56; D. CAuTE, supra note 78, at 172-78;
see also W.E.B. DuBois Clubs v. Clark, 389 U.S. 309 (1967); American Committee for
the Protection of Foreign Born v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 331 F.2d 53 (D.C.
Cir. 1963), vacated!r, 380 U.S. 503 (1965); Veterans of Abraham Lincoln Brigade v.
Subversive Activities Control Bd., 331 F.2d 64 (D.C. Cir. 1963), vacated, 380 U.S. 513
(1965); Weinstock v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 331 F.2d 75 (D.C. Cir. 1963);
Jefferson School of Social Science v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 331 F.2d 76
(D.C. Cir. 1963); Nat'l Council of American-Soviet Friendship v. Subversive Activities
Control Bd., 322 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1963). The ultimate result, given dissolutions of
organizations and judicial reversals of SACB orders, was that no such organizations were
registered.
Only two registration proceedings were brought under the "communist-infiltrated" or-
ganization provision of the 1954 Act, and both of them were ultimately dismissed. T.
EMERSON, supra note 9, at 171; M. KoNrVrz, supra note 99, at 154-55. As one commen-
tator has reported: "Efforts to force registration of 'communist-front' organizations and'communist infiltrated' labor unions with the SACB all had collapsed by 1966 either
because the organizations involved had dissolved, the government dropped the proceed-
ings or federal courts found the government case either could not be sustained or had
grown 'stale' with time." R. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 13, at 418.
159. 50 U.S.C. § 785 (1982).
160. Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 515 (1964).
161. Id.
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sought to proscribe.
1 62
The "innocent membership" distinction that was the heart of the
Aptheker decision was not novel as a point of constitutional law. A
unanimous court had embraced it as early as 1952, in a decision
striking down a state loyalty oath because it facilitated the barring
of individuals from state employment simply on the basis of mem-
bership in subversive organizations, "innocent" or not.1 3 Aptheker,
however, was the Court's first ruling that the Constitution required
legislatures to distinguish between "innocent" and "active" member-
ship in the Communist Party itself. That distinction was central to
Justice Harlan's opinion upholding the Smith Act's "membership"
clause in the Scales case, but the Court was willing and able in that
case to treat the distinction as implicit in the statute.164 In the
Aptheker decision, significantly, the majority refused to do so.5
A similar fate befell the McCarran Act provision"66 barring mem-
bers of "Communist-action organizations" from employment in any
"defense facility. 1 6' 7 This time, in contrast to its Aptheker decision,
the Court based its ruling squarely on freedom of association, but
the infirmity of the statute was essentially the same as in Aptheker.
As Chief Justice Warren observed, it was irrelevant under the Act
"that an individual may be a passive or inactive member of a desig-
nated organization, that he may be unaware of the organization's
162. Id. at 514. Aptheker's theoretical basis is criticized in H. KALVEN, supra note
9, at 379-82. Oddly, Justice Goldberg premised the decision on the "right to travel,"
rather than on freedom of association, yet filled his opinion with references to freedom of
association - the more natural and persuasive basis for the ruling. For example, "Since
freedom of association is itself guaranteed in the First Amendment, restrictions imposed
upon the right to travel cannot be dismissed by asserting that the right to travel could be
fully exercised if the individual would first yield up his membership in a given associa-
tion." 378 U.S. at 507. See also the language at id. 514, 516-17. The petitioners had set
forth a First Amendment theory, as well as a "travel theory," in their complaint, but
Justice Goldberg chose to focus on the "right to travel." Justice Black, concurring id. at
518, was more inclined to rely directly on First Amendment freedoms, among others. But
see Justice Douglas, concurring id. at 519-20. Later Supreme Court decisions have not
suggested that there is a fundamental right of international, as opposed to interstate,
travel. Cf. California v. Aznavorian, 439 U.S. 170 (1978).
163. Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
164. 367 U.S. at 222.
165. 378 U.S. at 515-16. Justices Clark, Harlan, and White dissented, eschewing a
"facial" challenge to the statute and focusing on the fact that "we have no 'unknowing
members' before us." Id. at 525.
166. 50 U.S.C. § 784(a)(1)(D) (1982).
167. U.S. v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967). This case apparently represented the
only prosecution under this part of the statute. Id. at 265, n. 10. The decision is criticized
in Gunther, Reflections on Robel: It's Not What the Court Did But the Way That It Did
It, 20 STAN. L. REy. 1140 (1968).
unlawful aims, or that he may disagree with those unlawful aims."'" 8
Nor was the Act's prohibition limited to sensitive positions in defense
facilities. The government's suggested justifications for this broad
prohibition were easily swept aside by the majority, perhaps too eas-
ily. Interestingly, Justice Brennan, in his concurrence, showed con-
siderably more sympathy for those justifications. 69 As Robel illus-
trates, the "innocent membership" distinction had become a well-
established constitutional principle by the late 1960's,170 and one
that would apparently prove fatal to virtually any law' 7' that was
broadly addressed to mere "membership" in an allegedly subversive
organization.
Applying this principle, the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia dealt a further blow to the McCarran Act
by holding unconstitutional the part of the Act which provided for
public disclosure of an SACB order determining that an individual
was a member of a "Communist-action organization."' 2 The prob-
lem, in the words of Judge Bazelon, was that "disclosure attaches to
mere membership in a Communist-action organization, whether or
not the member whose affiliation is to be publicized has engaged in,
or has any intent to further, the illicit ends of the organization."17 3
In the course of so deciding, the judge made an accurate statement
that merits quoting: "It seems clear to us that mere membership in
the Communist Party is protected by the First Amendment." 74 The
Supreme Court's decision upholding the basic registration require-
ment in the SACB case, whatever its current status, was distin-
guished in that it addressed the Act as applied to organizations (and
their membership) collectively, rather than to individuals. Thus,
"[i]nnocent members were unavoidably caught up in a net designed
to disclose the guilty."'175 Here, on the other hand, "since innocent
168. 389 U.S. at 266.
169. Id. at 271. Justices White and Harlan dissented. Id. at 282-89.
170. See also Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); Elfbrandt v.
Russell, 384 U.S. 11 (1966).
171. However, possible exceptions to this "rule" do come to mind. First, the 1961
ruling in Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Board, rejecting a First
Amendment challenge to the requirement that all members' names be disclosed, may
survive decisions like Robel. See infra text accompanying notes 522-55. But see the
Boorda case, infra notes 173-76 and accompanying text, arguably casting some doubt on
that suggestion. Second, in the words of Prof. Kalven: "Perhaps 'the keeper of the arse-
nal' may still be disqualified for mere membership in the Communist Party." H.
KALVEN, supra note 9, at 376. Similarly, it has been suggested that it may be constitu-
tional to deny all Communist Party members access to classified materials, as Congress
did in the McCarran Act, 50 U.S.C. § 783(c) (1982). Note, Civil Disabilities and the
First Amendment, 78 YALE L.J. 842, 861 (1969) (authored by Duncan Kennedy).
172. 50 U.S.C. § 788 (1982).
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members may easily be separated from guilty ones, the public inter-
est in exposure of the guilty cannot be used to justify exposure of the
innocent."17 Public disclosure of membership was deemed to be a
substantial burden on associational rights, and accordingly the provi-
sion was invalid.
In 1968, Congress repealed the registration requirements of the
1950 Act,177 but left standing the power of the SACB to issue de-
claratory orders and the statutory disabilities flowing therefrom. In
1973, the SACB was deprived of funding, and faded from sight for
good. In 1974, the notorious Attorney-General's list was
abolished.78
3. Deportation and Denaturalization
Constitutional challenges regarding deportations of "subversive"
aliens met with no success at the Supreme Court level. The constitu-
tionality of the Smith Act provisions concerning deportation were
upheld in Harisiades v. Shaughnessy,'" with only Justices Douglas
and Black dissenting. Evidence that the deportees themselves, past
members of the CPUSA, had never advocated forcible overthrow re-
ceived little attention in Justice Jackson's majority opinion, and their
first amendment argument was quickly rejected.8 0 Concurrently, the
Court upheld the Attorney-General's holding in custody, without
bail, alien Communists arrested for deportation.""' Justice Reed, for
the majority, did not even discuss the first amendment, upholding
the challenged practice in a highly deferential fashion:
We have no doubt that the doctrines and practices of Communism clearly
enough teach the use of force to achieve political control to give constitu-
tional basis, according to any theory of reasonableness or arbitrariness, for
Congress to expel known alien Communists under its power to regulate the
exclusion, admission and expulsion of aliens. Congress had before it evi-
dence of resident aliens' leadership in Communist domestic activities suffi-
cient to furnish reasonable ground for action against alien resident
Communists.182
In dissent, Justice Black replied: "To put people in jail for fear of
their talk seems to me to be an abridgment of speech in fiat violation
176. Id. at 1149.
177. Pub. L. 90-237, 81 Stat. 765 (1968). See also R. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 13,
at 441; T. EMERSON, supra note 9, at 146-47.
178. R. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 13, at 394.
179. 342 U.S. 580 (1952).
180. Id. at 592.
181. Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1952).
182. Id. at 535-36.
of the First Amendment.' 183
Judicial deference to Congress in the immigration field was made
even more explicit two years later, in Justice Frankfurter's opinion
for the Court in Galvan v. Press,1 84 upholding the deportation, under
the McCarran Act, of an alien who briefly belonged to the CP in the
mid-1940's. Galvan's claim that he never shared the Party's alleged
commitment to forcible overthrow drew Justice Frankfurter's sympa-
thy, but not his vote. "[D]eportation without permitting the alien to
prove that he was unaware of the Communist Party's advocacy of
violence," he wrote, "strikes one with a sense of harsh incon-
gruity. ' 185 The due process clause thus might pose limits here, "were
we writing on a clean slate . . . .But the slate is not clean." The
Court had long deferred to Congress with respect to substantive poli-
cies pertaining to the entry and exclusion of aliens, and would con-
tinue to do so."86 Justices Black and Douglas protested.
Thus, in the realm of entry and exclusion of aliens, the "innocent
membership" distinction did not come into play.
187
183. Id. at 555.
184. 347 U.S. 522 (1954).
185. Id. at 530.
186. Id. at 530-31.
187. In an earlier concurring opinion, Justice Murphy strongly condemned the
1940 Act on this ground. Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 163 (1945). In the process of
interpreting these federal statutes, however, the Court frequently managed to rule in
favor of those the government sought to deport or denaturalize. See, e.g., Nowak v. U.S.,
356 U.S. 660 (1958); Maisenberg v. U.S., 356 U.S. 670 (1958); Rowoldt v. Perfetto, 355
U.S. 115 (1957); Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135 (1945); Schneiderman v. U.S., 320
U.S. 118 (1943). But see Polites v. U.S., 364 U.S. 426 (1960). On the deportation of
American Communists see also R. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 13, at 311, 330-32; P. STEIN-
BERG, supra note 8, at 89-95, 206; D. CAUTE, supra note 78, at 229-35. See also H.
KALVEN, supra note 9, at 403-48, on deportation, denaturalization, and exclusion of
aliens and the first amendment.
More recent evidence of the Supreme Court's disinclination to impose ordinary First
Amendment standards upon the ideological exclusion process was given by Kleindienst v.
Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972), in which the Court upheld the denial of a nonimmigrant
visa to a Belgian Marxist, who wished to attend an academic conference in the U.S., on
the ground, under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(28)(D) (1982), that he was an advocate of world
communism. Justice Blackmun stated for the majority: "We hold that when the Execu-
tive exercises this power negatively on the basis of a facially legitimate and bona fide
reason, the courts will neither look behind the exercise of that discretion, nor test it by
balancing its justification against. . .First Amendment interests. . . ." Id. at 770. Jus-
tices Douglas, Marshall, and Brennan dissented. See also Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S.
603 (1960). Cf. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 796 (1977).
More recently, some lower federal courts have shown a willingness to review such ex-
clusions more rigorously. E.g., Harvard Law School Forum v. Schultz, 633 F. Supp. 525
(D. Mass. 1986), vacated, 852 F.2d 563 (1st Cir. 1986); American-Arab Anti-Discrim.
Comm. v. Meese, 714 F. Supp. 1060 (C.D. Cal. 1989), narrowly construing the cases of
the 1950's so as to reject the assertion that aliens enjoy less protection under the first
amendment than do American citizens, and finding the ideological-exclusion provisions
overbroad. See generally Note, First Amendment Limitations on the Exclusion of
Aliens, 62 N.Y.U. L. REv. 149 (1987).
In the last few years, Congress has taken a series of steps suspending the applicability
of the ideological-exclusion provisions, with certain exceptions, first on a temporary basis,
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4. The Effects on the Party
At the time of the first Smith Act prosecution of CP leaders in the
summer of 1948, the Party claimed a membership of approximately
60,000,188 represented a significant force in the American labor
movement,8" and was notably involved in presidential politics as a
prominent source of support for the third-party candidacy of former
Vice-President Henry Wallace.190 By the mid-1950's, all of that had
changed. Communist-dominated unions were expelled from the Con-
gress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) in 1949 and 1950 (spurred
by the Taft-Hartley Act), 19 1 and by the mid-1950's the Communists
were reduced to marginal status in the labor movement. 192 The FBI
estimated Party membership at approximately 23,000 members in
1955,119 and by the summer of 1958 all that remained was "a nearly
dead Party of only 3,000 to 6,000 members.' 94
The reasons for the Party's dramatic decline are many, but one
close student of the Party's fortunes concluded that "the major rea-
son for that phenomenon was the Smith Act prosecutions."' 95 How-
ever, according to Professor Belknap, it was not the simple fear of
arrest and prosecution that drove members away from the Party in
the early 1950's, but rather the perception, created by the startling
emergence of undercover informants at the first trial, "that the Party
had been thoroughly infiltrated by the FBI.'"'9 The result was "an
Pub. L. 100-204, 101 Stat. 1399-1400 (1987), as extended by Pub. L. No. 100-461, §
555, 102 Stat. 2268-36 to -37 (1988), and ultimately repealing the "sunset" provisions of
the reforms. Pub. L. 101-246, § 128(b), 104 Stat. 30 (1990). See generally, Note, The
McCarran-Walter Act and Ideological Exclusion: A Call for Reform, 43 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 1141, 1145-47, 1164-66 (1989).
188. J. STAROBIN, supra note 109, at 113. This figure was already well below the
approximately 80,000 members of mid-1945. D. SHANNON, THE DECLINE OF AM. Com-
MUNISM: A HISTORY OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE U.S. SINCE 1945, at 3 (1959);
see also P. STEINBERG, supra note 8, at 82; D. CAUTE, supra note 76, at 185-86.
189. See I. HOWE & L. COSER, supra note 11, at 457-69; R. GOLDSTEIN, supra
note 13, at 364.
190. I. HOWE & L. COSER, supra note 11, at 469-78; D. SHANNON, supra note
188, at 113-82; J. STAROBIN, supra note 109, at 173-94.
191. R. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 13, at 364-65.
192. I. HOWE & COSER, supra note 11, at 468.
193. D. SHANNON, supra note 188, at 202; M. BELKNAP, supra note 8, at 190.
194. M. BELKNAP, supra note 8, at 205; see the comparable estimates in D. SHAN-
NON, supra note 188, at 360: "In a little over two years, there had been a membership
drop of over 85 per cent, the greatest decline in percentages . . . in the party's history."
The circulation of the Party's voice, the Daily Worker, had fallen by 50% between 1950
and 1953, id. at 218, and publication of that newspaper was suspended in January 1958.
P. STEINBERG, supra note 8, at 282.
195. M. BELKNAP, supra note 8, at 190.
196. Id. at 191.
internal witch hunt which at least equaled in intensity the worst ex-
cesses of McCarthyism.' 9 7 Many members were expelled, and many
dropped out. Moreover, the entire national leadership was at that
time, "either in prison, in hiding, or on trial,"119 and dissent began to
arise concerning the Party's basic policies and strategy.
The near-fatal blows were delivered from abroad, in 1956, in the
form of Khrushchev's speech denouncing the crimes of Stalin and,
later, the Soviet repression of the uprising in Hungary. The resulting
disillusionment, and bitter factional infighting, led to the decimation
of the Party's ranks that occurred between 1956 and 1958.1"9
For the past three decades, the continued existence of the CPUSA
has largely gone unnoticed in middle America, but it does still exist,
and its membership has climbed over that span of time to an esti-
mated 15,000 to 20,000 members.20 0
But for the Smith Act prosecutions of 1949-55, would the Party
have enjoyed greater prosperity and influence in America? We will
never know.
III. THE CASE LAw: A CLOSER LOOK
The American Communists, as we have seen, managed to finally
escape the clutches of the SACB. The Yates decision in 1957 so de-
moralized the government that, prematurely or not, it abandoned its
prosecutions of "advocacy" under the Smith Act. For whatever rea-
son, "active membership" prosecutions under the Smith Act were
never pursued to any great extent, despite the decision in Scales.
After some twenty years of criminal and civil litigation, however,
irreparable damage had been done to the CPUSA. Above all else,
these consequences flowed from the decision in Dennis. Had the
Court ruled therein that the defendants had a constitutional right to
advocate their views and to join together for the purposes of such
advocacy, the conclusion seems inescapable that they would have
suffered no further direct legal impediments as a result of pure
speech and association.201
197. Id.
198. P. STEINBERG, supra note 8, at 263. On the Party's "underground" structure
of the early 1950's, see M. BELKNAP, supra note 8, at 175, 193-95.
199. See generally M. BELKNAP, supra note 8, at 185-206; P. STEINBERG, supra
note 8, at 266-83; I. HowE & L. COSER, supra note 11, at 490-98.
200. 1988 Yearbook on International Communist Affairs 124-30 (R. Staar, ed.
1988). According to that source, party general secretary Gus Hall's "main report to the
Twenty-fourth National Convention [in 1988] called for a continuation of recent party
policies of working around and in the left wing of the liberal and labor movement. ...
He called for a 'united working-class front, all-people's unity-and most important, unity
in action to defeat Reaganism." Id. at 127.
201. Registration requirements, however, may still have been upheld. See supra
note 172.
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Moreover, Dennis was also highly significant-and may remain so
today-for its reinterpretation of the "clear and present danger" test
for the constitutionality of punishing advocacy of unlawful action.
Therefore, this decision requires the closest scrutiny, as does its
progeny.
To fully understand these judicial rulings, however, it is necessary
to understand the doctrinal background from which they emerged.
A. The Law of Free Speech Prior to Dennis
The remarkable characteristic of first amendment law prior to the
Dennis decision, from today's standpoint, was its relative lack of de-
velopment. The first amendment was not applied to the states prior
to 1925,202 and even with respect to the federal government, it was
given little significant attention or content prior to World War I.20
It is generally thought that the "modern" law of freedom of speech
emerged from Justice Holmes' articulation of the "clear and present
danger" test in the Schenck case of 1919.2o4 The test sounded
speech-protective, but was not applied in an adequately protective
way either in the case in which it was announced or in any other
cases of the World War I era in which it was presumably the gov-
erning rule. 05 The Gitlow case of 1925,20 reminiscent of Dennis in
that it upheld a state conviction for advocacy of forcible overthrow
of the government, was notable for its explicit refusal to apply the
clear and present danger test, and for distinguishing the Schenck
line of cases on the ground that they had involved prosecutions under
statutes directed towards conduct (which might include speech),
whereas the New York law in Gitlow explicitly targeted certain
speech as dangerous and illegal.20 7 Gitlow provided the doctrinal un-
derpinning for the repressive ruling against a Communist organizer
in Whitney v. California°8 in 1927.
Even as late as 1937, "clear and present danger" had not provided
202. Cf. Gitlow v. N.Y., 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) with Patterson v. Colorado, 205
U.S. 454, 462 (1907).
203. See generally Rabban, The First Amendment in Its Forgotten Years, 90
YALE L.J. 514 (1981); Hunter, Problems in Search of Principles: The First Amendment
in the Supreme Court from 1791-1930, 35 EMORY L.J. 59 (1986).
204. Schenck v. U.S., 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
205. Frohwerk v. U.S., 249 U.S. 204 (1919); Debs v. U.S., 249 U.S. 211 (1919);
Abrams v. U.S., 250 U.S. 616 (1919); Pierce v. U.S., 252 U.S. 239 (1920); Schaefer v.
U.S., 251 U.S. 466 (1920).
206. Gitlow v. N.Y., 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
207. Id. at 670-71.
208. 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
the rationale for a single holding of the United States Supreme
Court in favor of a first amendment challenge to legislation. The
principle was infused with content, however, by the famous opinions
of Holmes and Brandeis, markedly at odds with the views of their
brethren, in Abrams, 209 Gitlow, 210 and Whitney.211 The test was not
needed by the court majorities that gave the first Supreme Court
victories to radical speakers in the 1930's,212 but in the early part of
the ensuing decade, it emerged as the test for the constitutionality of
legal measures burdening freedom of speech.213
Primary among such cases of the 1940's were three decisions up-
holding first amendment challenges to contempt convictions of per-
sons who published criticisms of judges in connection with pending
litigation.214 The language used by Justice Douglas, for the majority
in the most recent of those cases, is indicative: "The fires which [the
language] kindles must constitute an imminent, not merely a likely,
threat to the administration of justice. The danger must not be re-
mote or even probable; it must immediately imperil. 2 5 Another
"clear and present danger" case, decided in 1945, struck down a
state law requiring labor organizers to register as a condition to their
organizing activities.216 Any attempt to restrict first amendment lib-
erties, Justice Rutledge said, "must be justified by clear public inter-
est, threatened not doubtfully or remotely, but by clear and present
danger."211 At least in verbal formulations, the emphasis upon immi-
nence of danger, and thus the link to the Holmes-Brandeis rationale,
was apparent. 1
209. 250 U.S. at 624 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
210. 268 U.S. at 672-73 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
211. 274 U.S. at 372 (Brandeis, J., concurring). See generally Rabban, The Emer-
gence of Modern First Amendment Doctrine, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 1205, 1305-11, 1336-38
(1983); K. GREENAWALT, SPEECH, CRIME, AND THE UsEs OF LANGUAGE 188-96 (1989).
212. See, Stromberg, 283 U.S. 359, DeJonge, 299 U.S. 353, and Herndon, 301
U.S. 242; see also supra text accompanying notes 49-64.
213. "Although no case subsequent to Whitney and Gitlow has expressly overruled
the majority opinions in those cases, there is little doubt that subsequent opinions have
inclined toward the Holmes-Brandeis rationale." Dennis v. U.S., 341 U.S. 494, 507
(1951) (Vinson, C. J.).
214. Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947); Pennekamp v. Fla., 328 U.S. 331
(1946); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
215. Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. at 376.
216. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945).
217. Id. at 530.
218. See also Dennis v. U.S., 341 U.S. 494, 556-61 (Appendix to Opinion of Jus-
tice Frankfurter), setting forth additional quotations of "clear and present danger" lan-
guage from cases of the 1940's); Hartzel v. U.S., 322 U.S. 680, 687 (1944). On the
application of the clear and present danger test in the 1940's, see also H. KALVEN, supra
note 9, at 179-83. More than one commentator has observed that only four Supreme
Court Justices of that era appear to have been truly committed to that test: Black, Doug-
las, Murphy, and Rutledge. Id. at 181; Mendelson, Clear and Present Danger - From
Schenck to Dennis, 52 COLUM. L. REV. 313, 322-23 (1952). Twelve of the 154 opinions
(in 13 cases) written between 1943 and 1949 which used the language of that test were
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In addition, the Court ruled in favor of some unpopular speakers
on first amendment grounds during the 1940's. One such instance
was Taylor v. Mississippi,219 in which the speakers had been con-
victed of intentionally distributing literature calculated to encourage
disloyalty to the government of the United States or of the State of
Mississippi, "by speech . . . [which] reasonably tends to create an
attitude of stubborn refusal to salute, honor or respect the flag or
government of the United States or of the State of Mississippi. 220
One of the speeches basically criticized American involvement in
World War II; the other asserted "that the salute of the national
flag amounted to a contemptible form of primitive idol worship." ''
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed the convictions. Justice
Roberts observed that not only was there the absence of any clear
and present danger, but also the absence of proof that the speakers
had advocated subversive action.222 Another such instance was Ter-
miniello v. Chicago,223 in which an inflammatory right-wing speaker
spoke to a large and restive audience while an "angry and turbulent"
crowd protested outside the hall. The speaker was convicted of disor-
derly conduct, but the Supreme Court reversed, with four Justices
dissenting. For the majority, Justice Douglas found unconstitutional
the trial judge's instruction to the jury that the speaker's misbehav-
ior was criminal "if it stirs the public to anger, invites dispute, brings
written by those four Justices. Id. Moreover, all of those opinions supported First
Amendment claims, leading one commentator to call it a "one-way ticket. When First
Amendment arguments were rejected, other linguistic formulae were used." Id. at 324.
219. 319 U.S. 583 (1943).
220. Id. at 584-85.
221. Id. at 587.
222. Id. at 589. See also Hartzel v. U.S., 322 U.S. 680 (1944), reversing a convic-
tion under the federal Espionage Act, making it a crime to willfully attempt to cause
insubordination and disloyalty in the Armed Forces or to obstruct enlistment. Petitioner
had mailed, to numerous recipients in and out of the Armed Forces, articles harshly
critical of American involvement in World War II (including "scurrilous and vitriolic
attacks" on the English, the Jews, and FDR). The Court held that there was insufficient
evidence of Hartzel's intent to cause insubordination or obstruct enlistment. What is sur-
prising is that the four dissenting Justices - Reed, Frankfurter, Jackson, and Douglas
- not only disagreed with the majority on the question of the sufficiency of the evidence,
but had little difficulty in finding that a conviction for engaging in such speech would be
constitutional. Making quick work of the constitutional inquiry, Justice Reed said: "It is
only when the requisite intent to produce [insubordination or disloyalty in the military] is
present that criticism may cross over the line of prohibited conduct. The constitutional
power of Congress so to protect the national interest is beyond question." Id. at 690
(citing Schenck v. U.S.). (What happened to the requirement of clear and present dan-
ger?) For the majority, Justice Murphy stated that a clear and present danger must be
shown, but he saw no need to pursue that inquiry in this case.
223. 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
about a condition of unrest, or creates a disturbance ... "224 In
effect, the instruction was overbroad.
But it is noteworthy that three of the dissenting Jus-
tices-Jackson, Burton, and Frankfurter-were ready to uphold the
constitutionality of the conviction. Looking at the excerpts of Termi-
niello's speech set forth by Justice Jackson,225 it seems fair to say
that Terminiello advocated no action, but simply spoke of the mob
outside in strongly critical and provocative terms, in an atmosphere
that was apparently enormously tense. Projectiles were hurled into
the hall by the people outside and some of them were arrested. Ter-
miniello's speech, it was said, "stirred the audience . . . to expres-
sions of immediate anger, unrest and alarm. '226 Reacting to these
facts, Justice Jackson restated the clear and present danger test and
concluded: "In this case the evidence proves beyond dispute that
danger of rioting and violence in response to the speech was clear,
present and immediate. ' 227 Other Justices may have agreed. Argua-
bly, the position of these three Justices was not sufficiently protective
of the rights of the speaker, who did not advocate violence but was,
more accurately, a victim of it.
228
Nor was the Court terribly sensitive to the right of a speaker to
criticize public officials in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,229 the case
that gave rise to the well-known "fighting words" exception to pro-
tected speech. Chaplinsky's punishable utterances, made to "the City
Marshal," were: "You are a God damned racketeer [and] a damned
Fascist." According to a unanimous Court in 1942, with no less a
liberal than Justice Murphy speaking, "Argument is unnecessary to
demonstrate that the appellations 'damned racketeer' and 'damned
Fascist' are epithets likely to provoke the average person to retalia-
tion," and thus were not protected.23 0 Was the Court, in effect,
utilizing a species of "clear and present danger" analysis? Was its
application of its governing principle persuasive or appropriate?
224. Id. at 3.
225. Id. at 17-22 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
226. Id. at 22. As described by the Illinois Supreme Court, "the explosive situation
thus created by defendant resulted in innumerable acts of violence extending over a pe-
riod of several hours." City of Chicago v. Terminiello, 400 Il1. 23, 79 N.E.2d 39, 44
(1948).
227. Id. at 26. Justice Jackson recognized that Terminiello had not directly incited
violence, but apparently thought that irrelevant: "Rarely will a speaker directly urge a
crowd to lay hands on a victim or class of victims. An effective and safer way is to incite
mob action while pretending to deplore it .... " Id. at 35.
228. See also the Court's decision, just prior to Dennis, in Feiner v. New York,
340 U.S. 315 (1951), shamefully upholding the disorderly conduct conviction of a
speaker who refused two requests to stop speaking made by policemen because some in
his audience were beginning to become restless and hostile. Only Justices Black, Douglas,
and Minton dissented.
229. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
230. Id. at 574.
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The Chaplinsky decision is best-known for its articulation of a ra-
tionale for excluding some "pure" speech from first amendment pro-
tection altogether. Certain kinds of "utterances," said Justice
Murphy-including
[T]he lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or
'fighting' words-. . . are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and
are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may
be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order
and morality.
31
Notably, the list did not include, as one of its explicitly identified
items, - "advocacy of forcible overthrow of the government", nor did
the Court ever explicitly add such advocacy to the list of exceptions
to first amendment protection.
Of course, additional first amendment doctrine had emerged as of
1950: the virtual per se rule against granting "unbridled discretion"
to officials to license speakers was established early on;23 2 a different
approach to the incidental regulation of speech via "time, place, and
manner" regulations was in the early stages of formulation;s33 and
an entire body of cases dealing with labor picketing-viewed by all
of the Justices as expressive but involving "more than free
speech"-had been born and reached maturity within the decade of
the 1940s.2"4
But much of the basic framework of contemporary first amend-
ment analysis had yet to be constructed. Nothing had yet been heard
of "content-based regulation; ' 23 5 nor had the general rule yet been
formulated that a content-based regulation could survive constitu-
tional challenge only if the law were narrowly tailored to achieve a
compelling or "substantial" state interest.238 Those maxims came
later.
Nor was the concept of "freedom of association" a familiar one to
231. 315 U.S. at 572. The Court did not return, comprehensively, to the constitu-
tionality of laws pertaining to obscenity until 1957, in Roth v. U.S., 354 U.S. 476
(1957), or to libel until 1964, in New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
232. Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
233. See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 85-86 (1949); Cox v. New Hamsphire,
312 U.S. 569, 575-76 (1941).
234. Giboney v. Empire Storage Co., 336 U.S. 490, 503 (1949); see Thornhill v.
Ala., 310 U.S. 88 (1940); See generally Note, Peaceful Labor Picketing and the First
Amendment, 82 COLum. L. REV. 1469 (1982).
235. See Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972); but see Niemotko
v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 272 (1951).
236. Mosley, 408 U.S. at 99; Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Comm'n.,
447 U.S. 530, 540 (1980); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461-62 (1980); see also Boos
v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988).
readers of Supreme Court decisions in the year 1951. The Court rec-
ognized "freedom of assembly" in 1937 in DeJonge v. Oregon2 " in
connection with political gatherings, but the "right . . . peaceably to
assemble" is explicitly set forth in the first amendment. As of 1951,
nothing had yet been said of a separate, while correlative, right of
like-minded persons to unite physicially and spiritually for purposes
of political activity. Although the concept first received judicial men-
tion in an occasional concurring opinion, 38 it did not truly emerge
until 1958, in the case of NAACP v. Alabama.3 9 Case law quickly
made it clear that "significant encroachments" upon freedom of as-
sociation could be justified only by compelling governmental
interests.240
Another striking difference between the well-established law of
freedom of speech of today, and that of four decades earlier, is the
previous absence of a fully considered and relatively consistent judi-
cial intolerance of facially overbroad statutes affecting speech. While
the Supreme Court, relatively early on, employed the technique of
invalidating a statute because it swept too much protected speech
within its net,241 the practice was by no means commonplace.
In 1951, the "clear and present danger" test, typically applied to
the facts of individual cases, was dominant in the law of freedom of
speech. It had yet to be utilized, however, to save from punishment a
political activist engaging in advocacy of unlawful conduct.2 42
B. The Supreme Court and Communism Prior to Dennis
As we have seen, Communists fared poorly before the Supreme
Court in the 1920's (recall Gitlow and Whitney), but fared well
there in the 1930's (Herndon and DeJonge). As noted, however, the
1937 cases were in fact quite weak from the prosecution's
237. 299 U.S. 353, 364 (1937).
238. See, e.g., Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 195 (1952) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring); American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 417 (1950)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring). See also the unadorned statement, in Whitney v. Califor-
nia, 274 U.S. 357, 371-72 (1927), that the petitioner had suffered no deprivation of "any
right of free speech, . . . assembly or association ..
239. 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958).
240. Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960); Gibson v. Florida Legis. Inv.
Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 546 (1963); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 439 (1963).
241. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97-98 (1940); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S.
444, 451 (1938); Stromberg v. Calif., 283 U.S. 359, 369-70 (1931). Cf. Gooding v. Wil-
son, 405 U.S. 518, 520-22 (1972); Bd. of Airport Comm'rs v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482
U.S. 569, 574 (1987).
242. "Clear and present danger, although indisputably the test according to the
Vinson Court, was the test only for speech that did not matter, the luxury civil liberty."
H. KALVEN, supra note 9, at 197. Another commentator has persuasively suggested that
the test was not even necessary to the decision of those cases of the 1940's in which it
was employed. McKay, The Preference for Freedom, 34 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1182, 1208
(1959).
36
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standpoint.
In 1943, ar extraordinary debate by the Justices on the nature of
the Communist Party took place in a long forgotten, non-constitu-
tional decision concerning the denaturalization of a foreign-born
Russian Communist. 43 William Schneiderman was secretary of the
Communist Party in California at the time of the decision, and later
became one of the criminal defendants in the Yates case. 44 He be-
came a naturalized American citizen in 1927, while a member of the
Communist Party. In doing so, he took an oath to support the Con-
stitution of the United States. Under the pre-1940 law applicable in
1927, mere Communist belief or affiliation was not enough to deny
naturalization. 45 Thus, in 1939, when the government later moved
to strip Schneiderman of his United States citizenship, the question
posed was whether Schneiderman was, at the time of his naturaliza-
tion, "attached to the principles of the Constitution of the United
States .... ,,246 In other words, could a card-carrying Communist
be a good American citizen? The answer given by Justice Murphy,
for a five-member majority of the Court (which included Justices
Black and Douglas), was "yes."
In his trial testimony, Schneiderman denied that he or the Com-
munist Party advocated the forcible overthrow of the United States
government.247 As to Schneiderman personally, there was no evi-
dence to th contrary:
248
He stated that he believed in retention of personal property for personal use
but advocated social ownership of the means of production and exchange,
with compensation to the owners. He believed and hoped that socialization
could be achieved here by democratic processes but history showed that the
ruling minority has always used force against the majority before surren-
dering power. By dictatorship of the proletariat petitioner meant that the"majority of the people shall really direct their own destinies. .... M49
None of this, observed Justice Murphy, was "necessarily incompati-
ble with the 'general political philosophy' of the Constitution." 50
But rather than simply focus on Schneiderman's testimony con-
cerning his own beliefs, the Court considered the tenets of the
CPUSA itself in response to the Government's argument that be-
243. Schneiderman v. U.S., 320 U.S. 118 (1943).
244. 354 U.S. 298 (1957).
245. 320 U.S. at 132.
246. 34 Stat. 598 (1906).
247. 320 U.S. at 127.
248. Id. at 146.
249. Id. at 127-28.
250. Id. at 141.
cause Schneiderman belonged to an organization which advocated
forcible overthrow, Schneiderman must also have held those be-
liefs. 251 The majority was unpersuaded.
Regarding the Marxist concept of "the dictatorship of the proleta-
riat," Justice Murphy observed:
Theoretically it is control by a class, not a dictatorship in the sense of abso-
lute and total rule by one individual. So far as the record before us indi-
cates, the concept is a fluid one, capable of adjustment to different condi-
tions in different countries .... It does not appear that it would
necessarily mean the end of representative government or the federal
system.252
Although the Party had advocated radical restructuring of the fed-
eral government,253 Justice Murphy believed that "it is possible to
advocate such changes and still be attached to the Constitution
"254
But had the Party advocated forcible overthrow in 1927? "For
some time," wrote Justice Murphy, this question "has perplexed
courts, administrators, legislators, and students. 29 5 The Supreme
Court, he added, did not need to decide the question. A reasonable
person could have so found, he said, but the government's burden
was higher; it had to establish Schneiderman's lack of attachment to
the United States Constitution by "clear, unequivocal and convinc-
ing" evidence. 256 That burden had not been carried.
In the first place, Justice Murphy astutely observed, "there is, un-
fortunately, no absolutely accurate test of what a political party's
principles are. Political writings are often over-exaggerated polemics
bearing the imprint of the period and the place in which written.
'25 7
In this case, the government relied on the "classics" of Marxism-
Leninism, 258 but the majority found the evidence of unlawful advo-
cacy in these writings to be "sharply conflicting". 59 Reviewing these
works by Marx, Lenin, Stalin, and others, Justice Murphy
concluded:
A tenable conclusion from the foregoing is that the Party in 1927 desired to
achieve its purpose by peaceful and democratic means, and as a theoretical
matter justified the use of force and violence only as a method of preventing
an attempted forcible counter-overthrow once the Party had obtained con-
251. Id. at 146.
252. 320 U.S. at 142.
253. Id. at 143.
254. Id. at 144.
255. Id. at 147. Justice Murphy noted, at that point, that lower federal courts,
addressing that question in deportation proceedings, had reached different conclusions,
with some of them seeming to have taken judicial notice "that force and violence is a
Party principle"! Id. at 147-48.
256. Id. at 154.
257. 320 U.S. at 154.
258. Id. at 149-52.
259. Id. at 155.
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trol in a peaceful manner, or as a method of last resort to enforce the ma-
jority will if at some indefinite future time . . peaceful channels were no
longer open.
28
He continued, in language that contrasts remarkably with the language
of Chief Justice Vinson's plurality opinion in Dennis, eight years later:
There is a material difference between agitation and exhortation calling for
present violent action which creates a clear and present danger of public
disorder or other substantive evil, and mere doctrinal justification or pre-
diction of the use of force under hypothetical conditions at some indefinite
future time-prediction that is not calculated or intended to be presently
acted upon, thus leaving opportunity for general discussion and the calm
processes of thought and reason.
281
Because of this difference, he concluded, the majority was prepared
to assume that Congress did not intend to denaturalize persons
whose advocacy or beliefs fell into the latter category.
In dissent, Chief Justice Stone, joined by Justices Roberts and
Frankfurter, undertook the unusual judicial task of sifting through
the literature of the CP. Unlike Justice Murphy, Chief Justice Stone
had no trouble concluding that, at least up until 1927, the CPUSA
was dedicated to the goal of forcible overthrow of the government
and the imposition of an undemocratic form of government. 2  Per-
haps because the subject was citizenship, the dissenters perceived no
constitutional issue lurking in their application of federal law. The
question presented by this case, wrote the Chief Justice, is not one
"of freedom of thought, of speech or of opinion, or of present immi-
nent danger to the United States from our acceptance as citizens of
those who are not attached to the principles of our form of
260. Id. at 157.
261. Id. at 157-58 (citing Whitney, 274 U.S. 357 (Brandeis, J.)) (emphasis
added). Justice Murphy reiterated his demanding view of the clear and present danger
test in a strong concurring opinion, two years later, in Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135
(1945), involving the attempted deportation of famed labor leader Harry Bridges. The
majority ruled for Bridges on statutory grounds. Justice Murphy argued, inter alia, that
the applicable deportation statute, which allowed deportation based solely on the alien's
membership in an organization which advocated forcible overthrow, was unconstitutional
under the clear and present danger test. "It is clear," he wrote,
that if an organization advocated and was capable of causing immediate and
serious violence in order to overthrow the Government and if an alien member
ii. .personally joined in such advocacy a clear and present danger to the pub-
lic welfare would be demonstrated and the Government would then have the
power to deport or otherwise punish the alien. But the statute in issue ... is
apparently satisfied if an organization ... advocated as a theoretical doctrine
the use of force under hypothetical conditions at some indefinite future time.
Id. at 164 (emphasis added).
To subject a deportation statute to such a rigorous standard of review was virtually
unheard of. See supra text accompanying notes 179-87.
262. 320 U.S. at 182-97.
government. 263
Six years later, in American Communications Association v.
Douds,264 a majority of the Justices gave further evidence of their
views concerning the first amendment rights of Communists. The
case involved a challenge to the constitutionality of section 9(h) of
the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), which imposed various
disabilities upon a labor union unless each officer of such union filed
an affidavit stating "that he is not a member of the Communist
Party or affiliated with such party, and that he does not believe in,
and is not a member of or supports [sic] any organization that be-
lieves in or teaches" the forcible overthrow of the United States Gov-
ernment.26 5 Justices Douglas, Clark, and Minton took no part in the
decision. Five of the remaining six Justices found the affidavit re-
quirement constitutional to the extent that it addressed membership
in the CP. Two Justices were troubled only by the open-ended
clauses of the required affidavit, which spoke to "belie[f] in" and
"support" of forcible overthrow. 6 8 Only Justice Black would have
found the entire provision unconstitutional.
Chief Justice Vinson wrote for what was, in effect, a majority of
the Court with respect to the CP membership clause. He began by
reviewing the ostensible purpose of the 1947 legislation, elimination
of the "political strike." He observed that Congress had before it a
great deal of evidence tending to show that Communists and others
had "infiltrated" unions and had initiated "obstructive strikes" in
the service of their revolutionary goals.261 There was no doubt, he
stated that Congress could, under its power to regulate interstate
commerce, attempt to eliminate such burdens on commerce. 26 The
remedy provided by section 9(h), he continued,
[B]ears reasonable relation to the evil which the statute was designed to
reach. Congress could rationally find that the Communist Party is not like
other political parties in its utilization of positions of union leadership...
263. Id. at 171. Writing in 1951, one writer, critical of Schneiderman, complained
that the decision ended denaturalization efforts aimed at Communists. Wiener, "Free-
dom for the Thought That We Hate": Is It a Principle of the Constitution?, 37 A.B.A. J.
177, 178 (1951). The case is also examined, from a very different perspective, in S. LEV-
INSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 126-48 (1988).
264. 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
265. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
266. 339 U.S. at 419 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); id. at 435, n.8 (Jackson, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). One month later, the Court considered exactly
the same legal issues, in a brief per curiam opinion, in Osman v. Douds, 339 U.S. 846
(1950), this time with Justices Douglas and Minton participating. Justice Minton fully
joined in the views expressed by Chief Justice Vinson in the earlier opinion. Justice
Douglas joined the earlier dissenters insofar as they would have stricken the "belief"
section of the oath, and expressed no opinion with regard to the part of the oath pertain-
ing to Communist Party membership.
267. 339 U.S. at 388-89.
268. Id. at 390.
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and that many persons who believe in overthrow of the Government by
force and violence are also likely to resort to such tactics .... 269
The Chief Justice recognized, however, that such findings could not
be the end of the analysis, because, by addressing the problem of
"political strikes through section 9(h), "Congress has undeniably dis-
couraged the lawful exercise of political freedoms as well ....
Communists, we may assume, carry on legitimate political activi-
ties. 12 70 Although the case predated the Court's explicit recognition
of freedom of association, Chief Justice Vinson perceived that the
law had the effect "of discouraging the exercise of political rights
protected by the First Amendment,"' 271 because it would act as a
deterrent to Party membership. Thus, a first amendment analysis
was required.
But precisely what analysis was called for? The challengers in-
sisted that the clear and present danger test was the standard to be
applied. But Chief Justice Vinson rejected that approach, finding it
inapplicable to this case and in the process, expounded on the limits
of that test in a manner that foreshadowed his opinion in Dennis. He
began by decrying the use of clear and present danger "as a mechan-
ical test in every case touching First Amendment freedoms, without
regard to the context of its application. . . . It is the considerations
that gave birth to the phrase, 'clear and present danger,' not the
phrase itself, that are vital" in the Court's first amendment deci-
sions. 2  Moreover, first amendment freedoms "themselves are de-
pendent upon the power of constitutional government to survive. If it
is to survive it must have power to protect itself against unlawful
conduct and, under some circumstances, against incitement to com-
mit unlawful acts. 273
But that language was dictum, because, as Chief Justice Vinson
saw it, this was not a case involving the suppression of advocacy be-
cause of its likely effects. Rather, he pointed out that section 9(h)
[R]egulates harmful conduct which Congress has determined is carried on
by persons who may be identified by their political affiliations and beliefs
. . . Section 9(h) is designed to protect the public not against what Com-
munists and others identified therein advocate or believe, but against what
269. Id. at 390-91.
270. Id. at 393.
271. Id. Justice Frankfurter, however, spoke in his concurring opinion of "the right
of association for political purposes." Id. at 417.
272. 339 U.S. at 394.
273. Id. But Vinson appeared, later in the opinion, to endorse the use of the clear
and present danger test when evaluating direct restraints on advocacy. Id. at 412.
Congress has concluded they have done and are likely to do again.2 7'
This observation, coupled with the Chief Justice's ability to charac-
terize the effect of the law as "an indirect, conditional, partial
abridgment of speech," 275 led Chief Justice Vinson to eschew the
clear and present danger test in favor of a straight-out balancing
approach. 6
In performing that balancing, Chief Justice Vinson announced a
willingness to defer to Congress, with respect to the importance of
the government interest underlying the statute, that is seldom seen in
first amendment cases today. "[I]nsofar as the problem is one of
drawing inferences concerning the need for regulation of particular
forms of conduct from conflicting evidence," he stated, "this Court is
in no position to substitute its judgment as to the necessity or desira-
bility of the statute for that of Congress. 11  Accordingly, the gov-
ernment's alleged need for section 9(h) was generally accepted at
face value. The Chief Justice was also moved by the argument that,
under the NLRA, Congress had conferred great power upon those
labor unions which became collective bargaining representatives
under the Act, and, accordingly, "the public interest in the good
faith exercise of that power is very great. ' 18
Turning to the effects of the statute upon "the rights of speech
and assembly," Chief Justice Vinson emphasized the fact that no
criminal sanction or direct suppression of speech was involved
here.2 79 Furthermore, "only a relative handful of persons" were af-
fected by what was, in effect, no more than a limitation on eligibility
to hold union office.280 The balance thus tipped in favor of the
government.
Concurring in this part of the Court's ruling, Justice Jackson pro-
duced an absolutely extraordinary opinion in which he set forth at
length, largely sans footnotes and apparently based upon "informa-
tion before [Congressional] committees and . . . facts of general
knowledge," 21" a series of conclusions about the Communist Party
274. Id. at 396 (emphasis added).
275. Id. at 399.
276. Id. at 399-400. Also, "When the effect of a statute or ordinance upon the
expression of First Amendment freedoms is relatively small and the public interest to be
protected is substantial, it is obvious that a rigid test requiring a showing of imminent
danger to the security of the Nation is an absurdity." Id. at 397.
277. 339 U.S. at 400-01. Not surprisingly, Justice Frankfurter, concurring, echoed
this deferential attitude. Id. at 418-19.
278. Id. at 402.
279. Id. at 402-04. See also id. at 408-09.
280. Id. at 404. See also id. at 412.
281. Id. at 424. In an equally extraordinary footnote, Jackson stated that it was
unnecessary to review the evidentiary support for his opinion, admitting that "[m]ost of
this information would be of doubtful admissibility or credibility in a judicial proceed-
ing." He did, however, provide a reading list. Id. at n.2.
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which, in his view, Congress was entitled to draw. Admitting that he
would otherwise be troubled by a legislative singling out of a particu-
lar political party, he found a "rational basis" (which apparently was
all he thought necessary to sustain the law) "upon which Congress
reasonably could have concluded that the Communist Party is some-
thing different in fact from any other substantial party we have
known, and hence may constitutionally be treated as something dif-
ferent in law."282
The conclusions which Justice Jackson believed Congress was enti-
tled to reach were as follows:
28 3
1. The goal of the Communist Party is to seize powers of government by
and for a minority rather than to acquire power through the vote of a free
electorate.
2. The Communist Party alone among American parties past or present is
dominated and controlled by a foreign government.
3. Violent and undemocratic means are the calculated and indispensable
methods to attain the Communist Party's goal.
284
4. The Communist Party has sought to gain [a] leverage and hold on the
American population by acquiring control of the labor movement.
5. Every member of the Communist Party is an agent to execute the Com-
munist program."'
Apparently governed by these insights, and echoing Chief Justice
Vinson's observations concerning the limited impact of the law,28e
Justice Jackson had no trouble reaching the same result. Indeed, it
seems fair to say that he showed almost no awareness in this part of
his opinion, that first amendment interests were at stake.287
Justice Black, alone in dissent, worried that the Court's rationale
could not logically be limited to the Communist Party,2 8 or to limi-
tations on holding union office.28 9 With apparent accuracy, he ob-
282. 339 U.S. at 423.
283. Id. at 425-31 (emphasis in original).
284. To this he added: "It would be incredible naivete to expect the American
branch of this movement to forego the only methods by which a Communist Party has
anywhere come into power." Id. at 429.
285. Id. at 431. To this he added: "Inferences from membership in such an organi-
zation are justifiably different from those to be drawn from membership in the usual type
of political party. Individuals who assume such obligations are chargeable, on ordinary
conspiracy principles, with responsibility for and participation in all that makes up the
Party's programs." Jd. at 432.
286. Id. at 434.
287. Justice Jackson arguably did have first amendment concerns in mind in dis-
senting, in part III of his opinion, with respect to the law's "belief" clause, on the ground
that it violated "the principle of free thought." Id. at 435, 439.
288. Id. at 450.
289. "[I]ts reasoning would apply just as forcibly to statutes barring Communists
...from election to political office, mere membership in unions, and in fact from getting
or holding any jobs. . . ." 339 U.S. at 449.
served: "Never before has this Court held that the Government
could for any reason attaint persons for their political beliefs or affil-
iations. ' 290 The essence of his loosely structured dissent appears to
be his insistence upon "the basic constitutional precept that penalties
should be imposed only for a person's own conduct, not for his be-
liefs or for the conduct of others with whom he may associate. Guilt
should not be imputed solely from association or affiliation ....
Looking at the Douds case from the vantage point of subsequent
constitutional development, there are several reasons to view the re-
sult with suspicion. First, because the concept of freedom of associa-
tion had not yet crystallized, the first amendment interests at stake
were probably undervalued. Second, each of the participating Jus-
tices other than Justice Black brought into the analysis an attitude
of deference that is distinctly outmoded in first amendment thinking
today; a modern court would, presumably require and carefully scru-
tinize some evidentiary showing in support of the government's fac-
tual conclusions about Communist labor leaders. But what is most
striking about Douds, in light of later decisions such as Aptheker
and Robel, is its total insensitivity to the distinctions that became
well-established some twenty years later between "active" and "inac-
tive" members of the Communist Party.292
290. Id.
291. Id. at 452. Eleven years later, in a case giving an expansive and questionable
meaning to the terms "membership" and "affiliation" in section 9(h), Justice Black, dis-
senting, reiterated his belief that section 9(h) was unconstitutional, and called for the
overruling of Douds. Killian v. U.S., 368 U.S. 231, 260 (1961). Justice Douglas, indicat-
ing that he did not participate in Douds because he was not present at oral argument,
stated that he saw "no constitutional answer to the opinions of Mr. Justice Black in that
case and in the present one that Congress has no power to exact from people affirmations
or affidavits of belief. .. ." Id. Justice Brennan dissented separately in Killian, finding
the Court's "subjective" definition of "membership" to be at odds with Douds, and urg-
ing, in light of that departure, a fresh examination of the constitutionality of section
9(h). Id. at 267-76.
292. See supra text accompanying notes 161-76. The distinction had not yet taken
hold in 1961, as Killian, 368 U.S. 231, demonstrated. The dissent of Justice Douglas
therein, 368 U.S. at 261, joined by Justices Black and Warren, was based on the argu-
ment that section 9(h) must be interpreted to apply only to active members. Justice
Douglas expressed the view, in Killian, that the Douds decision did reflect that distinc-
tion. Id. at 263-64. However, that assertion seems clearly incorrect.
In 1959, Congress repealed section 9(h) (73 Stat. 525) and replaced it with 29 U.S.C.
section 504, which simply made it a crime for a member of the Communist Party to be
an officer of a labor union. See U.S. v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 477 (1965) (White, J.,
dissenting). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held, in 1964, that section 504 violated
the first amendment, by failing to distinguish between active and inactive members. U.S.
v. Brown, 334 F.2d 488 (9th Cir. 1964). That court attempted to distinguish Douds,
based on the seriousness of the criminal sanction under section 504. The Supreme Court
affirmed, Brown v. U.S., 381 U.S. 437 (1965), but, oddly, on the ground that the statute
constituted a bill of attainder. Even so, observations relevant to a first amendment analy-
sis crept into Chief Justice Warren's majority opinion: "In a number of decisions, this
Court has pointed out the fallacy of the suggestion that membership in the Communist
Party ... can be regarded as an alternative, but equivalent, expression for a list of
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But, in 1950, deference to Congress held great sway, and it ap-
peared that some of the Justices held firm views as to the nature of
the Communist Party. Further evidence of the latter proposition was
provided the following year, in a case decided slightly more than a
month before Dennis. In Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v.
McGrath,2"' the Court reversed the dismissal of a complaint which
alleged that the Attorney General had no authority to characterize
certain groups as "Communist" on the infamous "Attorney-Gen-
eral's list" of subversive organizations that was furnished to the Loy-
alty Review Board of the United States Civil Service Commission. 94
The five Justices in the majority produced five separate opinions, of-
fering a variety of constitutional and non-constitutional bases for
concluding that the petitioners had indeed stated a good cause of
action.2 95 The dissenting Justices included Reed, Minton, and Vin-
son, who were unimpressed by the petitioner's complaint, essentially
seeing no real harm done to groups merely by virtue of their being
undesirable characteristics." Id. at 455. Citing Schneiderman and Aptheker, he said:
"These cases are relevant to the question before us." Id. at 456.
Justice White, dissenting on behalf of four Justices, complained that Douds had effec-
tively been overruled. Id. at 464. He wrote of Douds with approval, and argued that
Congress in 1959 had a rational basis for making the same conclusions about the CP that
the Court had found permissible in 1950.
Oddly, the Court in 1969 spoke of Douds as though it were a viable precedent, explic-
itly refusing to reconsider it, in Bryson v. U.S., 396 U.S. 64 (1969). Following the Brown
decision, Bryson sought to set aside his 1955 conviction for filing a fraudulent affidavit
under section 9(h). Justice Harlan, or the majority, refused to consider Bryson's argu-
ment, in light of the fact that his affidavit had clearly been fraudulent. Justice Douglas,
dissenting (joined by Justice Black), referred to Douds as "obviously . . .discredited."
Id. at 76.
For further discussion and criticism of Douds, see H. KALvEN, supra note 9, at 323-
39; T. EMERSON, supra note 9, at 164-75. Criticizing the succession of legislative efforts
to eliminate Communist influence from labor unions, Professor Emerson wrote: "[O]ur
internal security successfully survived the continuous failure of the [labor union] pro-
gram . . . . [T]he experience does indicate that the threat to internal security was, as
usual, exaggerated." Id. at 175. Treating Douds a bit more kindly is Currie, The Consti-
tution in the Supreme Court: 1946-1953, 37 EMORY L.J. 249, 273-75 (1988).
293. 341 U.S. 123 (1951). The case is discussed in H. KALVEN, supra note 9, at
289-93.
294. See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
295. Justices Frankfurter, Jackson, and Douglas invoked procedural due process
concerns. Only Justice Black went further and asserted that "the executive has no consti-
tutional authority, with or without a hearing," to publish the lists. The system, he said,
"punishes many organizations and their members merely because of their political beliefs
and utterances . . ." in violation of the first amendment. 341 U.S. at 143. He also
deemed it a bill of attainder.
"After the federal government established hearing procedures for listing groups [as a
result of the McGrath decision] the Attorney General made no attempt to list any addi-
tional groups." R. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 13, at 369.
listed. What is especially interesting is the characterization of the
Communist Party, probably gratuitous, that crept into Justice
Reed's discussion of the Attorney General's procedure in compiling
the list:
What is required by the [Executive] Order is an examination and determi-
nation by the Attorney General that these organizations are "communist."
The description "communist" is adequate for the purposes of inquiry and
listing. No such precision of definition is necessary as a criminal prosecution
might require . . . . Communism is well understood to mean a group seek-
ing to overthrow by force and violence governments such as ours and to
establish a new government based on public ownership and direction of pro-
ductive property. Undoubtedly, there are reasonable grounds to conclude
that accepted history teaches that revolution by force and violence to ac-
complish this end is a tenet of communists. No more is necessary to justify
an organization's designation as communist.0 8
In support of his conclusions, Justice Reed cited works by Marx,
Trotsky, Lenin, and Stalin.29
7
Thus, of the eight Justices who decided the Dennis case,
four-Reed, Minton, Jackson, and the Chief Justice-had recently
taken judicial notice, in effect, that the Communist Party was dedi-
cated to the forcible overthrow of the United States government.
Two others, Frankfurter and Burton, along with Reed and Vinson,
had written or joined opinions in the Douds case which explicitly
endorsed the appropriateness of showing a high degree of deference
to Congress even when first amendment rights were at stake. Justice
Frankfurter had also joined the Stone dissent in the Schneiderman
case, which had similarly characterized the Party, in 1927, as indis-
putably subversive.298 Of the five Justices making up the majority in
Schneiderman, that had arguably demonstrated a greater tendency
toward open-mindedness about the Party and its objectives, Justices
Murphy and Rutledge both died in 1949 and were replaced by Jus-
tices Minton and Clark.
C. The Dennis Case
Casebooks on constitutional law typically include excerpts from
the Supreme Court's decision in Dennis v. United States."' What
the Supreme Court decision does not clearly reveal is the high level
of abstraction at which that decision was reached. Indeed, there is
virtually no discussion in the Supreme Court opinion of the facts of
the Dennis case, due to the oddly limited way in which the Court
approached its task of reviewing the convictions. Despite being asked
296. Id. at 195.
297. Id. at n. 9.
298. 320 U.S. at 170 (Stone, C.*J., dissenting).
299. 341 U.S. 494 (1951). See, e.g., G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1042
(12th ed. 1991).
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to review the sufficiency of the evidence, the Court in Dennis granted
certiorari
[L]imited to the following two questions: (1) Whether either [section] 2 or
[section] 3 of the Smith Act, inherently or as construed and applied in the
instant case, violates the First Amendment. . .; (2) whether either [section]
2 or [section] 3 of the Act, inherently or as construed and applied in the
instant case, violates the First and Fifth Amendments because of
indefiniteness.300
Given this deliberately limited grant, the Court expressly declined to
consider the factual underpinnings of the case. "Whether on this rec-
ord petitioners did in fact advocate the overthrow of the Government
by force and violence," wrote Chief Justice Vinson, "is not before
us."30 1 Even accepting the Court's own description of its task, it is
hard to believe that a modern court, considering the constitutionality
of a statute "as applied," would not feel obliged to review the evi-
dence in the record.30 2 Instead, the Court proceeded on the assump-
tion that the facts were as the jury must have found them in order to
convict the petitioners, namely, that the petitioners "advocate[d]
* . . a successful overthrow of the existing order by force and vio-
lence," 303 and "intended to initiate a violent revolution whenever the
propitious occasion appeared."304 Not until Yates305 was decided six
years later, would the Court take a hard look at the question of the
kind of evidence needed under the first amendment to support a
valid conviction for 'illegal advocacy of forcible overthrow (or for
conspiracy to so advocate). A serious question thus arises as to
300. 341 U.S. at 495-96. These were the first two (of twelve) proposed "questions
presented" by the petitioners in their petition for writ of certiorari. The fifth of those
questions, as to which certiorari was not granted, was "Whether, as to each of the peti-
tioners, the evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction." The remaining nine ques-
tions pertained to procedural matters, such as the sufficiency of the indictment, the selec-
tion of the jury, certain admissions and exclusions of evidence, and the conduct of the
trial jbdge. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, U.S. v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201 (2d Cir.)
(1950), at 10-12, reprinted in 47 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE U.S.: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 17-19 (P. Kurland & G. Casper, eds. 1975).
301. Dennis, 341 U.S. at 497. Oddly, despite the limited grant of certiorari, both
the petitioners and the government addressed the sufficiency of the evidence at some
length in their briefs before the Supreme Court. Brief for Petitioners at 6-26, 188-205,
U.S. v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201 (2d Cir.) (1950); Brief for the United States at 10-156,
U.S. v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. (1950), LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 300, at
191-211, 373-90, 479-625.
302. Cf., e.g., Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978);
Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, 466 U.S. 405 (1984). See generally Monaghan, Consti-
tutional Fact Review, 85 CoLUM. L. REV. 229 (1985).
303. 341 U.S. at 498.
304. Id. at 497.
305. 354 U.S. 298 (1957).
whether sufficient-or, indeed, any-evidence of the necessary kind
had been introduced at the Dennis trial.
1. The Trial
In July of 1948, the federal government indicted twelve of the top
leaders of the CPUSA under the Smith Act. Among those charged
were: William Z. Foster, the Party's National Secretary and highest
official; Eugene Dennis, the Party's General Secretary; New York
City Councilman Benjamin Davis; and Gus Hall, then chairman of
the CP in Ohio, and a member of the Party's National Commit-
tee.308 Because of Foster's poor health, his case was severed and the
trial proceeded without him.
The indictment charged that from approximately April 1, 1945,
the defendants conspired: (a) to organize as the CPUSA a group of
persons who teach and advocate the forcible overthrow of the United
States government; and (b) to advocate and teach the necessity of
doing so. The indictment focused on the dissolution of the Commu-
nist Political Association and subsequent reorganization of the
CPUSA in 1945, and it specifically referred to meetings, organiza-
tion of clubs, and recruitment of members. It stated that as a part of
the conspiracy, the defendants "would publish and circulate ...
books .. .and newspapers advocating the principles of Marxism-
Leninism," and that they would "conduct .. .schools and classes
for the study of the principles of Marxism-Leninism, in which would
be taught and advocated the duty and necessity of overthrowing and
destroying the Government of the United States by force and vio-
lence. 8030 The district judge denied a inotion to dismiss the indict-
ment on first amendment grounds,308 relying on the reasoning of an
earlier Smith Act decision 309 which in turn had relied on the reason-
ing of Gitlow v. New York:310 the legislature had decided that cer-
tain language was dangerous, so the clear and present danger test
did not apply.
The theory of the prosecution 1' was that the Communists re-
turned, in 1945, to their pre-1935, pre-"popular front" position of
devotion to a Marxist-Leninist philosophy which embraced forcible
306. For a description of each of the defendants, see M. BELKNAP, supra note 8, at
65-66.
307. U.S. v. Foster, 9 F.R.D. 367, 374-75 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
308. U.S. v. Foster, 80 F. Supp. 479, 485 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
309. Dunne v. U.S., 138 F.2d 137, 145 (8th Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 790
(1943) (Socialist Workers Party).
310., 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
311. The trial has been described in fascinating detail in M. BELKNAP, supra note
8, at 79-112, and P. STEINBERG, supra note 8, at 157-77. See also Belknap, Trial, supra
note 111, at 242-48; D. CAUTE, supra note 78, at 189-93.
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overthrow as a central tenet.3 12 As a close student of the trial has
summarized the prosecution's case:
[T]he prosecution relied mainly on articles, pamphlets, and
books--especially on Marx and Engels' The Communist Manifesto (1848),
Lenin's State and Revolution (1917), Stalin's Fundamentals of Leninism
(1929) and Program of the Communist International (1928). Much of this
literary evidence was quite dated, and the government could offer no proof
that American Communists were about to translate into action any of the
ideas it contained. Nevertheless, literature was the heart of the prosecu-
tion's case. Government lawyers regarded the testimony of witnesses as only
corroborative of their printed evidence and put them on the stand primarily
to introduce and interpret Communist literature and explain how it had
manifested itself in the activities of the CPUSA.31s
Judge Medina put the evidence in a somewhat different light in
his instructions to the jury.314 In his review of the prosecution's case,
the following statements are the most damning:
The prosecution claims that the defendants. . . resorted to many clandes-
tine and fraudulent devices in teaching those subject to their influence
secretly to prepare for the coming of some crisis, such as a deep depression
or a war with the Soviet Union, to spring into action when the word of
command was given, to paralyze power houses, the transportation system
and the vast industrial machine at the heart of our economic system and in
the resultant chaos and confusion to bring about, by violent and unlawful
means, the overthrow or destruction of the Government . . . [and] that
plans were deeply laid to place . . members of the Communist Party in
key positions in various industries indispensable to the functioning of the
American economy, to be ready for action at a given signal; and that such
action was to consist of strikes, sabotage, and violence of one sort or another
appropriate to the consummation of the desired end, that is to say the
smashing of the machine of state . .. .35
There was, however, apparently no evidence of direct "advocacy of
action" by any of the defendants, relating to any of these types of
action.3 16 Indeed, the historical record suggests that Justice Depart-
ment officials knew of the absence of evidence of seditious advocacy,
and as a result chose to charge the CP leaders with organizing and
conspiring to so advocate.317
In their defense, the Communist leaders denied that the Party ad-
vocated forcible overthrow.318 Rather, as their basic contentions have
312. M. BELKNAP, supra note 8, at 82; Belknap, Trial, supra note 111, at 242.
313. Belknap, Trial, supra note 111, at 242-43.
314. The judge's summary of the evidence appears at 9 F.R.D. 381-86.
315. Id. at 381-82.
316. P. STEINBERG, supra note 8, at 166; see generally M. BELKNAP, supra note 8,
at 79-112.
317. P. STEINBERG, supra note 8, at 108-09.
318. M. BELKNAP, supra note 8, at 80, 93-94, 106, 109; 9 F.R.D. at 383-85. See
also Brief of Petitioners at 17-25, U.S. v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, (2d Cir. 1950), re-
printed in LANDMARK BRIEFS supra note 300, at 202-11.
been summarized,
[T]he CPUSA sought to convert America to socialism not by
force, but . . . by educating the masses about the need to
build a political organization committed to that economic
system and by persuading the people, when a majority of the
country was prepared for the step, to install socialism in the
United States . . . . Books written prior to 1935, such as
most of those emphasized by the prosecution, were obsolete
as expressions of party policy.319
In the words of a careful student and critic of the trial, the gov-
ernment case "was not a strong one:"
If the Justice Department had possessed evidence that the CPUSA was
plotting a revolt, it could have prosecuted the organization's leaders for se-
ditious conspiracy .... Indeed, even under the Smith Act, federal prose-
cutors did not have as strong a case as they might have wished .... For-
tunately for [the government], the Smith Act did not require a prosecutor
to establish actual advocacy of armed revolt but only that the defendants
were guilty of creating a group to engage in such activity or of conspiring to
advocate or organize. Unable to prove actual incitement, let alone revolu-
tionary deeds or plots, the authorities attacked the Party with the conspir-
acy provisions of the Smith Act.
3 20
In his charge to the jury, Judge Medina did display a certain degree
of sensitivity to first amendment concerns, virtually anticipating the
Supreme Court's later analysis in the Yates case:
[I]t is not the abstract doctrine of over-throwing. . . organized government
by unlawful means which is denounced by this law, but the teaching and
advocacy of action for the accomplishment of that purpose, by language
reasonably . . . calculated to incite persons to such action. 2 1
Arguably, the constitutional problem was that he did not instruct the
jury, that to convict, they needed to find that any such "advocacy of
action" had occurred. Instead, he told them,
You cannot find the defendants. . . guilty. . . unless you are satisfied...
that they conspired to organize [a] . . . group . . . of persons who teach
and advocate the overthrow. . .of the Government. . . by force. . . and
319. Belknap, Trial, supra note 111, at 248.
320. M. BELKNAP, supra note 8, at 80-81. Belknap's overall views are that the
prosecution was the product of political motivations on the part of the Truman Adminis-
tration; that the prosecution's case was weak; that the trial judge was hostile to the de-
fendants and their attorneys and favored the prosecution in his evidentiary rulings; and
that the defendants and their lawyers detracted from the effectiveness of their defense by
the use of various tactics such as delay and proselytizing. See generally id. at 43-112.
The acrimony between Judge Medina and the defendants and their lawyers is too well-
documented to be doubted.
The suggestion that the prosecution was basically politically motivated, coming as it
did before the 1948 presidential election at a time when the Truman Administration had
opposed anticommunist legislation in Congress, is basically supported by P. STEINBERG,
supra note 8. Interestingly, however, Steinberg has reported that neither President Tru-
man nor the White House staff was ever involved in the decision to prosecute, id. at 107,
and that Attorney General Tom Clark initially opposed the idea. Id. at 110.
321. 9 F.R.D. at 391.
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to advocate and teach the duty and necessity of overthrowing. . . the Gov-
ernment . . . by force . . ., with the intent that such teaching and advo-
cacy be of a rule or principle of action and by language reasonably and
ordinarily calculated to incite persons to such action, all with the intent to
cause the overthrow. . . of the Government. . .by force. . . as speedily
as circumstances would permit.
3 22
Meanwhile, a Smith Act conspiracy did not require the commission
of an overt act. 23 Therefore, all the jury needed to find was a combi-
nation of association and intent. 24
Given the "fall" of China, the trial of Alger Hiss, and the explo-
sion of the first Soviet atomic bomb, 1949 was surely not a year in
which Americans were particularly inclined to take a benign view of
domestic Communism. 25 On October 14, 1949, the defendants were
convicted, and all of them but one was sentenced to five years in
prison and a $10,000 fine. 28
2. Appeal: Round I
The appeal in Dennis was argued before a panel of the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals on June 21 and 22, 1950. The following
day, North Korean troops invaded South Korea. On August 1, the
court announced its decision affirming the convictions. 27
Unlike the Supreme Court, the court of appeals did review the
evidence below, and in approximately one page of discussion, Judge
Learned Hand found it sufficient to convict, relying almost entirely
upon the literature placed in evidence by the prosecution. 32 '8 An
"honest jury," he opined, "could scarcely have found otherwise" on
the crucial issues in the case. 29 Judge Chase, concurring, indicated
that among the important evidence was proof of secret activity, a
policy of infiltration of "basic industries," and the close alliance with
322. Id. (emphasis added).
323. Id. at 394.
324. The judge properly instructed the jury, however, that guilt could not be based
merely on a defendant's membership in the Communist Party. Id. at 392. But on the
issue of intent, he told the jurors that it was "important" for them to "weigh with
scrupulous care the testimony concerning secret schools, false names, devious ways, gen-
eral falsification and so on. . . ." Id. at 391. Surely that did not help the defendants.
325. See generally A. HARPER, supra note 78, at 85-121.
326. On the details of the sentencing, see M. BELKNAP, supra note 8, at 115.
327. 183 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1950).
328. Id. at 206.
329. Id. See also Judge Hand's description of the Communist Party, not explicitly
linked to the record below, in the midst of his legal analysis: "The violent capture of all
existing governments is one article of the creed of that faith, which abjures the possibility
of success by lawful means." Id. at 212.
a foreign government.330
On the issue of constitutionality, Judge Hand's opinion is famous
for its reformulation of the clear and present danger test in terms
later endorsed by Chief Justice Vinson:33 1 "In each case [courts]
must ask whether the gravity of the 'evil,' discounted by its improba-
bility, justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid
the danger.332 But Judge Hand said more than that. Posing the
question, "When does the conspiracy become a 'present danger'?,"
he asserted: "The jury has found that the conspirators will strike as
soon as success seems possible . . . .- But did the jury necessarily
so find? Again, all the jury needed to find, on the basis of Judge
Medina's instructions, was that the defendants conspired to organize
a group which would engage in advocacy of forcible overthrow with
the intent to act as soon as circumstances were favorable. To use the
phrase "will strike," albeit conditionally, is arguably to imply some-
thing closer to imminence than was warranted by a fair reading of
the evidence.
Judge Hand's opinion was also infused with explicit concerns
about the American Communists in the light of contemporary world
conditions. To Judge Hand, the question was
[H]ow probable of execution-it [what?] was in the summer of 1948, when
the indictment was found. We must not close our eyes to our position in the
world at that time .... Any border fray, any diplomatic incident...
such as the Berlin blockade ... might prove a spark in the tinder-box, and
lead to war. We do not understand how one could ask for a more probable
danger, unless we must wait till the actual eve of hostilities.33'
Discussion and rebuttal to the Communists' advocacy "may be a
proper enough antidote in ordinary times and for less redoubtable
combinations, 3 35 but not here, and not now. "[W]e shall be silly
dupes," he continued, "if we forget that again and again in the past
[thirty] years, just such preparations in other countries have aided to
supplant existing governments, when the time was ripe. '336 Here,
then, was a danger "of the utmost gravity and of enough probability
to justify its suppression. We hold that it is a danger 'clear and
present.' -337
Judge Chase, in his concurrence, was far more deferential to Con-
gress, believing that the highly deferential opinions in Gitlow and
Whitney were still good law and thus controlling in this case. 338 In-
330. Id. at 235, n. 3.
331. 341 U.S. at 510.
332. 183 F.2d at 212.




337. 183 F.2d at 213.
338. Id. at 234-37.
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terestingly, he also drew upon the Chaplinsky decision, reasoning
that the utterances prohibited by the Smith Act are "no essential
part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value" as
to be outweighed by the public interest in order.339 Judge Chase was
also apparently influenced by his understanding of political develop-
ments abroad. "Communism has by forcible overthrow engulfed or
attempted to engulf nation after nation," he wrote, "after prepara-
tion for the use of force by just such advocacy as this Act
forbids." 4 '
For the convicted American Communist leaders, it was on to the
Supreme Court.
3. Appeal: Round 2
The Supreme Court decision in Dennis v. United States 41 has
been the subject of much scholary consideration and criticism. 42
The three opinions upholding the constitutionality of the Smith Act
provisions in question, representing the views of six Justices, collec-
tively reflect: (a) great deference to the Congress, even in the realm
of speech; (b) a clear consciousness of the perceived threat posed by
the Soviet Union, and an apparent judgment that that threat was
relevant to the decision at hand; and (c) an approach to first amend-
ment issues, in general, that fell notably short of the highest level of
vigilance. The question remains, however, as to whether the result
they reached was surely wrong.
Chief Justice Vinson, writing for himself and Justices Reed, Bur-
ton, and Minton, initially deflected the argument that the statute
prohibited even academic discussion of Marxism-Leninism. The stat-
ute, he said, "is directed at advocacy, not discussion. 3 43 (Regretta-
bly, significant and essential refinement of the meaning of punishable
"advocacy" did not come until six years later, in Yates.) "[P]eaceful
studies and discussions' 3 44 of subversion, as distinct from all advo-
cacy thereof, had not been made illegal by the Smith Act. "Congress
did not intend to eradicate the free discussion of political theories,"
Chief Justice Vinson wrote. "Rather Congress was concerned with
339. Id. at 236, quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
340. Id. at 236.
341. Dennis, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). Justice Clark, Attorney General when the pros-
ecution took place, did not participate in the decision.
342. See infra text accompanying notes 626-47.
343. 341 U.S. at 502. Justice Frankfurter, concurring, also focused on this distinc-
tion. Id. at 545-47.
344. Id. at 502.
the very kind of activity in which the evidence showed these petition-
ers engaged.1145 This last comment was a bit striking, considering
that the court had not set out to review the sufficiency of the evi-
dence below.
Reaching the issue of constitutionality, Chief Justice Vinson ac-
cepted the general applicability of a "clear and present danger" test
for judging the validity of "direct" restrictions on speech,3 46 but ac-
cepted Learned Hand's reformulation of that test.347 It was a sub-
stantial reformulation, requiring an evaluation of "the gravity of the
'evil,' discounted by its improbability, ' 348 instead of asking whether
the advocacy created a risk of relatively probable and fairly immi-
nent harm. Why the reformulation? Because, Chief Justice Vinson
explained, the clear and present danger test, as it was previously un-
derstood, was suitable only for cases, like Gitlow, involving "a com-
paratively isolated event, bearing little relation in [the minds of Jus-
.tices Holmes and Brandeis] to any substantial threat to the safety of
the community. '349 But in Gitlow, a Socialist who later became a
Communist was convicted for advocating the forcible overthrow of
the government.350 Why, then, was the Dennis case different? Vinson
answered, in effect, by submitting that Holmes and Brandeis "were
not confronted with any situation comparable to the instant one-the
development of an apparatus designed and dedicated to the over-
throw of the Government, in the context of world crisis after cri-
sis."35 Exactly what justified the less demanding approach? The
"apparatus"? (The conspiracy? The number of its members?) Its
apparent capacity for effectiveness? The "context of world crisis"?
All of these things? Vinson didn't say. In finding that "the requisite
danger existed," Vinson did make a slightly more specific reference
to similar factors, some of which appear to be the product of the
unacknowledged use of judicial notice, including "a highly organized
conspiracy," "the inflammable nature of world conditions [and] sim-
ilar uprisings in other countries," and "the touch-and-go nature of
our relations" with the Soviet Union. 3"2 But exactly how did these
elements fit into the first amendment analysis? Whatever else might
be said about Chief Justice Vinson's opinion, it could surely have
345. Id.
346. Id. at 507-08.
347. Id. at 510.
348. Id.
349. Id. Justice Frankfurter, concurring, similarly distinguished cases like Gilow
and Abrams. Id. at 542-43.
350. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
351. 341 U.S. at 510.
352. Id. at 510-11. This "uncontrolled" use of judicial notice by Vinson was criti-
cized contemporaneously in Rostow, The Democratic Character of Judicial Review, 66
HARV. L. REV. 193, 218 (1952); Boudin, "Seditious Doctrines" and the "Clear and Pre-
sent Danger" Rule (Part I1), 38 VA. L. REV. 315, 354 (1952).
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made its basic premises clearer.
Hovering about the foregoing were some conclusions that are
probably incontestable: (1) preventing forcible overthrow of the gov-
ernment constitutes a substantial government interest;3 53 (2) Con-
gress may act to prevent even an attempt at forcible overthrow;354
and (3) the government may act even if the attempt is unlikely to
succeed.355 The key question then arises: given these conclusions,
when may government intervene when speech has not given way to
action? "If Government is aware," answered Vinson, "that a group
aiming [intent] at its overthrow [grave evil] is attempting to indoc-
trinate its members and to commit them to a course [speech]
whereby they will strike when the leaders feel the circumstances per-
mit [uncertain time of danger], action by the Government is re-
quired."3 6 If there is something troubling about that statement,
what is it? It might be unacceptable that the time element, "when
the leaders feel the circumstance permit," is something other than
imminence. Or, it might be that "indoctrination" is still simply
speech, and not even necessarily advocacy of action as opposed to
mere "abstract" advocacy. But no such distinctions were 1ut forth
by Vinson.
Justice Frankfurter's concurrence was quite clear on the necessity
of deferring to Congress' balancing of the relevant interests at
stake.35 7 Even in this first amendment setting, he deemed the lowest
level of judicial review as appropriate: "We are to set aside the judg-
ment of those whose duty it is to legislate only if there is no reasona-
ble basis for it."'3 58 He was not satisfied, moreover, by a reformula-
tion of the clear and present danger test, preferring instead to
disavow its validity altogether. 59 A "careful weighing of conflicting
interests" was the proper approach,360 but with deference, appar-
ently, toward the legislative weighing already done.3 61 Approaching
that balancing, Justice Frankfurter drew upon the Chaplinsky the-
353. 341 U.S. at 509.
354. Id.
355. Id. at 510.
356. Id. at 509.
357. Id. at 525-26.
358. Id. at 525.
359. Id. at 527, 542-43.
360. Id. at 542.
361. Id. at 550-51. It has been properly observed, however, that Congress, which
enacted the Smith Act in 1940, had never passed judgment on the danger posed by
subversive advocacy in 1948. T. EMERSON, supra note 9, at 118; accord, Rostow, supra
note 352, at 216.
ory of "low-value" speech, as well as the trial judge's references to
advocacy of action, to conclude: "On any scale of values which we
have hitherto recognized, speech of this sort ranks low." 3 2 In finding
adequate support for the Congressional judgment, furthermore,
Frankfurter engaged in a very candid use of judicial notice:
[I]n determining whether application of the statute to the defendants is
within the constitutional powers of Congress, we are not limited to the facts
found by the jury . . .. We may take judicial notice that the Communist
doctrines which these defendants have conspired to advocate are in the as-
cendancy in powerful nations who cannot be acquitted of unfriendliness to
the institutions of this country. We may take account of evidence brought
forward at this time and elsewhere, much of which has long been common
knowledge. In sum, it would amply justify a legislature in concluding that
recruitment of additional members for the Party would create a substantial
danger to national security.
In 1947, it has been reliably reported, at least 60,000 members were en-
rolled in the Party. Evidence was introduced in this case that the member-
ship was organized in small units, linked by an intricate chain of command,
and protected by elaborate precautions designed to prevent disclosure of in-
dividual identity. There are no reliable data tracing acts of sabotage or espi-
onage directly to these defendants. But a Canadian Royal Commission...
in 1946 . . .reported that it was "overwhelmingly established" that "the
Communist movement was the principal base within which the espionage
network was recruited . . . ." Evidence supports the conclusion that mem-
bers of the Party seek and occupy positions of importance in political and
labor organizations. Congress was not barred by the Constitution from be-
lieving that indifference to such experience would be an exercise not of free-
dom but of irresponsibility.83
In evaluating those paragraphs, it must be remembered that
Frankfurter was not looking for a "clear and present danger." But
exactly what did he identify that ought to carry weight on the regu-
latory side of the balancing process? He seems to have said that the
Party was a sizable, well-organized and secretive group, some of
whose members had infiltrated other important institutions of Amer-
ican society; it was, in addition, linked to hostile foreign powers, and
a base for foreign spies.
The Party's link to the Soviet Union was undeniable. Arguably it
was well-organized. Whether it was sizable enough to be taken seri-
ously is a matter for debate, however, and it does not appear fair to
say that the Party's activities were fully shrouded in secrecy. More-
over, conclusions concerning a connection between the Party (as op-
posed to the Soviet Union directly) and domestic espionage are con-
siderably more questionable, and Frankfurter himself appeared to
acknowledge the absence of evidence to support such allegations. But
even assuming that all of those observations were accurate and prop-
erly before the Court, did they suffice to carry the constitutional ar-
gument for the government?
362. 341 U.S. at 544-45.
363. Id. at 547-48 (footnotes omitted).
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Interestingly, Justice Frankfurter, a legendary devotee of judicial
restraint, appended to the bulk of his concurrence an argument, es-
sentially addressed to Congress and the American people, against
the prohibition of any political advocacy,3 64 suggesting that he per-
sonally viewed the threat posed by the CPUSA as minimal. Thus,
quoting George F. Kennan at length, he offered a view of the Party
similar to that underlying the dissenting opinion of Justice Douglas:
The American Communist Party is today, by and large, an external danger.
It represents a tiny minority in our country; it has no real contact with the
feelings of the mass of our people; and its position as the agency of a hostile
foreign power is clearly recognized by the overwhelming mass of our
citizens. 65
Justice Jackson's concurrence set forth at length the reasons for
not applying the clear and present danger test in this case. The es-
sence of his opinion is easily expressed; it appears that he simply did
not view the advocacy of forcible overthrow as protected speech.3 16
In reaching the decision to reject a clear and present danger ap-
proach, Jackson again expounded on the nature of the Communists
(as he had done in his Douds concurrence), noting particularly that
the Party sought to accomplish through infiltration and deception,
not suddenly but over time, what it could not accomplish through
recruitment or persuasion. 6 Thus, he concluded, "the Communist
stratagem outwits the anti-anarchist pattern of statute aimed against
'overthrow by force and violence' if qualified by the doctrine that
only 'clear and present danger' of accomplishing that result will sus-
tain the prosecution." '368 He would have saved the clear and present
danger test "for application as a 'rule of reason' in the kind of case
for which it was devised," i.e., the case of the "hot-headed speech on
a street corner" or "incendiary pamphlet," in which its application
was "not beyond the capacity of the judicial process. '36 9 But even
then, he would apparently have limited its applicability to cases in-
volving speech "which does not directly or explicitly advocate a
crime. '370 Here, on the other hand, he argued-with considerable
force under the circumstances-that to apply the clear and present
danger test
364. Id. at 549-50, 553-55.
365. Id. at 554.
366. Id. at 570, 574.
367. Id. at 564-66.
368. Id. at 567.
369. Id. at 568 (footnote omitted).
370. Id.
We must appraise imponderables, including international and national phe-
nomena which baffle the best informed foreign offices and our most exper-
ienced politicians. We would have to foresee and predict the effectiveness of
Communist propaganda, opportunities for infiltration, whether, and when, a
time will come that they consider propitious for action, and whether and
how fast our existing government will deteriorate . . . .No doctrine can be
sound whose application requires us to make a prophecy of that sort in the
guise of a legal decision. The judicial process simply is not adequate to a
trial of such far-flung issues. The answers given would reflect our own polit-
ical predilections and nothing more.
37 1
It is impossible to credibly maintain that the Justices who consti-
tuted the majority in Dennis utilized a "clear and present danger"
test in any meaningful sense.3 72 Two Justices explicitly disavowed
doing so, while the four Justices who joined the plurality decision
engaged in a balancing approach, but with a degree of conscious def-
erence to the legislature's judgment that today would represent an
enormous departure from first amendment analysis. To ask whether
the Court reached a wrong result in Dennis is to ask a much more
difficult question, to which we will return. But, as Justice Black rec-
ognized,3 73 the Court surely did not require the government to
demonstrate, on the record, the existence of a danger either immi-
nent or probable. Perhaps, for the reasons stated by Justice Jackson,
it was right not to do so, but perhaps the constitutional commitment
to freedom of expression is such that, absent clear proof of impend-
ing harm, speech should have prevailed in the balancing, notwith-
371. Id. at 570. Ironically, Professor Emerson, who would protect all "expression"
absolutely, voiced similar thoughts, albeit in support of an argument that the "clear and
present danger" test is insufficiently protective of speech. If the Court in Dennis had
seriously attempted a "clear and present danger" analysis, he wrote, "it would have been
plunged into consideration of a mass of historical, political, economic, psychological and
social facts" concerning domestic and foreign communism, thereby engaging in "evalua-
tion and prophecy of a sort no court is competent to give." Emerson, Toward A General
Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 911 (1963).
372. The Dennis decision is widely regarded as having ended the reign of "clear
and present danger" as the test of the validity of governmental limitations on political
advocacy. E.g., Redish, Advocacy of Unlawful Conduct and the First Amendment: In
Defense of Clear and Present Danger, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 1159, 1171 (1982); Corwin,
Bowing Out "Clear and Present Danger', 27 NOTRE DAME LAw. 325 (1952). One writer
described the Learned Hand formulation as "a balancing test that is devoid of any pref-
erence for the first amendment." McKay, The Preference for Freedom, 34 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 1182, 1209 (1959). Another observer reported that, at oral argument in Dennis, the
Solicitor General admitted that application of the clear and present danger test in its
traditional sense would require reversal of the conviction. Antieau, Dennis v. U.S. -
Precedent, Principle or Perversion?, 5 VAND. L. REV. 141, 143 (1952). And the late
Professor Kalven wryly observed: "[T]he supreme achievement of the [clear and present
danger] test in American constitutional law, and perhaps its only achievement, was that
it made the court sweat so much to affirm the conviction in Dennis. . . ." H. KALVEN,
supra note 9, at 196. But another account of the Court's decision-making process sug-
gests that most of the Justices had little difficulty in reaching the result in Dennis. See J.
SIMON, THE ANTAGONISTS: HUGO BLACK, FELIX FRANKFURTER AND CIVIL LIBERTIES IN
MODERN AMERICA 199 (1989).
373. 341 U.S. at 579-80.
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standing Justice Jackson's impressive rhetoric.
Immersing oneself in the flow of cautious judicial theorizing of
those troubled times, one is likely to be enormously impressed by the
deep commitment to freedom of speech held by the two Justices who
dissented in Dennis. "Undoubtedly," wrote Justice Black, "a govern-
mental policy of unfettered communication of ideas does entail dan-
gers. To the Founders of this Nation, however, the benefits derived
from free expression were worth the risk.1
374
Justice Douglas, the other dissenter, would have applied the clear
and present danger test, as classically explicated by Holmes and
Brandeis, to find the convictions invalid. His opinion focused on
the position of the CPUSA in the United States, and is important
for its criticism of the Court's use of judicial notice, and as a con-
temporary statement that offers a competing judicial vision of the
extent of the Communist threat in the year 1951:
[T]he primary consideration is the strength and tactical position of petition-
ers and their converts in this country. On that there is no evidence in the
record. If we are to take judicial notice of the threat of Communists within
the nation, it should not be difficult to conclude that as a political party
they are of little consequence. . . .Communism in the world scene is no
bogeyman; but Communism as a political faction or party in this country
plainly is. Communism has been so thoroughly exposed in this country that
it has been crippled as a political force.
3 7 6
As if to respond to Justice Jackson, he continued:
The political impotence of the Communists in this country does not, of
course, dispose of the problem. Their numbers; their positions in industry
and government; the extent to which they have in fact infiltrated [govern-
ment and industry] ...all bear on the likelihood that their advocacy...
will endanger the Republic. But the record is silent on these facts. If we are
to proceed on the basis of judicial notice, it is impossible for me to say that
the Communists in this country are so potent or so strategically deployed
that they must be suppressed for their speech . . . .To believe that peti-
tioners and their following are placed in such critical positions as to endan-
ger the Nation is to believe the incredible ...
This is my view if we are to act on the basis of judicial notice. But the
mere statement of the opposing views indicates how important it is that we
know the facts before we act . . . .Free speech . . . should not be sacri-
ficed on anything less than plain and objective proof of danger that the evil
374. Id. at 580.
375. Id. at 585-87. Douglas, moreover, would have submitted the question of
"clear and present danger" to the jury, id. at 587, and Justice Black agreed. Id. at 580.
Judge Medina had decided that question as a matter of law, and so informed the jury,
prompting one critic of Dennis to write: "As soon as Medina informed the jury. . . that
a clear and present danger existed, the jury's own function of determining the innocence
or guilt of the defendants was largely expropriated - for how could there be a clear and
present danger unless the defendants were guilty?" D. CAUTE, supra note 78, at 193.
376. 341 U.S. at 588.
advocated is imminent.377
Justice Douglas made some additional observations that under-
scored the serious flaw in the Court's refusal to directly consider the
sufficiency of the evidence in the record. If the defendants had
taught "the techniques of sabotage," or "methods of terror and other
seditious conduct," he would have upheld their convictions.3 " Tell-
ingly, he observed: "This case was argued as if those were the facts
... .But the fact is that no such evidence was introduced at the
trial."3 7
9
With their convictions thus affirmed, the defendants began serving
their prison sentences.380
D. The Subsequent Prosecutions
1. The Lower Court Decisions: "Clear and Present Danger"
The post-Dennis prosecutions of the early 1950's closely resembled
the trial in Dennis itself.38' The defendants typically argued that
their first amendment rights had been violated because of the ab-
sence of a clear and present danger; in none of these cases were they
successful.3 82 As might be expected, Dennis had virtually settled the
issue. However, one federal judge, William Hastie of the Third Cir-
cuit, was receptive to the first amendment argument, albeit in a dis-
senting opinion a3 In essence, Judge Hastie read Dennis as requiring
evidence of advocacy "directed toward violent action 'as speedily as
the circumstances would permit.' "384 "[A] call to action in the in-
definite future," he asserted, "is a meaningless contradiction of
377. Id. at 589-90.
378. Id. at 581.
379. Id.
380. Seven of the eleven defendants surrendered to begin serving their sentences in
July of 1951, but four defendants went into hiding; all were later apprehended, or ulti-
mately surrendered. On these events, and on the Party's maintenance of a partial "under-
ground" leadership structure, generally, during the early 1950's, see P. STEINBERG, supra
note 8, at 225-32, 261-66.
381. See the description of these trials in M. BELKNAP, supra note 8, at 162-66; D.
CAUTE, supra note 78, at 195-206; and P. STEINBERG, supra note 8, at 234-51. Belknap
has written that these trials "were, like the original one. . ., essentially battles of quota-
tions." M. BELKNAP, supra note 8, at 163. But Steinberg has emphasized the testimony,
in these trials, concerning the Party's "underground" structure. P. STEINBERG, supra
note 8, at 234-37.
382. See, e.g., Frankfeld v. U.S., 198 F.2d 679, 682-84 (4th Cir. 1952), cert. de-
nied, 344 U.S. 922 (1953); U.S. v. Flynn, 216 F.2d 354, 365-67 (2d Cir. 1954), cert.
denied, 348 U.S. 909 (1955); P. STEINBERG, supra note 8, at 234. For a discussion of the
treatment of the "clear and present danger" doctrine in these cases, see also Mollan,
supra note 122, at 710-16; Note, supra note 129, at 116-18.
383. Mesarosh v. U.S., 223 F.2d 449, 461-64 (3d Cir. 1955), rev'd on other
grounds, 352 U.S. 1 (1956).
384. Id. at 461.
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terms;" there must be some orientation in time.385 Finding that the
evidence in the case before him did not go beyond "inculcation of
belief in and approval of an ultimate revolution," he stated, in lan-
guage that anticipated the Supreme Court's decision in Yates, that
as a principle of constitutional law, "[t]he line which the courts try
to draw distinguishes punishable incitation to insurrectionary action
from permissible teaching that at some time in the future violence is
inevitable .. .. *"86 "If their present tactic is a waiting game," he
continued, "characterized by the teaching of revolutionary theory
while incitation to action is left for the indefinite future, the First
Amendment prevents the government from proscribing their teach-
ing.138 7 But such an opinion was a lonely exception to the rule.
In reiterating the existence of a "clear and present danger," as
these courts generally did, it was not at all unusual for judges to take
their cues from the Supreme Court and advert to current world
events. For example, Judge Dimock, presiding over the second trial
of Communist Party leaders in New York, took judicial notice of
events in China, Tibet, Korea, Malaya, Indo-China, and Berlin, all
in support of his finding of clear and present danger. 88 In affirming
that conviction, then-Judge Harlan stated: "And if the danger was
clear and present in 1948, it can hardly be thought to have been less
in 1951, when the Korean conflict was raging and our relations with
the Communist world had moved from cold to hot war." '389 In at
least one case, the defendants sought to introduce evidence contra-
dicting this view, but were rebuffed: "The evidence which the appel-
lants would have offered would have been immaterial in view of the
"9390court's undoubted knowledge of general world conditions ....
In another case, the defendants asked the trial judge to take judicial
notice in 1951, of the minimal threat of overthrow, because the
Party's size had been reduced to just over 43,000 (according to J.
Edgar Hoover) at the end of 1950; that represented only 0.03 per-
cent of the United States population at the time. Judge Dimock re-
sponded: "I might take judicial notice of the fact that a successful
385. Id.
386. Id. at 463-64.
387. Id. at 464.
388. U.S. v. Flynn, 216 F.2d 354, at 367, n. 9 (2nd Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348
U.S. 909 (1955).
389. Id. at 367. Accord, Yates v. U.S., 225 F.2d 146, 166 (9th Cir. 1955), rev'd,
354 U.S. 298 (1957); U.S. v. Mesarosh, 13 F.R.D. 180 (W.D. Pa. 1952).
390. Mesarosh v. U.S., 223 F.2d 449, 456 (3d Cir. 1955), rev'd on other'grounds,
352 U.S. 1 (1956).
revolution in Russia was accomplished by a group whose member-
ship was probably less proportionately to the population of all Russia
than the above figures show."39'
Indeed, the defendants in these cases simply did not fare very well
when it came to "judicial notice" and "common knowledge." One
trial judge, in denying a motion for acquittal, held that the jury
could reasonably find (as it ostensibly had) that the defendants advo-
cated forcible overthrow, and gratuitously added: "Indeed, there is
persuasive argument that such is the common notoriety of this al-
leged objective of the Communist Party that the courts might prop-
erly take judicial notice of it." '392 Another federal judge, concurring
in an affirmance of Smith Act convictions in 1957, offered this view:
It seems to me that notwithstanding the general phraseology of the Smith
Act,. . . we may assume, as a matter of common knowledge, that the pri-
mary purpose of the Act was to combat the Communist conspiracy, the
object of which was to effect the overthrow of the Government of the
United States by force or violence.,9
An issue in each prosecution was whether the defendants conspired
to organize the Party as a group which would so advocate.
2. Prelude to Yates
Was the decision in Yates in any significant way reflective of the
change in the membership of the Court between 1951 and 1957?
Four changes occurred: Chief Justice Fred Vinson died in 1953, and
was ieplaced by Earl Warren; Robert Jackson died in 1954, with
John Harlan taking his place the following year; Stanley Reed re-
tired in 1957, replaced by Charles Whittaker; and Sherman Minton
retired in 1956, replaced by William Brennan.
The Court that decided the Dennis case continued to uphold "loy-
alty"-related laws, for the most part, during the next two years. It
sustained a requirement that public employees swear to oaths dis-
avowing advocacy of forcible overthrow and "knowing" membership
in organizations engaging in such advocacy, and an affidavit-disclo-
sure requirement regarding Communist Party membership. 9 4 The
law made no distinction among members of the Communist Party,
but only Justices Black and Douglas objected to this aspect of the
law.39 5 The Court also upheld a New York law barring anyone who
391. U.S. v. Flynn, 103 F. Supp. 925, 928-29 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
392. U.S. v. Schneiderman, 106 F. Supp. 906, 922 (S.D. Cal. 1952), aft'd, Yates
v. U.S., 225 F.2d 146 (9th Cir. 1955), rev'd, 354 U.S. 298 (1957).
393. Bary v. U.S., 248 F.2d 201, 216 (10th Cir. 1957) (Phillips, J., concurring).
394. Garner v. Los Angeles Bd. of Pub. Works, 341 U.S. 716 (1951); see also
Gerende v. Bd. of Supervisors, 341 U.S. 56 (1951), affig 78 A.2d 660 (Md. 1950) (up-
holding a similar oath).
395. Justices Frankfurter and Burton dissented only with respect to the oath's ref-
erence to membership in any organization engaging in forbidden advocacy. Frankfurter
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advocated forcible overthrow or who belonged to any organization
having such a purpose from employment in the public schools.396
This law made no distinction among "active" and "inactive" mem-
bers, but the New York courts construed the statute to require
knowledge of organizational purpose before the regulation could ap-
ply. Justice Minton, writing for six members of the Court in that
case, employed what is surely some of the most discredited reasoning
of the modern judicial era:
It is clear that such persons have the right under our law to assemble,
speak, think and believe as they will. . . . It is equally clear that they have
no right to work for the State in the school system on their own terms
.... They may work for the school system upon the reasonable terms laid
down by the proper authorities of New York. If they do not choose to work
on such terms, they are at liberty to retain their beliefs and associations and
go elsewhere. Has the State thus deprived them of any right to free speech
or assembly? We think not.397
Later cases would recognize that any governmental deprivation of
a tangible benefit, even of an. interest that might once have been
labelled a "privilege", sufficed to bring first amendment interests into
play when the deprivation was imposed on the basis of speech or
association. 398 Minton's opinion further suggests insufficient sensitiv-
ity to the not-yet-emerged concept of freedom of association, through
comments such as these: "One's associates, past and present, ...
may properly be considered in determining fitness and loyalty. From
time immemorial, one's reputation has been determined in part by
the company he keeps." He knew of "no rule, constitutional or other-
wise, that prevents the State. . . from considering the organizations
and persons with whom [employees] associate." ' 9 Again, the Court
would display far greater sensitivity to such concerns by the end of
the decade. 40 0 For the moment, however, only Justices Black and
Douglas bucked the prevailing tide.
40 1
could not accept the majority's assertion that this was limited to "knowing" membership.
Burton thought it applied to a time period extending too far into the past to be reasona-
bly related to the city's legitimate purpose. Garner, 341 U.S. at 726-29
396. Adler v. Bd. of Ed., 342 U.S. 485 (1952).
397. Id. at 492.
398. E.g., Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958); Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents,
385 U.S. 589, 605-06 (1967); See also Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 191-92
(1952).
399. 342 U.S. at 493.
400. E.g., Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S.
479 (1960). See infra text accompanying notes 451-56.
401. 342 U.S. at 496, 508. Justice Frankfurter dissented as well, on jurisdictional
grounds. Id. at 497. Fifteen years later, Justice Brennan, writing for a bare majority of
the Court, said of Adler "[P]ertinent constitutional doctrines have since rejected the
But the Court did show some sensitivity to associational rights in
another loyalty-oath case decided that same year. In Wieman v. Up-
degraff,40 2 a unanimous Court struck down a loyalty oath that re-
quired state employees, among other things, to disavow membership
in any organization which the federal government had determined to
be a Communist front or subversive organization. The problem, in
Justice Clark's words, was that "the fact of association alone deter-
mines disloyalty and disqualification; it matters not whether associa-
tion existed innocently or knowingly." 40 3 The prior decisions were
distinguished on this basis. But, if Garner was still good law, as it
apparently was, it could only be because the Court was willing to
distinguish between a requirement that one disclose membership in
any subversive organization-in which case the law could validly ap-
ply only to "knowing" members-and a requirement that one dis-
close membership in the Communist Party-in which case the law
could validly apply to all members.
During the years 1956 and 1957, the Supreme Court produced
almost nothing but "liberal" decisions in the area of "loyalty"-re-
lated litigation, on a variety of grounds and in a variety of con-
texts. 4  Three of those cases arose out of inquiries by legislative
committees about past or present radical political associations; in
each case, a divided Court upheld the right of the challenger to re-
fuse to answer questions.4 0 5 None of these decisions rested firmly
upon first amendment grounds. In the Sweezy case, however, the
new Chief Justice, writing for a plurality of the Court, 0 6 infused his
opinion with a tone and sensitivity that had not often been heard in
premises upon which that [decision] rested." Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589,
595 (1967).
402. 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
403. Id. at 191.
404. The exception was Black v. Cutter Laboratories, 351 U.S. 292 (1956), in
which a majority of the Court upheld a California Supreme Court decision permitting a
private employer to discharge an employee on the grounds of Communist Party member-
ship. The majority did not even perceive the presence of a substantial federal question,
but the three dissenters - Douglas, Black and Chief Justice Warren - believed that a
first amendment question was involved. Although the majority did not say so explicitly, it
seems fair to say that their conclusion rested on the absence of sufficient "state action."
Justice Douglas, however, citing Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), viewed the in-
volvement of state courts, in upholding the discharge, as sufficient to supply the necessary
"state action". 351 U.S. at 302.
405. Slochower v. Bd. of Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956); Watkins v. U.S., 354 U.S.
178 (1957); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957). With respect to the Wat-
kins and Sweezy cases, Prof. Emerson wrote that the Court "seemed to be having a
difficult time working out a satisfactory theory for application of the First Amendment to
legislative investigations." T. EmERSON, supra note 9, at 260. The reasoning of Watkins
is also criticized in H. KALVEN, supra note 9, at 483-92, and Sweezy is discussed, id. at
492-97. See generally id. at 465-72.
406. Warren wrote for himself and Justices Black, Douglas and Brennan. Justices
Frankfurter and Harlan concurred.
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recent plurality or majority decisions:
Merely to summon a witness and compel him, against his will, to disclose
the nature of his past expressions and associations is a measure of govern-
mental interference . . . .These are rights which are safeguarded by the
Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment ....
Our form of government is built on the premise that every citizen shall have
the right to engage in political expression and association. This right was
enshrined in the First Amendment of the Bill of Rights. Exercise of these
basic freedoms in America has traditionally been through the media of po-
litical associations . . . .All political ideas cannot and should not be chan-
neled into the programs of our two major parties. History has amply proved
the virtue of political activity by minority, dissident groups, who innumera-
ble times have been in the vanguard of democratic thought. . . .Mere
unorthodoxy or dissent from the prevailing mores is not to be condemned.
The absence of such voices would be a symptom of grave illness in our
society.40
7
Two other decisions of 1957 reversed state rulings denying admis-
sion to the bar, on grounds of bad moral character, because the per-
sons had been, or were suspected of having been, affiliated with the
CPUSA.40 8 Again, these decisions did not rest on first amendment
grounds, but they did provide the Justices with additional opportuni-
ties to discuss the Communist Party. Thus, in ruling that the New
Mexico Bar had acted irrationally in excluding Schware, on the ba-
sis of his CP membership during the 1930's, Justice Black, writing
for a unanimous Court, noted once again that "it cannot automati-
cally be inferred that all [CP] members shared their evil purposes or
participated in their illegal conduct.
' 409
407. 354 U.S. at 250-51. The decision upheld, on creative "due process" grounds,
the right of a university professor to refuse to answer questions, before a one-person state
investigating committee, concerning his academic lectures and the Progressive Party (al-
legedly infiltrated by Communists). Justice Frankfurter, concurring in the result with
Justice Harlan, took an extremely strong stand in defense of Sweezy's rights, speaking of
"the inviolability of privacy belonging to a citizen's political loyalties." Id. at 265. The
language he used was sweeping, but he may have revealed his intent to limit its applica-
tion when he said:
Whatever, on the basis of massive proof and in the light of history, of which
this Court may well take judicial notice, be the justification for not regarding
the Communist Party as a conventional political party, no such justification has
been afforded in regard to the Progressive Party.
Id. at 266.
408. Konigsberg v. State Bar of Calif., 353 U.S. 252 (1957); Schware v. Bd. of
Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957).
409. 353 U.S. at 246. See also 353 U.S. at 273. Konigsberg raised the additional
issue of whether one could be denied admission to the bar simply because he refused to
answer questions concerning past CP membership. Justices Harlan and Clark, dissenting,
insisted that the answer was "yes", but, perhaps remarkably, the majority in 1957 did
not agree, ruling simply that the record - including the possibility of past CP member-
ship - did not support the Bar's action. For further discussion of these cases, see H.
KALVEN, supra note 9, at 550-59.
Such was the state of the law when the Court decided Yates.
3. Yates
The Yates decision 410 was occasioned by the Smith Act conspiracy
convictions of fourteen CP leaders in Southern California in 1952.
Justice Harlan wrote for the Court; Justices Brennan and Whittaker
did not participate. Only Justice Clark dissented. The Court clarified
the Smith Act in two important and related respects: (1) by distin-
guishing between "advocacy of action" and "mere abstract advo-
cacy"; and (2) by finally describing the kinds of evidence needed to
support a Smith Act conspiracy conviction.
The first point of clarification was necessitated by the erroneous
jury instruction given by the trial judge. Arguing in support of that
instruction, the government maintained that "the true constitutional
dividing line [was] between advocacy as such, irrespective of its in-
citing qualities, and the mere discussion or exposition of violent over-
throw as an abstract theory." 411 Only Justice Clark accepted that
interpretation.412 "The essential distinction" made by the Smith Act,
said Justice Harlan, "is that those to whom the advocacy is ad-
dressed must be urged to do something, now or in the future, rather
than merely to believe in something. ' 413 This distinction was explic-
itly put forth as a matter of statutory interpretation, rather than as a
constitutional ruling. But Justice Harlan stated that, in interpreting
the Smith Act, "we should not assume that Congress chose to disre-
gard a constitutional danger zone so clearly marked. 414 Where and
when that constitutional "marking" had occurred was not at all
clear, because although Harlan cited Schenck, quoted Gitlow, and
harmonized the present opinion with Dennis-in which the trial
judge had properly instructed the jury-none of those cases had ad-
dressed the issue squarely as a point of constitutional law. Harlan's
clear but questionable implication was that this distinction was noth-
ing new. However, having adverted to the likely constitutional
dimensions of this bit of important statutory interpretation, he effec-
tively made it so.
Justices Black and Douglas concurring in part, supported this rul-
ing, but continued to stand dependably to the left of the majority.
"Under the Court's approach," wrote Black for the two of them,
"defendants could still be convicted simply for agreeing to talk as
distinguished from agreeing to act. I believe that the First Amend-
410. 354 U.S. 298 (1957).
411. Id. at 313.
412. Id. at 349.
413. Id. at 324-25 (emphasis in original).
414. Id. at 319.
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ment forbids Congress to punish people for talking about public af-
fairs, whether or not such discussion incites to action, legal or
illegal. 41 5
Turning to the record, now exposed as chock full of inoperative
evidence pertaining to "organizing" 4116 the Party and advocacy of ab-
stract doctrine, Harlan viewed it as "strikingly deficient" with re-
spect to the crucial element of advocacy of action.417 Surprisingly,
despite the fact that the charge was "conspiracy to advocate,"
Harlan clearly did not view the prosecution's burden as being satis-
fied by mere proof of agreement to speak. Dennis, he said, was con-
cerned with "a conspiracy to advocate presently the taking of forci-
ble action in the future," 418 and from this observation he distilled
somewhat oddly, a requirement of proof that actionable advocacy
had already been voiced by the defendants. Instances of such speech
in this case, he said, "are so few and far between as to be almost
completely over-shadowed by the hundreds of instances in the record
in which [mention of] overthrow . . . occurs in the course of doctri-
nal disputation so remote from action as to be almost wholly lacking
in probative value. ' 419 The Government's thesis was that the Party
constituted the conspiracy group, and that membership in the con-
spiracy could be proved by showing a sufficient connection between
the defendants, the Party, and the Party's tenets. But, while the rec-
ord supported the conclusion that abstract advocacy of forcible over-
throw was one of the Party's tenets, there was minimal evidence in
the record, "even under the loosest standards," to support a finding
of advocacy of action by the Party.420
Thus, it was necessary to consider, with respect to the individual
defendants themselves, the evidence of conspiracy to engage in such
advocacy. As to five of them, there was no evidence of conspiring;
the sole evidence against them was that they had been members,
officers, or functionaries of the Party.421
As to the remaining nine defendants, Harlan was "not prepared to
say . . . that it would be impossible" for a jury to validly find the
415. Id. at 340.
416. See supra text accompanying notes 130-31.
417. 354 U.S. at 329.
418. Id. at 324 (emphasis added).
419. Id. at 327.
420. Id. at 329-30.
421. Id. at 330-31. Justice Harlan observed, as well, that such evidence would not
likely support the necessary finding of specific intent to forcibly overthrow the govern-
ment. Id. at 331.
requisite advocacy of action.422 It might be found, he said, that those
defendants were sufficiently connected to systematic teaching-of
"sabotage and street fighting," and of "methods ... of moving
'masses of people in times of crisis' "-designed "to prepare the
members of the underground apparatus to engage in, to facilitate,
and to cooperate with violent action directed against the government
when the time was ripe.5
423
Justices Black and Douglas, dissenting in part, would have ordered
acquittal for all of the defendants.424 Justice Clark would have af-
firmed all of the convictions.425
While the Harlan decision in Yates has been criticized as ambigu-
ous and insufficiently protective of speech,426 it seems largely to have
been hailed by legal scholars as a masterful piece of judicial crafts-
manship inspired by a deliberate but unacknowledged desire to re-
treat gracefully from the constitutional doctrine of Dennis.427 For ex-
ample, Professor Belknap has written that the Yates case "offered a
way for justices concerned about the excesses of the anti-communist
crusade to limit the Smith Act prosecutions without having to take
the embarrassing step of directly overruling Dennis, '428 and that the
decision was "admirably suited to disguise a change in outlook and
allow its author and Frankfurter to maintain at least the illusion of
consistency. s4 2  But although the Court in Yates broke new doctrinal
ground, it did so as a matter of statutory interpretation, albeit with
constitutional principles hovering closely above. As the concurring
Justices in Yates noted, the basic constitutional principles of Dennis
422. 354 U.S. at 332.
423. Id. at 331-32. Interestingly, one of the defendants for whom the Court did not
order an acquittal was William Schneiderman, the same person whose denaturalization
had been reversed by the Supreme Court fourteen years earlier. Schneiderman v. U.S.,
320 U.S. 118 (1943). In Yates, Schneiderman argued that the government was collater-
ally estopped, based on that ruling, from pursuing him under the Smith Act. The Court
properly rejected that procedural argument. 354 U.S. at 335-38.
424. 354 U.S. at 339.
425. Id. at 345.
426. See Greenawalt, Speech and Crime, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 645, 720-21;
M. KoNvITZ, supra note 99, at 126; see also Church, Conspiracy Doctrine and Speech
Offenses: A Reexamination of Yates v. U.S. from the Perspective of U.S. v. Spock, 60
CORNELL L. REV. 569, 580-83 (1975). Perhaps the strongest critique has been voiced by
Prof. Redish, who has opined that "attempting to distinguish between one who favors the
ultimate overthrow of the government in the 'abstract' and one who illegally advocates
overthrow at some undetermined future time rivals the inquiry into the number of angels
dancing on a pin's head for absurdity." Redish, supra note 372, at 1196.
427. See, e.g., M. KoNVITZ, supra note 99, at 126; H. KALVEN, supra note 9, at
211-22; P. STEINBERG, supra note 8, at 279-80; Mollan, supra note 122, at 726; D.
CAUTE, supra note 78, at 208; Gunther, Learned Hand and the Origins of Modern First
Amendment Doctrine: Some Fragments of History, 27 STAN. L. REv. 719, 753 (1975).
428. M. BELKNAP, supra note 8, at 241.
429. Id. at 246. With respect to Justice Frankfurter, Belknap points to correspon-
dence by that Justice revealing his growing concern about the anti-Communist hysteria
of the mid-1950's. Id. at 245.
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had not been repudiated in Yates, and while the Court's rulings on
the evidence in Yates ultimately ended the Smith Act conspiracy
prosecutions, the fact is that the Court was prepared to allow new
trials for some of the Yates defendants on the basis of meager evi-
dence. Only two Justices, Frankfurter and Burton, supported the re-
sults in both Dennis and Yates. Was it clear that six years after
Dennis, they had second thoughts about their earlier votes? Yates
was surely an important development, but the suggestion that it rep-
resented a clear retreat from Dennis appears to be unwarranted.
4. Back to the Loier Courts: The Evidence of
Forbidden Advocacy
After Yates, then, certain advocacy of forcible overthrow was pun-
ishable under the Smith Act and the Constitution, while other such
advocacy was not punishable, as a matter of constitutionally-influ-
enced statutory interpretation. Was the distinction clear, workable,
and constitutionally appropriate? The "essential distinction," again,
was "that those to whom the advocacy is addressed must be urged to
do something, now or in the future, rather than merely to believe in
something. 4 30 That sounds clear and workable, but is it? A review
of some of the opinions of the courts of appeals that have applied
Yates to pending cases raises serious questions in this regard.
Consider for example, the case of Bary v. United States,"1 in
which the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals faced the task of applying
Yates in reviewing the convictions of seven Smith Act defendants in
Denver in 1954. From the Court's extensive review of the evi-
dence,43 2 here are, in this author's opinion, the most incriminating
pieces of evidence in the case:
Bary ... [i]n a lecture. . ., said that their job was to get the politicians to
fight and thus create a political crisis ... and that the job of members of
the Party was to work for peace as a tactic, to establish an economic crisis
and also to work in the political field.4
3
Anna ... said that if the Party was in power in steel, meat packing,
rubber, and mining industries in Colorado and there were strikes, they
would be in a position to shut down such industries and thus affect the
economy of the region and the nation. She was present at a meeting when a
speaker said that it was necessary to create a huge Mexican organization in
the Southwest to overthrow the capitalists; was present at an educational
[meeting] when Bary compared the Party to an army staff and talked of
430. 354 U.S. at 324-25 (emphasis in original).
431. 248 F.2d 201 (10th Cir. 1957).
432. Id. at 209-13.
433. Id. at 210.
having cadres in correct position in key industries when the proper time
came ...
Zepelin . . . said at a meeting that the party must organize the Negro
and Mexican people . . . . Johnson . .. [a]t a club meeting . . . said that
they were trying to recruit a lot of people . . . and urged his listeners to
make a sincere effort to bring someone into the party. . . 3
Scherrer . . . said . . . that the Communists could get in power in
Pueblo through the Union . . . . He. . . was present at a group meeting
when Maia said that after civil, legal, and political means were exhausted,
Negroes should take up arms to protect themselves ....
Maia. . . said at a meeting that she thought it was not impossible to get
some members of the party in the Ordinance Depot at Pueblo, and that it
could be done very silently and safely.
43 5
Patricia stated in the course of a meeting that it was necessary to create
a huge Mexican organization in the Southwest to overthrow the capitalists;
and on another occasion, she said that it would be very fine if certain dissat-
isfied persons working at White Sands and Los Alamos, New Mexico, could
be brought into the Party because they were working on such highly secret
and important government projects .4
3
How should such utterances be characterized? To categorize them
as "mere abstract discussion" seems less than fully accurate. But
were listeners urged to take any specific steps? Other than with re-
spect to recruiting, it seems not. On which side of the line, should
such speech fall? Would it be naive, and therefore erroneous, to in-
sist, as a predicate for sanctions, on words that clearly and directly
exhort a response on the part of a listener? In any event, the court of
appeals had no trouble reaching a conclusion:
The evidence did not merely disclose advocacy, utterances, or teaching in
the abstract-unrelated to or divorced from incitement to action ....
Neither did it merely disclose discussion or exposition of violent overthrow
as an abstract theory. Considered in its totality, the evidence disclosed as to
each of the appellants incitement and advocacy of action in an effort to
overthrow the Government by force and violence as speedily as circum-
stances would permit . ... 437
The Bary court was not exceptional in its post-Yates review of
evidence of forbidden advocacy.438 But not all courts shared its
views. For instance, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals did not
share the view when it ordered acquittals for the Connecticut Com-
munist leaders in United States v. Silverman.4 3 9 Following a close
434. Id. at 211.
435. Id. at 212.
436. Id. at 212-13.
437. Id. at 213. The second trial in Bary resulted in another conviction, which was
later reversed on other grounds. Bary v. U.S., 292 F.2d 53 (10th Cir. 1961). See M.
BELKNAP, supra note 8, at 260-61.
438. See also Wellman v. U.S., 253 F.2d 601, 607-08 (6th Cir. 1958), in which
the majority of the Court seemed to be inordinately impressed by the Party's secretive-
ness and "systematic" educational endeavors. The concurring opinion of then-Judge Pot-
ter Stewart, at 608-09, demonstrated considerably more awareness of the weakness of the
evidence. It was enough for him, however, that the record was "not too tenuous to jus-
tify" retrial. On retrial, the case was dismissed for lack of sufficient evidence. Mollan,
supra note 122, at 732.
439. 248 F.2d 671 (2d Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 942 (1958).
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and detailed analysis of the evidence440 which, in fairness, seems to
have consisted more clearly of prognostications and justifications
than was true in Bary, Judge Clark concluded that there was "no
direct evidence of a single example of [forbidden] advocacy, despite
ample opportunity for observation by FBI agents with access to the
conspirators' innermost councils." 44' Judge Clark even suggested an
explanation of why the American Communists might not have en-
gaged in "advocacy of action" in the early 1950's. While those seek-
ing violent revolution in the future might presently teach its neces-
sity, he observed, "would-be revolutionaries are at least as
likely. . .to adopt the tactic in years of unpopularity of decrying the
use of violence and posing as peaceful social reformers. '"442 The
crime charged, he emphasized, was conspiracy to advocate forcible
overthrow, not conspiracy to commit sabotage or espionage.
As it happened, all of the remaining Smith Act conspiracy prose-
cutions were eventually dropped or dismissed.443 But cases like Bary,
as well as the Yates opinion itself,444 suggest that the government's
crusade had not necessarily been rendered futile by the Yates deci-
sion. Nonetheless, while these prosecutions were ultimately aban-
doned, legal precedent was established which bears close analysis.
The question that should count, in a case like Bary, is not "Is it
abstract advocacy, or a call to action?", but rather, "Is this speech
constitutionally punishable?" The truly regrettable fact is that the
Supreme Court never really answered that question. Yates was a de-
cision based on statutory interpretation, albeit with serious constitu-
tional overtones, in which "clear and present danger" re-analysis was
440. Id. at 677-86.
441. Id. at 686. Accord, Mollan, supra note 122, at 735, posing the possibility that
the lack of government evidence of illegal advocacy "may have been because the Com-
munist Party was skillful in preventing discovery of such . . . conspiracy. But the extent
to which the FBI had infiltrated the Party makes this an unlikely hypothesis. Many of
the Government's witnesses were informers who had succeeded in assuming positions of
trust and leadership within the Party."
442. 248 F.2d at 686. In an insightful footnote, Judge Clark added: "The prosecu-
tion stresses the proof of industrial concentration and of concealment. But these do not
rationally raise any inference that the appellants engaged in a plot to advocate insurrec-
tion at the time they were hiding and seeking factory jobs. The industrial concentration
possibly suggests a conspiracy to commit sabotage, espionage, or political strikes. . .; but
it does not point very directly toward illegal exhortation. Similarly, concealment is con-
sistent with any unpopular or illegal enterprise; but the jury could not tell the nature of
the enterprise from the mere fact of concealment." Id. at 685, n. 5.
443. See supra text accompanying notes 138-41.
444. It is true, of course, that the Court in Yates did not decide that the evidence
against nine defendants was sufficient to convict, but only that it justified a retrial. 354
U.S. at 328, 332.
avoided, probably because the decision was so favorable to the de-
fendants. Had the nine defendants been retried and convicted, con-
stitutional review could have taken place on the basis of a clear, un-
cluttered record. The Court's "clear and present danger" analysis in
Dennis, such as it was, continued to govern, but Dennis was virtually
an exercise in "abstract advocacy" itself, eschewing any direct focus
upon the evidence while conjuring up images of revolutionary guer-
rillas waiting for the opportune moment to strike.44 Even Justice
Harlan, in Yates, referred vividly to the preparation of Party mem-
bers for "sabotage and street fighting,"446 in summarizing the
"good" evidence of illegal advocacy. But where was the first amend-
ment analysis of the validity of punishing the kind of speech de-
scribed in cases like Bary, such as speech about creating political
and economic "crises," about recruiting members and organizing
among minority groups, and about placing members in key indus-
tries? Very possibly the Court in Dennis would have seen sufficient
danger in such speech to justify its suppression. But the law of free-
dom of expression would have been much clearer if the Court had
directly discussed such speech in constitutional terms.
5. Prelude to Scales and Noto
The Supreme Court returned to the Smith Act in 1961, but in the
interim between the Yates and Scales decisions it decided a batch of
loyalty-oath and disclosure cases that had resulted from the perva-
sive concern about the Communist threat to national security. In
only one case out of ten did the Court strike down the challenged
law, despite the more liberal trend in the decisions of 1956 and 1957.
The exception was Speiser v. Randall,44 in which the Court
struck down a California law conditioning property tax exemptions
for veterans upon their signing an oath stating that they did not ad-
vocate forcible overthrow of the Government. Justice Brennan's ra-
tionale, for the majority, was a narrow and particularized one, in-
fused with first amendment concerns but smacking equally of due
process, and, as Justice Clark observed, Brennan did not unequivo-
cally suggest that every such oath must be invalid. Justices Black
and Douglas, concurring, relied firmly on the first amendment. They
noted that the oath was not limited to incitement to action. "As
Yates . . . makes clear," wrote Justice Douglas, "there is still a
clear constitutional line between advocacy of abstract doctrine and
445. See generally Dennis v. U.S., 341 U.S. at 509-10.
446. 354 U.S. at 331. Recall Justice Douglas in Dennis: "If this were a case where
those who claimed protection under the First Amendment were teaching the techniques
of sabotage,. . . I would have no doubts.. .. But the fact is that no such evidence was
introduced at the trial." 341 U.S. at 581.
447. 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
[VOL 28: 1. 1991] Communists & First Amendment
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
advocacy of action. '448 Thus, what was previously put forth, strictly
speaking, as a matter of statutory interpretation was now clearly
stated, by at least two Justices, as a constitutional principle. On that
basis alone, the Speiser decision should have been an easy one, once
one accepted the majority's now-fundamental assertion that a denial
of a governmental benefit based upon speech is a limitation on free-
dom of speech.449 But even if the oath had applied solely to "advo-
cacy of action," could there be a significant government interest in
denying a monetary benefit on that basis alone? Did the greater
power to make such advocacy criminal include the lesser power to
deny benefits? While simple logic would suggest that the answer is
"yes," that conclusion is not inescapable. Only Justice Clark, in dis-
sent, expressly embraced it, finding the state's interest in avoiding
"subsidization" of illegal advocacy sufficient.450
In that same year, 1958, the Court promulgated its landmark
opinion on freedom of association in NAACP v. Alabama.451 Al-
though various Justices had occasionally spoken in previous opinions
of a "right to associate,"45 the majority opinion in NAACP was the
first to crystallize and explain the first amendment protection of
group association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas. For a
unanimous Court, Justice Harlan recognized the serious harm, such
as loss of employment, that could befall members of politically un-
popular groups if the government could compel disclosure of mem-
bership in those groups.453
In NAACP, Alabama sought to compel the organization itself to
448. Id. at 537. Ironically, Justices Douglas and Black relied upon that distinction
while still believing that even advocacy of action was constitutionally protected speech.
Id. at 538.
449. Id. at 518.
450. Id. at 542-43:
The majority assumes, without deciding, that California may deny a tax ex-
emption to those in the proscribed class. I think it perfectly clear that the State
may do so, since only that speech is affected which is criminally punishable
under the Federal Smith Act. . . . The interest of the State that justifies re-
striction of speech by imposition of criminal sanctions surely justifies the far
less severe measure of denying a tax exemption ...
(Justice Clark's statement about the majority's "assumption" seems to me to go a bit too
far, but it is true that Justice Brennan's majority opinion allowed for the possibility that
such a denial could be upheld.) Problems with Speiser are suggested in Note, Loyalty
Oaths, 77 YALE L.J. 739, 764-65 (1968).
451. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
452. See cases cited supra note 238. See also the plurality opinion of Chief Justice
Warren in Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 235 (1957), see supra in text accompa-
nying notes 405-07.
453. 357 U.S. at 461-63.
disclose its membership records, for highly unpersuasive reasons.
The Court rejected the state's position, stating in the process that the
state's interest, in order to overcome the first amendment rights at
stake, must be "compelling."" 4
In 1960 the Court reached a similar result in another case,415 and,
in yet another, struck down an Arkansas statute requiring every
teacher to file an affidavit listing "every organization to which he has
belonged ...within the preceding five years."" 6 Justice Stewart,
who had replaced Justice Burton in 1958, wrote for the majority that
the requirement swept too broadly without sufficient justification.
Yet, on the same day that NAACP was decided, a divided Court,
in two separate cases, upheld the dismissals of a teacher and a sub-
way-car conductor for their refusals to answer questions concerning
past or present membership in the Communist Party." 1 The major-
ity of the Court did not seem to even perceive these cases as raising
the same issue of freedom of association posed by the Alabama and
Arkansas disclosure requirements. Only Justice Douglas, joined by
Justice Black, insisted that the principles of NAACP should con-
trol.4 8 Justice Douglas also protested that "the most we can assume
from their failure to answer is that" the discharged employees were
Communists; yet membership in the CP "may be innocent," and
therefore, beyond the power of the state to penalize. 59 But the Court
had not yet clearly accepted the notion that CP membership might
be innocent and therefore beyond sanction. Nor was it settled that a
state could not inquire into status, even if that status alone could not
be penalized.
But the associational-freedom argument was squarely confronted
and rejected, by a 5-4 margin, in the following year, in a case involv-
ing a state's ability to inquire into possible Communist involvement
in an organization called World Fellowship, Inc.46 0 Given the evi-
dence and the circumstances, the majority found "the governmental
interest in self-preservation . .. sufficiently compelling to
454. Id. at 463.
455. Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960).
456. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960). But in this case there were four
dissenters: Justices Frankfurter, Clark, Harlan, and Whittaker.
457. Lerner v. Casey, 357 U.S. 468 (1958); Beilan v. Bd. of Public Educ., 357
U.S. 399 (1958).
458. Beilan, 357 U.S. at 414. Justices Brennan and Warren also dissented, but on
procedural due process grounds. The arguable difficulty of reconciling these decisions is
reflected in Professor Kalven's quip: "It is tempting to join the 'realist' and state the
operative principle bluntly: The Communists cannot win, the NAACP cannot lose." H.
KALVEE, supra note 9, at 259.
459. Beilan, 357 U.S. at 414.
460. Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72 (1959). Justices Brennan, Black, Douglas,
and Warren dissented.
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subordinate the interest in associational privacy. "461
That same day, an identical majority of the Court, in Barenblatt
v. United States,412 upheld the contempt conviction of a witness
before the House Committee on Un-American Activities (HUAC) in
1954 who refused to answer questions about his past or present
membership in the CP. Because Congiess had the power to legislate
in the field of Communist activity, Justice Harlan reasoned, it also
had the power to investigate in aid of that legislative authority. 463 In
justifying the application to the Communists of the power of national
"self-preservation," Harlan cited Dennis, and used language reminis-
cent of much that was said in that opinion: "Justification for its exer-
cise in turn rests on the long and widely accepted view that the ten-
ets of the Communist Party include the ultimate overthrow of the
Government of the United States by force and violence," a view, he
noted, with reference to the Internal Security Act of 1950, "which
has been given formal expression by the Congress. '"464
Thus, he continued, the Court "has consistently refused to view
the Communist Party as an ordinary political party, and has upheld
federal legislation aimed at the Communist problem which in a dif-
ferent context would certainly have raised constitutional issues of the
gravest character. ' 46 5 Reaching the critical point at hand, he con-
cluded: "An investigation of advocacy of or preparation for over-
throw certainly embraces the right to identify a witness as a member
of the Communist Party. ' 466 Very significantly, he added: "The
strict requirements of a prosecution under the Smith Act .. .are
not the measure of the permissible scope of a congressional investiga-
tion into 'overthrow,' for of necessity the investigatory process must
proceed step by step. ' 467 First amendment interests were implicated,
461. Id. at 81. While the quoted passage hints at the exercise of strict scrutiny,
Justice Clark posed the question at hand as "whether the public interests overbalance"
the interests in associational privacy, and asserted that the decision would turn on the
"substantiality" of the state's interests. Id. at 78. In his dissent, Justice Brennan charac-
terized the state's goal as "exposure for exposure's sake", and rejected that goal as an
"impermissible" state interest. Id. at 82.
462. 360 U.S. 109 (1959).
463. Id. at 127.
464. Id. at 128.
465. Id. To suggest that the CP be viewed as an "ordinary political party from the
standpoint of national security", he added, would be "to ask this Court to blind itself to
world affairs which have determined the whole course of our national policy since the
close of World War II, affairs to which Judge Learned Hand gave vivid expression in his
opinion in U.S. v. Dennis...." Id. at 128-29.
466. Id. at 130.
467. Id. Barenblatt is criticized in H. KALVEN, supra note 9, at 497-505; T. EMER-
but were outweighed by those of the government. Once again, Jus-
tices Black, Douglas, Brennan, and Warren dissented. In the next
two years, the Court sustained the penalties imposed upon resistant
witnesses before the HUAC in three additional cases, with the Jus-
tices dividing along virtually the same lines as in Barenblatt and
Uphaus.
4 8
Splitting exactly the same way, the Court in 1961 (in striking con-
trast to its rulings of 1957) upheld two state bar decisions denying
admission to would-be attorneys who refused to answer questions
concerning their political associations and beliefs, including past or
present membership in the Communist Party. 6 9 Admission to the
California bar, at stake in one of the cases, was unavailable to per-
sons who advocated forcible overthrow of the government, and, thus,
information concerning CP membership was deemed relevant to the
ultimate inquiry. Again, the fact that mere membership alone was
not a ground for disqualification under state law did not mean, to the
majority, that it was unconstitutional for the question to be asked
and an answer required.4 70 The requirement of non-advocacy itself,
as a condition to bar admission, had not been challenged in this liti-
gation, but caused the majority no difficulty. Speaking for the Court
yet again, Justice Harlan stated:
It would indeed be difficult to argue that a belief, firm enough to be carried
over into advocacy, in the use of illegal means to change the form of the
State or Federal Government is an unimportant consideration in determin-
ing the fitness of applicants for membership in a profession in whose hands
so largely lies the safekeeping of this country's legal and political
SON, supra note 9, at 276-78; and Meiklejohn, The Balancing of Self-Preservation
Against Political Freedom, 49 CALIF. L. REV. 4 (1961). In Professor Emerson's strong
words: "Justice Harlan made no serious effort to balance interests in the Barenblatt
case. . . ." T. EMERSON, supra note 9, at 276. Writing in 1970, Prof. Nathanson raised
the interesting question "whether the rule of Barenblatt, and the principle illustrated by
Robel [see supra text accompanying notes 167-69] can long survive comfortably to-
gether ... ." He continued: "Indeed, realistically viewed, it might well appear that the
Government's interest in disqualifying Communists from defense facilities and Govern-
ment employment would be considerably stronger than would be the Government's inter-
est in publishing lists of Communists who might then be excluded from various walks of
private life by purely private action." Nathanson, Freedom of Association and the Quest
for Internal Security: Conspiracy From Dennis to Dr. Spock, 65 Nw. U. L. Rav. 153,
186 (1970).
468. Braden v. U.S., 365 U.S. 431 (1961); Wilkinson v. U.S., 365 U.S. 399
(1961); Nelson v. County of LA, 362 U.S. 1 (1960). Chief Justice Warren took no part
in the Nelson decision. For an earlier decision of the same ilk, see also Barsky v. Board
of Regents, 347 U.S. 442 (1954) (Justices Black, Douglas, and Frankfurter, dissenting).
469. Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36 (1961); In Re Anastaplo, 366
U.S. 82 (1961). Konigsberg was the follow-up to the 1957 decision of the same name.
The decision in Konigsberg I addressed the Bar's conclusion that Konigsberg had failed
to prove his good moral character and non-advocacy of forcible overthrow. Konigsberg If
addressed the Bar's later decision, following rehearing, expressly based on Konigsberg's
refusal to answer certain questions. The difference presumptively explains why Justice
Frankfurter was in the majority in both cases.
470. 366 U.S. at 46-47.
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institutions .471
The state's interest in having lawyers "who are devoted to law in its
broadest sense," including its procedures for orderly change, was
deemed "sufficient to outweigh the minimal effect upon free associa-
tion occasioned by compulsory disclosure.' 72
Justice Harlan spoke, in Konigsberg II, of "weighing" interests
and "the informed exercise of valid governmental powers. 473 Justice
Black, dissenting, took Harlan to task for engaging in "balancing,"
believing "that the First Amendment's unequivocal command" re-
vealed that the Framers "did all the 'balancing' that was to be done
in this field.'' What no one raised was the ostensible rule, stated
by Justice Harlan himself in NAACP v. Alabama, that a valid inter-
ference with freedom of association requires a "compelling" state in-
terest. Justice Harlan distinguished that case on the ground that, be-
cause the Bar's inquiry was private, there was no danger here of
opprobrium descending upon an exposed Communist; consequently,
he seemed to be little impressed with the first amendment claim.475
Justice Black disagreed with both the majority's suggestion that the
effect on speech was "minimal" or "incidental, '47 6 and that the an-
swers given would likely be kept confidential.477 He also noted that
the majority had not attempted to find a "clear" or "present" danger
posed by the speech or association in question. 47
What can we conclude from these cases of the late 1950's and
early '60's? For one thing, it is clear that the famed "liberal" wing
of the Warren Court had not yet come into the ascendancy. The
majority that consisted of Justices Frankfurter, Clark, and Harlan,
plus newcomers Potter Stewart and the inscrutable Charles Whitta-
471. Id. at 51-52.
472. Id. at 52.
473. Id. at 51.
474. Id. at 61.
475. Id. at 53.
476. Id. at 70-71, 73.
477. Id. at 72-73.
478. Id. at 64. Justice Black wrote for himself, Justice Douglas, and Chief Justice
Warren. Justice Brennan concurred separately, joined by Chief Justice Warren. His ar-
gument, shared by Justice Black but rejected by the majority, was that the California
State Bar procedure was in conflict with the principle stated by Brennan for the Court in
Speiser v. Randall, that the burden of proof could not be placed on a claimant to demon-
strate that he had not engaged in forbidden speech or association.
The 1961 Bar Admission cases are criticized in H. KALVEN, supra note 9, at 559-74;
and T. EMERSON, supra note 9, at 181-82. See also Powe, Justice Douglas After Fifty
Years: The First Amendment, McCarthyism and Rights, 6 CoNsT. COMMENTARY 267,
281-83 (1989), extolling the opinions of Justices Black and Douglas in Konigsberg, Anas-
taplo, Barenblatt, and Wilkinson.
ker, had upheld virtually every requirement, whether state or fed-
eral, that questions be answered and information disclosed, pertain-
ing directly to past or present membership in the Communist Party.
The bounds of permissible inquiry, moreover, were not co-equal with
the bounds of permissible punishment. The theoretical approach of
the Court varied in these cases. The language of strict scrutiny,
emerging in 1958 but failing to take firm hold, was used in cases
involving NAACP members, who generally succeeded in their chal-
lenges to disclosure requirements. In the "Communist" cases, the
majority typically fell back into the language of "balancing."
Did the willingness of a Justice to uphold a disclosure requirement
imply his agreement with the basic constitutional ruling in Dennis?
(Ten years later, only Justices Frankfurter, Black, and Douglas re-
mained, from the Dennis Court.) Had Dennis played any role in lay-
ing the conceptual groundwork for these disclosure decisions? If the
Court had ruled in Dennis that the application of the Smith Act
therein was unconstitutional, would these later cases have been af-
fected? Was the validity of demanding these disclosures in any way
dependent upon the fact that, according to Dennis, the CPUSA did
pose a sufficiently "clear and present" danger of attempted
overthrow?
It is not possible to be certain that the answer to any of these
questions is "yes". In strict theory, the question of disclosure is quite
separate from the question of criminal punishment for advocacy, or-
ganization, or membership. The advocacy of the Communists could
have been fully protected by the first amendment, and still member-
ship could have been deemed relevant to potential legislation bearing
upon sabotage, or other illegal conduct. However, given the charac-
terization of the Communist Party set forth by Justice Harlan in
Barenblatt, it is surely possible to imagine, in an era of persistent 5-4
rulings, that had Dennis not etched in stone the assumption that the
CP truly posed a grave danger to national security, these subsequent
cases might have come out differently.
6. The Scales and Noto Decisions
The twelve leaders of the CPUSA who were convicted in 1949 had
been indicted under the membership clause of the Smith Act as well,
but the government chose to try them only for conspiracy. Beginning
in the spring of 1954 and continuing into 1956, various American
Communists were indicted, and later tried, under the membership
clause.47 9 All were convicted. One of them was Junius Scales, ini-
479. For the history of these prosecutions, see generally M. BELKNAP, supra note
8, at 262-65, 271-72. According to Belknap, the trials resembled those in the conspiracy
cases, involving "the same battle of books." Id. at 263. See also Mollan, supra note 122,
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tially convicted in North Carolina in 1955, whose case ultimately
found its way to the United States Supreme Court. After a series of
delays,48 0 the Supreme Court decided the case on its merits in 1961.
As had become commonplace, Justice Harlan wrote for the majority,
while Justices Black, Douglas, Brennan, and the Chief Justice
dissented.
The jury had been instructed that, to convict, it had to find that
(1) the Communist Party advocated the violent overthrow of the Govern-
ment, in the sense of present "advocacy of action" to accomplish that end
as soon as circumstances were propitious; and (2) [Scales] was an "active"
member of the Party, and not merely "a nominal, passive, inactive or purely
technical" member, with knowledge of the Party's illegal advocacy and a
specific intent to bring about violent overthrow "as speedily as circum-
stances would permit.
4 8 1
The Court approved that construction of the membership clause,
and, as so interpreted, found it constitutional.
On the constitutional issue, Justice Harlan made his point with
admirable succinctness:
Little remains to be said concerning the claim that the statute infringes
First Amendment freedoms. It was settled in Dennis that the advocacy with
which we are here concerned is not constitutionally protected speech, and it
was further established that a combination to promote such advocacy, ...
is not such association as is protected by the First Amendment. We can
discern no reason why membership, when it constitutes a purposeful form of
complicity in a group engaging in this same forbidden advocacy, should re-
ceive any greater degree of protection from the guarantees of that
Amendment.482
at 716-20, 740-41.
480. The procedural history of the case is set out in Scales v. U.S., 367 U.S. 203,
206, n. 2 (1961). See also M. BELKNAP, supra note 8, at 265-66. The Scales decisions at
the court of appeals level are analyzed in Mollan, supra note 122, at 720-23, 741-44,
along with the decision in U.S. v. Lightfoot, 228 F.2d 861 (7th Cir. 1956), rev'd on other
grounds 355 U.S. 2 (1957). The courts of appeals had no problems upholding the consti-
tutionality of these convictions.
On the chronology and context of the Scales case, see also Taylor, Foreword to J.
SCALES & R. NICKSON, CAUSE AT HEART: A FORMER COMMUNIST REMEMBERS at xi-xxvi
(1987). Taylor suggests therein that the government's motivation in retrying Scales, after
the reversal of his first conviction and after he had withdrawn from the CP, was to
bolster its position with respect to the McCarran Act. "Thus it had become plain to the
government, that if either the membership clause of the Smith Act, or the much more
important Internal Security Act, was to be salvaged, the immediate necessity was to
produce before the Supreme Court a case in which the evidence about the CP would
satisfy the Yates case standards and persuade the Supreme Court to find that the Party
was an organization which incited the use of force and violence to overthrow the govern-
ment. The Scales case was chosen as the vehicle for that purpose ... " Taylor, supra at
xviii.
481. 367 U.S. 203, 220.
482. Id. at 228-29. See also id. at 251.
For the first time in a majority opinion, the opinion also hinted
strongly that anything other than "active" membership in the Com-
munist Party, "even though accompanied by 'knowledge' and 'in-
tent,'" could not be made illegal under the first amendment. 83 To
do so, Justice Harlan recognized, would create "a real danger that
legitimate political expression or association would be impaired.
48 4
To that extent, Scales took a significant step forward.
But can it be doubted that, with respect to the first amendment,
Scales rested firmly and necessarily on Dennis, its ten-year-old pred-
ecessor? Furthermore, was there no need for reassessment of the
Dennis finding of the "clear and present danger" posed by the
CPUSA? All three of the "majority" opinions in Dennis had ad-
verted to world conditions at the time of the conviction, 485 as had
other federal judges in the ensuing conspiracy prosecutions. 48 Was
reassessment of the international situation not warranted? Was the
demonstrably reduced potency of the CPUSA in the mid-1950's ir-
relevant? Even by Learned Hand's standards, should not the "im-
probability" discount have been raised sometime between 1949 and
1961, even if the "gravity of the 'evil'" remained the same?48" 7 Char-
acterizing Dennis in a nutshell in 1957, Justice Harlan had written:
The essence of the Dennis holding was that indoctrination of a group in
preparation for future violent action ... by advocacy found to be directed
to "action for the accomplishment" of forcible overthrow,. . . is not consti-
tutionally protected when the group is of sufficient size and cohesiveness, is
sufficiently oriented towards action, and other circumstances are such as
reasonably to justify apprehension that action will occur.
488
Did all those circumstances still exist in 1955, or 1961? Apparently,
no one asked.489
The Scales opinion was also important, in theory, because of its
treatment of the sufficiency of the evidence at trial. Again, an essen-
tial element of a membership clause violation was illegal Party "ad-
vocacy of action." Scales contended that the evidence of such advo-
cacy in his case was no better than that which was found wanting in
483. Id. at 222.
484. Id. at 229.
485. See supra text accompanying notes 351-52, 363, 371.
486. See supra text accompanying notes 388-90.
487. See supra text accompanying notes 331-32.
488. Yates v. U.S., 354 U.S. 298, 321 (1956) (emphasis added).
489. In a footnote, Justice Harlan indicated that the petition for certiorari had not
raised the issue of the application of the clear and present danger test in this case; there-
fore, the Court would not consider it. Nonetheless, the Court did evaluate the constitu-
tionality of the membership clause. Justices Black and Douglas dissented on first amend-
ment grounds, 367 U.S. at 260, 262-68, but spoke only in broad, general terms. Justice
Brennan, joined by Justice Douglas and the Chief Justice, wrote a separate dissenting
opinion arguing solely that section (4)(f) of the McCarran Act - making clear that CP
membership per se was not a crime - had effectively repealed the Smith Act's member-
ship clause. No dissenter addressed the sufficiency of the evidence.
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Yates itself. The Court disagreed.
Harlan began this part of his opinion by listing the kinds of evi-
dence that would and would not suffice. Properly on the "insuffi-
cient" list were: teaching of the Marxist-Leninist "classics" and
"general literature"; general Party resolutions and pronouncements;
"the clandestine nature of the Party"; and statements supportive of
the Soviet Union.49° The "sufficient" list is not as easily described,
and even less easily understood. Reviewing the Yates evidence in
summary form, Harlan referred to the teaching of "techniques for
achieving" violent revolution, examples of which were teaching
members: (1) how to "convert a general strike into a revolution;" (2)
how "to deal with Negroes so as to prepare them specifically for
revolution;" (3) "methods of moving 'masses of people in times of
crisis;'" and (4) the "development of a special communication sys-
tem. '491 All of this indicated, he said, two patterns of evidence that
were sufficient to show illegal advocacy:
(a) the teaching of forceful overthrow, accompanied by directions as to the
type of illegal action which must be taken when the time for the revolution
is reached; and (b) the teaching of forceful overthrow, accompanied by a
contemporary, though legal, course of conduct clearly undertaken for the
specific purpose of rendering effective the later illegal activity which is
advocated.
49 2
Examples (1) and (3) above arguably'fall into and exemplify pattern
(a), in that they can be seen as present directions concerning long-
term future acts. Examples (2) and (4) are similar, but arguably fall
into a category which we might describe as present directions con-
cerning present or short-term future acts. But pattern (b), as de-
scribed by Justice Harlan, seems anomalous, in that its key element
amounts to nothing more than present legal conduct. The "teaching
of forceful overthrow," which must accompany it, obviously would
not suffice in and of itself, as it might be wholly abstract, and thus
protected. How could legal abstract advocacy, accompanied by legal
conduct, add up to illegal advocacy? It is not at all clear, however,
that this troubling verbal formula had any direct effect upon the
decision.
Again, the critical Yates distinction was the difference between
(a) urging a listener to believe in something, and (b) urging a lis-
tener to do something. The trial judge in Scales, judging by his in-
structions to the jury, seems to have fully understood the distinc-
490. 367 U.S. at 232.
491. Id. at 233.
492. Id. at 234 (emphasis added).
tion.40 3 In fact, he underscored it well by advising the jurors of the
necessity to find Party advocacy which "one, called on its members
to take forcible and concrete action at some advantageous time
thereafter . . . and, two, expressed that call in such . . . words as
would reasonably and ordinarily be calculated to incite its members
to take [such] action. . . .-9 But Justice Harlan's extensive review
of the evidence of Party advocacy495 suggests that there was very
little evidence of such punishable speech. Many of the testimonial
excerpts concerning Party teaching, which Harlan deemed important
enough to quote, concern highly abstract or predictive statements,
such as these:
[T]he forcible elements of the capitalist state must be smashed in the
course of taking power. .... .96
[Pletitioner repeatedly told [a member] of the necessity for revolution to
bring about the Dictatorship of the Proletariat . . . . 7 [and] that ...
when the revolution started, we would have the benefit of the help from the
mother country, Russia, in bringing about our own revolution .... 498
Petitioner . . .said "that we Communists in this country would have to
start the revolution, and we would have to continue fighting it ... . 9
[He also stated, as Scales had,] that "the revolution basically would come
about by combining the forces of . . .the Negro nation and the working
class as the vanguard. 00
Other highlighted statements were merely descriptive:
[P]etitioner told [a member] that. . . the strategy of the Communist Party
was to bring the working class. . . and what he termed the Negro nation,
together, to bring about a forceful overthrow of the Government. 50 1
The District Organizer ... told the students that ... the Communist
Party has a program of industrial concentration in which they try to get
...Communist Party members into key shops or key industries . . . so
that the Communist Party members ...will be able to more effectively
...[attempt] to control the union in that particular plant.802
Other statements pertained solely to what would happen after the
revolution.50 3 A great many of the statements attributed to Party
members could possibly be construed as "urging someone to do
something," but not as urging "concrete action," in the trial judge's
words, or in words "ordinarily . . .calculated to incite." Examples:
[A party activist testified that she] was told that the "role" of the Commu-
nist Party was "preparing the workers and the people to be ready to be able
to take power, to know how to take power" when a revolutionary situation
493. Id. at 252-53, n. 27.
494. Id. at 252, n. 27 (emphasis added).
495. Id. at 234-51.
496. Id. at 237.
497. Id. at 245.
498. Id. at 246.
499. Id.
500. Id. at 248.
501. Id. at 244-45.
502. Id. at 250.
503. Id. at 240.
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arose.
504
[H]e said that you couldn't be a good leader without knowing all of the
techniques of fighting. 505
Scales noted that a "depression would greatly accelerate the coming of the
revolution" if the Communists used it properly to prepare the masses of the
people.
508
He told the students that "the role of the Communist Party is to lead the
working masses to the overthrow of the capitalist government." 507
Something relatively "concrete" that Party members were arguably
taught to do was to teach others. Thus, the witness Duran had
testified:
Professor Moreau explained throughout the school that the Proletarian
Revolution would only come about if a Bolshevik rank and file. . . would
get out and teach, and teach the people, the desirability of changing the
system and the necessity of changing them, and in doing that, we had to
teach the people that you cannot change the capitalist system to a Socialist
system. . the peaceful way; it had to be... taken away by force and
violence .... and the entire state machinery of the Bourgeoisie smashed
008
How relevant was this? Could punishable "advocacy of action" con-
sist of advocacy of more abstract advocacy?
In some seventeen pages of testimonial excerpts, the only evidence
of Party statements unequivocally urging "concrete" action were
these:
Wilkerson advised Clontz that he should not let his membership in the
Communist Party become known, that by remaining "under cover" he
"would be much more helpful to the Party when the revolution came." As
part of his undercover activity, Clontz was directed to attempt to infiltrate
various organizations of the working class in order to achieve "a back-
ground of respectability" and to be able to lead such organizations "toward
the goal of the Communist Party . . .-"9
Scales directed him to "get in with the ACLU organization to report on
what value they might have in the coming struggle. . . ." Clontz had also
been advised by an associate of petitioner to "infiltrate . . .the Civilian
Defense setup."510
Reavis was . . . advised to seek employment at the Western Electric Plant
in Winston-Salem [and to sign a Taft-Hartley affidavit].
504. Id. at 237.
505. Id. at 242.
506. Id. at 247.
507. Id. at 250. See also id. at 238-39. There was also some evidence of teaching,
without advocacy. E.g., "[An] instructor gave a demonstration of jujitsu and, explaining
that the students 'might be able to use this on a picket-line,' how to kill a person with a
pencil." Id. at 250.
508. 367 U.S. at 239 (emphasis added). See also id. at 241.
509. Id. at 248.
510. Id. at 249.
511. Id. at 251.
Based on all of this and without any indications as to which state-
ments, if any, carried particular weight, Justice Harlan concluded
that the jury could infer that "advocacy of action" had been engaged
in by the Party. In doing so, he characterized the Party's speech as
"the kind of indoctrination preparatory to action which was con-
demned in Dennis."5"2 That phrase, "indoctrination preparatory to
action," seems apt, and, for the most part, more descriptive of the
Party's speech in Scales than calling it "urging someone to do some-
thing." Does not the word "indoctrination" connote, to some extent,
the kind of mere "abstract advocacy" (i.e., urging someone to be-
lieve something) that was ostensibly protected speech? 13
The evidence has been explored in some detail here in order to
convey some of its flavor, to demonstrate again how difficult it is to
apply the critical distinction between "urging to do" and "urging to
believe,151 4 and to provoke serious thought on the question of
whether the American Communists' advocacy and teaching-so
overwhelmingly concerned, as far as the government or the judges
knew, with theory and prediction, recruitment and organization, and
industrial infiltration-truly posed a sufficient danger to justify its
suppression consistently with the first amendment.
The acceptance of the evidence in Scales is all the more difficult
to understand in light of the Court's unanimous decision, finding the
evidence insufficient to support a membership clause conviction, in
the companion case, Noto v. United States,1 5 and especially in light
of Justice Harlan's opinion therein. There must be evidence under
the Smith Act, he said in Noto, "of a call to violence now or in the
future. ' 516 Where was such evidence, beyond the abstract, in
Scales? As Harlan acknowledged, the Noto record was filled with
evidence of teaching of industrial infiltration. 11 Such teaching con-
stituted the most unequivocal advocacy in Scales. Yet, in Noto,
Harlan said of this evidence that
[It] too fails to establish that the Communist Party was an organization
which presently advocated violent overthrow of the Government now or in
the future, for that is what must be proven. The most that can be said is
that the evidence as to that program might justify an inference that the
512. Id. at 252. On the fate of Junius Scales personally, and the commutation of
his sentence in 1962, see M. KoNVITZ, supra note 99, at 129.
513. Accord, Mollan, supra note 122, at 741: "[T]his advocacy of forcible over-
throw hardly could be said to be concrete planning to commit specific acts at any foresee-
able time in the future."
514. Professor Kalven, who found Harlan's acceptance of the evidence in Scales
"puzzling," supra note 9, at 224, was also led by the Scales decision to wonder whether
the Yates distinction was viable. Id. at 225-26. He further critically analyzed Scales at
246-53. See also T. EMERsON, supra note 9, at 127-29.
515. 367 U.S. 290 (1961).
516. Id. at 298 (emphasis added).
517. Id. at 292-95.
[VOL. 28: 1, 1991] Communists & First Amendment
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
leadership of the Party was preparing the way for a situation in which fu-
ture acts of sabotage might be facilitated, but there is no evidence that such
acts of sabotage were presently advocated; and it is present advocacy, and
not an intent to advocate in the future ... , which is an element of the
crime under the membership clause.618
Strangely enough, no Justice dissented in Noto, and none argued
that the evidence in Scales was no better than that in Noto.5 19
The government abandoned its use of the membership clause
shortly after the Scales decision.52 0 The Noto decision very likely
was largely responsible for that development. The Scales decision,
however, did leave the door open for further membership-clause
prosecutions, and made clear that convictions for active CP member-
ship were possible.521
E. The SACB Registration Case
On the same day that it decided the Scales and Noto cases, the
Supreme Court announced its long-delayed decision on the validity
of the registration requirements of the Subversive Activities Control
Act of 1950.522 That Act set forth extensive Congressional findings
518. Id. at 298 (emphasis originally). See also H. KALVEN. supra note 9, at 225:
"[T]he differences between the evidence that failed in Noto and the evidence that per-
suaded in Scales are pretty subtle."
519. The Scales dissenters all concurred separately in Noto, essentially adhering to
the positions they had taken in Scales. 367 U.S. at 300, 302. Justice Douglas stated that
he considered the speech in both cases to be protected by the first amendment. Professor
Kalven has criticized the quality of the arguments raised in the dissenting opinions in
Scales: "Scales was the Court's first full dress confrontation with the strategy of apply-
ing conspiracy notions to membership in 'quasi-political parties,' a question of the great-
est import for political freedom in America. Rejoinder to the Harlan analysis in these
terms should have commandeered all the dissenters' energy." H. KALVEN, supra note 9,
at 253.
520. See M. BELKNAP, supra note 8, at 271-72. Compare Hellman v. U.S., 298
F.2d 810 (9th Cir. 1961), reversing a membership-clause conviction due to lack of suffi-
cient evidence of the requisite intent, with U.S. v. Blumberg, 207 F. Supp. 28 (E.D. Pa.
1962), finding the evidence sufficient to support a conviction, but ordering a new trial on
other grounds; that trial was never held. Mollan, supra note 122, at 740. As in Scales,
the "worst" advocacy revealed by the evidence in Blumberg was advocacy of infiltration
of basic industries. 207 F. Supp. at 40, 42.
521. Thus, the evaluation of the Scales-Noto decisions by Professor Belknap seems
overly sanguine. According to Belknap, the Court "overturned the conviction of Noto on
evidentiary grounds, and in this way deprived the Scales ruling of most of its value as a
precedent. While appearing to give a great deal with his right hand, Harlan took most of
it away with his left." M. BELKNAP, supra note 8, at 268. The evidence in Scales does
not appear to have been by any means impossible to replicate, but, as Belknap more
persuasively observed, by the late 1950's "Communists had become so careful about
what they said and did that proving membership of the type required by [Scales] and
Noto was virtually impossible." M. BELKNAP, supra note 8, at 272.
522. Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1 (1961).
concerning the Communist threat, including the extraordinary legis-
lative declaration that "[t]he Communist organization in the United
States, . . . and the nature and control of the World Communist
Movement itself, present a clear and present danger to the security
of the United States . ,."I It required the registration of any
"Communist-action organization," defined by the Act as an organi-
zation "which (i) is substantially directed, dominated, or controlled
by the foreign government or foreign organization controlling the
World Communist Movement . . .and (ii) operates primarily to ad-
vance the objectives of such World Communist Move-
ment" 524-namely, "to establish a Communist totalitarian dictator-
ship in the countries throughout the world. '6 25 Again, registration
required disclosure of the names of all members of such organiza-
tions. Not surprisingly, the SACB found that the CPUSA was a
"Communist-action organization."
By a now familiar 5-4 margin, the Supreme Court rejected the
Party's challenge to the registration requirements as violative of its
members' freedom of speech and association. In doing so, Justice
Frankfurter, writing for the majority, essentially refused to in any
way second-guess the Congressional judgment, and, while purporting
to balance the interests at stake,5 26 watered down the governing stan-
dard of review to its lowest possible level.
Justice Frankfurter accurately observed that the statute at hand
did not prohibit any activity,5 27 and that the registration require-
ment was tied, not to speech, but to the fact of foreign domina-
tion.52 18 At the same time, he recognized that first amendment inter-
ests were implicated by a compulsory disclosure requirement of this
kind, especially because disclosure of membership was as likely to
produce problems for members of the Communist Party as it had for
members of the NAACP in Alabama.5 29 But, the NAACP cases5
3°
had been easy cases for the Court to decide, and thus, despite the
Court's use of the language of strict scrutiny in those opinions, Jus-
tice Frankfurter was able, without serious inaccuracy, to
recharacterize those decisions as having held that "where the re-
quired making public of an organization's membership lists bears no
rational relation to the interest which is asserted by the State to
justify disclosure, . . . disclosure cannot constitutionally be
523. 50 U.S.C. § 781(15) (1982).
524. 50 U.S.C. § 782(3) (1982).
525. 50 U.S.C. § 781(1) (1982).
526. 367 U.S. at 91.
527. Id. at 97.
528. Id. at 90, 104.
529. Id. at 102.
530. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361
U.S. 516 (1960).
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compelled.
531
This case was different, said Frankfurter, "in the magnitude of the
public interests which the registration and disclosure provisions are
designed to protect . . ,. . At that point he summarized the Con-
gressional findings regarding Communism set forth in the Act, and
concluded: "It is not for the courts to re-examine the validity of
these legislative findings and reject them . . . . We certainly cannot
dismiss them as unfounded or irrational imaginings. 533 He pro-
ceeded to characterize the Congressional judgment as "a not
unentertainable appraisal by Congress of the threat" and a "not
wholly insupportable" conclusion.5 3 4 Characteristically, the majority
did not question whether the legislative findings of 1950 were reason-
able eleven years later.535
In support of this highly deferential approach to the resolution of
a first amendment question, Justice Frankfurter cited Nebbia v. New
York,536 the 1934 case famous for its relaxation of judicial review of
economic legislation in the name of substantive due process, and
Galvan v. Press,537 an exemplar of the several decisions in which the
Court deferred almost completely to Congress in the fields of immi-
gration and naturalization. Providing a bit more explanation for his
methodology, he stated, in language reminiscent of the words of Jus-
tice Jackson in Dennis, ten years earlier, that the legislative judg-
ment should not be set aside "where the problems of accommodating
the exigencies of self-preservation and the values of liberty are as
complex and intricate" as they were here--"when existing govern-
ment is menaced by a world-wide integrated movement which em-
ploys every combination of possible means . . . to destroy the gov-
ernment .... ,,538
By the standards of the 1980's, Frankfurter's opinion fares poorly
because of its excessive deference to government in a case involving
first amendment freedoms. The use of a higher standard of review,
531. 367 U.S. at 92 (emphasis added). Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960),
was similarly distinguished, albeit as a decision resting upon "the absence of substantial
connection between the breadth of disclosure demanded and the purpose which disclosure
.was asserted to serve." 367 U.S. at 93.
532. 367 U.S. at 93.
533. Id. at 94-95.
534. Id. at 95.
535. See M. KONVITZ, supra note 99, at 136-38; see also T. EMERSON, supra note
9, at 143.
536. 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
537. 347 U.S. 522 (1954).
538. 367 U.S. at 96.
presumptively strict scrutiny, 539 would have altered the SACB analy-
sis primarily by requiring something more than a mere governmental
assertion (and unarticulated judicial notice?) of a need for the regis-
tration scheme. Presumptively, some proof would be required, 40 al-
though the Court might well find that "proof" in the committee re-
ports and transcripts of Congressional hearings produced during the
preceding decade or two.
54"
Yet the result is neither clearly erroneous nor dependent upon the
earlier decision in Dennis. In fact, while four Justices dissented, two
of them-Douglas and Brennan-indicated that they did not disa-
gree with the majority's response to the first amendment challenge.
Justice Douglas, in an unprecedented break with Justice Black on a
first amendment question in the "loyalty" context, discussed the is-
sue at some length. For him, the Congressional findings, especially of
Soviet control of the CPUSA, "establish[ed] that more than . . .
free speech and association are involved. 542 He found persuasive, as
did Frankfurter, 543 the analogy to other federal registration require-
ments, and concluded:
When an organization is used by a foreign power to make advances here,
questions of security are raised beyond the ken of disputation and debate
between the people resident here. Espionage, business activities, formation
of cells for subversion, as well as the exercise of First Amendment rights,
are then used to pry open our society and make intrusion of a foreign power
easy. These machinations of a foreign power add additional elements to free
speech just as marching up and down adds something to picketing that goes
beyond free speech.
These are reasons why, in my view, the bare requirement that the Com-
munist Party register and disclose the names of its officers and directors is
in line with the most exacting adjudications touching First Amendmentactivities.5 4
Critics of the SACB decision have been unimpressed with this
"foreign control" rationale. Professor Emerson, for example, charac-
terized the Soviet control of the CPUSA, as found by the SACB, as
"entirely ideological," and went on to argue that "[s]hort of domina-
tion by the purse or the sword, foreign influence would not seem an
adequate ground for restricting freedom of expression by citizens
and residents of the United States. 545 But while Justice Frankfurter
interpreted the Act as foreclosing the CP's contention that, for the
Act to apply, the Soviet Union must enjoy "enforceable control"
539. See cases cited supra note 236.
540. Cf., e.g., Schad v. Borough of Mt. Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 72-73 (1981);
Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 227-28 (1984).
541. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 502-06 (1980) (Powell, J.,
concurring).
542. 367 U.S. at 172.
543. Id. at 97-101.
544. Id. at 174-75. Justice Brennan stated his agreement, id. at 191.
545. T. EMERSON, supra note 9, at 138.
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over it,546 he also rejected the Party's suggestion that the SACB's
report held "that conformity [to Soviet policies] which stems from
nothing more than ideological agreement satisfies the requirements
of [the Act] . ' '"' The subjection to foreign domination of which the
Act speaks, he said, "is a disposition unerringly to follow the dictates
of a designated foreign country . . ., not by the exercise of indepen-
dent judgment on the intrinsic appeal that those dictates carry, but
for the reason that they emanate from that country . . ,. . In
light of all that has been written about the CPUSA, it seems difficult
to deny the applicability of that definition. The real question was:
how threatening was such an organization to the security of the
United States?
At the same time, it is somewhat troubling that the SACB was
directed by Congress to consider, as one of several factors pointing
toward a finding of the requisite foreign domination, "the extent to
which [an organization's] views and policies do not deviate from
those of such foreign government. . .. ,,54. This provision was by no
means academic, for the SACB concluded that it was "a material
consideration" that "during the years since 1943 [the CPUSA] has
without a single exception, as before [1943], continued to adhere to
the views and policies of the Soviet Union; and that its witnesses
when asked to do so were unable to show conflict in any of these
policies."5 50 That the expression of opinions on matters of public
concern could be used against the speakers in this fashion has been
intensely criticized by some constitutional scholars. 51 It is by no
means clear, however, that in the overall context of this legislative
scheme, the use of policy positions as one indication of foreign domi-
nation ought to invalidate the Act on first amendment grounds.
Only Justice Black dissented explicitly on first amendment
grounds, 5 52 characteristically speaking of first amendment freedoms
546. 367 U.S. at 36-42.
547. Id. at 41.
548. Id. at 39-40.
549. 50 U.S.C.A. § 792(e)(2) (West 1951).
550. 367 U.S. at 54. Justice Frankfurter's lengthy excerpts from the SACB report
appear at pages 42-54.
551. T. EMERSON, supra note 9, at 138; H. KALVEN, supra note 9, at 276: "The
Court thus ratified, without even seeming to be aware of it, a devastating technique for
chilling discussion of public issues."
552. Chief Justice Warren dissented on a variety of non-constitutional grounds,
but one of them was his agreement with the Party that the Act should be interpreted to
require registration of a Communist-action organization only if the SACB finds "that the
organization is engaged in advocacy aimed at inciting action," 367 U.S. at 132, as dis-
tinct from mere abstract advocacy. Here, no such finding of illegal advocacy had been
in sweeping terms. Going back to basics with citations to Holmes
and Brandeis, he acknowledged the potential danger posed by advo-
cacy of revolution, but responded:
But, under our system of government, the remedy for this danger must be
the same remedy that is applied to the danger that comes from any other
erroneous talk---education and contrary argument. If that remedy is not
sufficient, the only meaning of free speech must be that the revolutionary
ideas will be allowed to prevail.553
Justices Douglas and Brennan dissented, with Justice Black's
agreement, on the ground that the registration requirement violated
the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination, in light of
the Smith Act's membership clause-the same argument, in essence,
that ultimately persuaded a unanimous Court four years later.r
54
The registration requirements thus ultimately became moot; but, in
the absence of federal law making active Communist Party member-
ship criminal, it appears that only one or two of the Justices would
have invalidated such registration requirements under the first
amendment. 555
made. While not grounding this argument directly on the first amendment, Warren
stated: "There is no reason to assume that when Congress adopted the Subversive Activi-
ties Control Act it was any less aware of the constitutional pitfalls involved in attempting
to proscribe advocacy as an abstract doctrine than it was when it passed the Smith
Act. . . ." Id. at 131. The majority dismissed this argument with dispatch, id. at 56,
pointing out that the 1950 Act "is a regulatory, not a prohibitory statute."
553. Id. at 147-48. For further critical analysis of the SACB decision, see H.
KALVEN, supra note 9, at 264-86; T. EMERSON, supra note 9, at 136-41. Prof. Kalven,
while suggesting at one point that "the decision seems to set out a rule for the Party
alone," H. KALVEN, supra note 9, at 284, also regarded it as "quite possibly the prece-
dent which carries the greatest threat to political freedom in the future." Id. at 265. His
ultimate position was that compulsory disclosure of membership was constitutionally
equivalent to a criminal sanction and thus ought to be governed by the same constitu-
tional standard. Prof. Emerson, in keeping with his overall theory, would have permitted
official sanctions only as a response to illegal action, as opposed to protected expression.
T. EMERSON, supra note 9, at 139-41.
554. Albertson v. SACB, 382 U.S. 70 (1965). See supra text accompanying notes
152-57.
555. The reasoning of the majority in the SACB case was relied on completely in
brushing away constitutional challenges to the Act's correlative requirement of registra-
tion by "Communist-front organizations." While the Act defined a "Communist-action
organization" as one that, in essence,-was dominated by a foreign government and oper-
ated primarily to advance the objectives of the World Communist Movement, a "Com-
munist-front organization" was defined as one "substantially directed, dominated, or con-
trolled by a Communist-action organization," and "primarily operated for the purpose
of" aiding and supplying a Communist-action organization, a Communist foreign govern-
ment, or the World Communist Movement. 50 U.S.C. § 782(4) (1982). Might the dis-
tinction have constitutional significance, at least in certain applications of the "Commu-
nist-front" provision? As Prof. Emerson wrote: "The connection with foreign influence is
even more remote. Nor is there a suggestion that any [such] organization has engaged in
conduct other than wholly legitimate expression." T. EMERSON, supra note 9, at 142-43.
Judge Bazelon of the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals was open to such an argument,
but was alone in dissent in the handful of cases in which the issue arose. See American
Committee for Protection of Foreign Born v. SACB, 331 F.2d 53, 62-63 (DC Cir. 1963),
vacated on other grounds, 380 U.S. 503 (1965) (Justices Douglas, Black, and Harlan
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F. Aftermath: The 1960's
After the Scales and SACB decisions of 1961, every first amend-
ment challenge to "loyalty" laws that reached the Supreme Court in
the 1960's was successful. 556 None of these cases, however, posed is-
sues as fundamental, momentous, or difficult as those faced by the
Court in Dennis and Scales. Indeed, once the majority accepted as
constitutionally basic the "innocent-membership" distinction which
had emerged in Scales, all of the later decisions of the 1960s, deal-
ing as many of them did with disabilities befalling all Communist
Party members, were actually fairly easy. At the same time, the
"real" Warren Court came into being in 1962, when Arthur
Goldberg replaced Felix Frankfurter; that same year, Byron White
succeeded the barely-noticed Charles Whittaker.
Even prior to those changes, the Court managed to achieve a rare
unanimity in striking down, as unconstitutionally vague, a Florida
statute requiring state employees to swear that they had never lent
"aid, support, advice, counsel or influence to the Communist
Party."5 '7 Less than three years later, a divided Court reached the
same result, on similar reasoning, with respect to Washington loyalty
oaths whose constitutional infirmities were less obvious. 558 The pri-
would have reached the constitutional questions); Veterans of Abraham Lincoln Brigade
v. SACB, 331 F.2d 64, 73 (D.C. Cir. 1963), vacated on other grounds, 380 U.S. 513
(1965); Weinstock v. SACB, 331 F.2d 75 (D.C. Cir. 1963). For an eloquent contempo-
rary critique of the "Communist-front" registration requirement, see Chafee, The Regis-
tration of "Communist-Front" Organizations in the Mundt-Nixon Bill, 63 HARV. L.
REv. 1382 (1950). See also H. KALVEN, supra note 9, at 294.
Later, in W.E.B. DuBois Clubs v. Clark, 389 U.S. 309 (1967), a per curiam opinion
rejecting, on procedural grounds, a challenge to the Act's "Communist-front" provisions,
Justices Douglas and Black dissented, id. at 313, taking the position that these provisions
were facially invalid under the first amendment.
556. But see Nostrand v. Little, 368 U.S. 436 (1962), which avoided the challenge
to the loyalty oaths later considered in Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964), infra at
note 558. In addition to the first amendment cases described infra, the Court ruled in
favor of some challenges in the "loyalty" arena on other grounds. Thus, in Gojack v.
U.S., 384 U.S. 702 (1966); Yellin v. U.S., 374 U.S. 109 (1963); Russell v. U.S., 369
U.S. 749 (1962); and Deutch v. U.S., 367 U.S. 456 (1961), the Court upheld, on statu-
tory grounds, refusals to answer questions posed by HUAC. In Russell, Justice Douglas
concurred on first amendment grounds.
In Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965), the Court struck down a Louisiana
law requiring "Communist-front" and "subversive" organizations to register, on grounds
of vagueness and procedural due process (with reliance, by Justice Brennan for the ma-
jority, on such prior cases as McGrath and Speiser). (Justices Harlan and Clark dis-
sented, on procedural grounds, and Justices Black and Stewart did not participate.)
See also Louisiana ex rel. Gremillion v. NAACP, 366 U.S. 293 (1961).
557. Cramp v. Board of Public Instruction, 368 U.S. 278 (1961).
558. Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964). Justices Clark and Harlan dissented,
mary vice in each of these cases, according to the Court, was that
prospective state employees might reasonably be unsure about
whether they had rendered assistance to someone who intended for-
cible overthrow.
In 1963, a closely divided Court ruled that a Florida legislative
committee lacked the power to compel a NAACP representative to
bring NAACP membership records to a committee hearing, despite
the fact that the committee was investigating Communist infiltration
of organizations like the NAACP. 59 Recall that freedom of associa-
tion had consistently prevailed, on a strict-scrutiny basis, in the
NAACP cases of 1958-60,56o but that the government had consist-
ently prevailed, under a "balancing" approach, in the Communist-
disclosure cases of 1958-61." 6' In the Gibson case, the NAACP
"met" the Communist Party, but still managed to win. Justice
Goldberg provided the crucial vote and wrote the majority opinion.
It was essential, he said, "that the State convincingly show a sub-
stantial relation between the information sought and a subject of
overriding and compelling state interest."" 2 Here, a relationship be-
tween the NAACP and Communists had not been shown. Cases like
Barenblatt were distinguished-perhaps unconvincingly, as Justices
Harlan and White suggested5 3-- on the ground that, in those cases,
witnesses had been questioned concerning their own Communist
affiliations.
In 1964 the Court decided the Aptheker case," 4 striking down the
passport restrictions on CP members. In 1965 the Court dealt the
death-blow to the McCarran Act registration requirements on the
ground that they compelled the officers of the CPUSA to incriminate
themselves.6 5 That same year, the Court took the highly unusual
arguing that the Court had effectively overruled its earlier decision in Gerende v. Bd. of
Supervisors, 341 U.S. 56 (1951), and called into question its rejection of a vagueness
challenge to the Smith Act in Dennis. 377 U.S. at 382-84. For the majority, Justice
White rejected those conclusions. Id. at 368-70.
559. Gibson v. Florida Legis. Committee, 372 U.S. 539 (1963).
560. See supra text accompanying notes 451-56.
561. See supra text accompanying notes 457-78.
562. 372 U.S. at 546.
563. Justice Harlan was joined in dissent by Justices Clark, Stewart, and White.
Justice White, who filed a separate dissenting opinion as well, gave some evidence therein
of a distinctly illiberal approach to the issue at hand:
I would have thought that the freedom of association which is and should be
entitled to constitutional protection would be promoted, not hindered, by dis-
closure which permits members of an organization to know with whom they are
associating and affords them the opportunity to make an intelligent choice as to
whether certain of their associates who are Communists should be allowed to
continue their membership.
Id. at 584. For an interesting reconsideration of Gibson, see Nagel, How Useful Is Judi-
cial Review in Free Speech Cases?, 69 CORNELL L. REv. 302, 321-23 (1984).
564. See supra text accompanying notes 159-65.
565. Albertson v. SACB, 382 U.S. 70 (1965).
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step of striking down a statute as a bill of attainder. The Court
struck down section 504 of the Labor Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act of 1959, explicitly making it a crime for a CP mem-
ber to be an officer of a labor union.5 6 Notably, the majority hinted
at the emerging "innocent-membership" rationale, without actually
relying on it, despite the fact that the court of appeals had utilized
that rationale in striking down the law.567 At nearly the same time
the Court struck down, without dissent, a federal law allowing the
Postmaster General to detain mail from foreign countries determined
to be "Communist political propaganda; ' 568 with the requirement
that the addressee of such mail request its delivery in writing was
seen as an undue interference with first amendment rights.
In 1966 the Court returned to the subject of loyalty-oaths and leg-
islative investigations, ruling in favor of the challengers each time. In
a case involving an ongoing state investigation of subversion in New
Hampshire, the Court upheld the first amendment right of a witness
to refuse to answer questions concerning CP membership and activi-
ties prior to 1957 .5 9 For the majority, Justice Douglas referred to
the "staleness" of the inquiry, and adverted to the use of a high level
of judicial scrutiny in resolving the constitutional issue presented.
"There is no showing of 'overriding and compelling state interest'
...that would warrant intrusion into the realm of political and asso-
ciational privacy protected by the First Amendment." The informa-
tion sought was "historical, not current." While that alone would not
be fatal, he observed, "[t]he present record is devoid of any evidence
that there is any Communist movement in New Hampshire ....
There is no showing whatsoever of present danger of sedition against
the State itself, the only area to which the Authority of the State
extends." Thus, the state's interest was "too remote and conjectural"
to override the witness' associational rights.570 For the first time, a
Court majority had unequivocally spoken the language of strict scru-
tiny in a "pure" loyalty-investigation case. Whereas the dissent-
ers-once in the majority-would apparently have allowed any and
566. U.S. v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965). Justices White, Clark, Harlan and
Stewart dissented.
567. 334 F.2d 488 (9th Cir. 1964). Justice White, dissenting, asserted that Brown
had overruled Douds, 381 U.S. at 464-65, and that the disabling provisions of the 1950
SAC Act had now been called into question as well. As Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967),
demonstrated, he was correct, but not because the Act was a bill of attainder.
568. Lamont v. Postmaster General,. 381 U.S. 301 (1965).
569. DeGregory v. New Hampshire Atty. General, 383 U.S. 825 (1966).
570. Id. at 829-30. Justices Harlan, Stewart, and White dissented.
all inquiries into past or present political activity, the majority paid
attention to the presence or absence of a "showing . ..of present
danger of sedition.
115 1
The second "loyalty oath" decision of 1966, Elfbrandt v. Rus-
sell,57 12 rested firmly and expressly, for the first time, on the theory
that a statute that penalized knowing membership in the Communist
Party (as well as any other subversive organization), and was not
limited to those members who shared the "specific intent" to further
the Party's unlawful goals, effected an unconstitutional infringement
of freedom of association under the first amendment. 573 Justice
White, joined in dissent by Justices Clark, Harlan, and Stewart, ac-
curately observed that the Elfbrandt decision represented a depar-
ture from past doctrine. Several prior decisions had upheld state
laws which, like the Arizona law at issue here, essentially required
state employees to swear that they were not knowingly members of
the CP or other subversive organizations. 1 4 Thus, the Court which
in 1952 had permitted states to deny employment to any member of
the Communist Party5 75 was now ruling that only those members
with criminal intent could be so treated. Moreover, as the dissenters
noted,5 76 it was a major step to go from placing limits on what could
constitutionally be made criminal (compare Scales) to placing those
same limits on eligibility requirements for state employment. Later
that term, in Keyishian v. Board of Regents,57  the Court effectively
571. Id. at 829.
572. 384 U.S. 11 (1966).
573. Aptheker v. Sec'y of State, 378 U.S. 500, 510 (1964), too, had turned largely
on the failure of the law to distinguish between "active" and "innocent" members, but
had done so under the ostensible heading of "freedom of travel." See supra text accom-
panying notes 159-62. Professor Gunther has suggested that Robel was the ground-
breaking case in this area, observing that, in prior cases, "again and again, the Court
rested these rulings not on the broad issues tendered to it but on narrow, often tenuous,
escape routes." Gunther, supra note 167, at 1141. But the Eljbrandt and Keyishian deci-
sions seem clearly grounded on straight-ahead first amendment principles.
574. See supra text accompanying notes 394-99.
575. Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 486 (1952).
576. ElJbrandt, 384 U.S. at 23. It is worth noting, however, that the dissenters
were, in 1966, still willing to accept as established fact the Congressional findings of
1950, namely that the CPUSA was "an organization which has been found to be con-
trolled by a foreign power and to be dedicated to the overthrow of the government by any
illegal means necessary to achieve this end." Id. at 21.
577. 385 U.S. 589 (1967) (Keyishian also struck down, on vagueness grounds, a
provision requiring removal from state employment of one who makes "treasonable or
seditious" utterances, because of the problem in distinguishing between incitements to
action and statements of abstract doctrine.) See also Gilmore v. James, 274 F. Supp. 75,
91-93 (N.D. Tex. 1967) (relying on Keyishian and Elfbrandt), afj'd, 389 U.S. 572
(1968); Whitehill v. Elkins, 389 U.S. 54 (1967); Stewart v. Washington, 301 F. Supp.
610 (D.D.C. 1969); Haskett v. Washington, 294 F. Supp. 912 (D.D.C. 1968), all striking
down public-employee "non-membership" oaths. Cf. Hosack v. Smiley, 276 F. Supp. 876
(D. Colo. 1967), affid, 390 U.S. 744 (1968); Knight v. Bd. of Regents, 269 F. Supp. 339
(S.D.N.Y. 1967), aft'd, 390 U.S. 36 (1968), each of which upheld "positive" loyalty-oath
requirements (i.e., oaths pledging to support the U.S. Constitution) imposed upon public
94
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reaffirmed the holding of Elfbrandt, by an identical 5-4 margin, as
did the Robel decision, in essence, shortly thereafter.
57 8
employees. See also Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116 (1966).
For criticism of Keyishian, Whitehill, Knight, and the distinction generally between
"positive" and "negative" oaths, see Note, Loyalty Oaths, 77 YALE L.J. 739, 753-64
(1968). For criticism of loyalty oaths generally, see H. KALVEN, supra note 9, at 340-67
("The test oath is ... a gratuitous, unnecessary legal device. . . ." Id. at 341.). See
also T. EMERSON, supra note 9, at 240-41, 245-46, criticizing the "positive" oath, and
observing, at 240, that the Supreme Court "has made it virtually impossible for . . .
government to impose a meaningful loyalty oath upon its employees."
See also Schneider v. Smith, 390 U.S. 17 (1968), ruling, on statutory grounds, in
favor of a marine engineer who had been denied a license by the Coast Guard because he
admitted, in response to an official questionnaire, that he had belonged to the CP.
Sidestepping constitutional questions, the majority (through Justice Douglas) declined to
conclude that Congress had authorized any such inquiry into associational ties on the
part of maritime personnel. To construe the governing legislation more broadly, he said,
would raise "the kind of issue present in Shelton v. Tucker." Id. at 24.
Loyalty oaths continued to be a subject of Supreme Court attention into the early
1970's. Another "positive" oath was upheld summarily, in Ohlson v. Phillips, 397 U.S.
317 (1970), affg 304 F. Supp. 1152 (D. Colo. 1969). In Lisker v. Kelley, 401 U.S. 928
(1971), af'g 315 F. Supp. 777 (M.D. Pa. 1970), the Court summarily upheld an oath
required of candidates for public office in Pennsylvania, to the effect that a candidate is
not a "subversive person," defined as, inter alia, a knowing member, sharing the organi-
zation's unlawful goals, of an organization which advocates the forcible overthrow of
government. (Lisker thus appears to be consistent with Elfbrandt.) Justices Douglas and
Brennan dissented.
Connell v. Higginbotham, 403 U.S. 207 (1971), was a per curiam opinion which unan-
imously upheld the "positive" part of a Florida loyalty oath, but which reversed the
appellant's dismissal for refusing to swear that she "[does] not believe in the overthrow
of the Government. . . by force or violence." That part of the oath, said the Court, fell
"within the ambit of decisions of this Court proscribing summary dismissal from public
employment without hearing or inquiry required by due process." Id. at 208. The major-
ity cited Slochower and Speiser, but made the point more clearly in this case than it had
in those. Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Douglas and Brennan in concurring in the
result, asserted that "belief in overthrow" could not properly be made the basis for a
denial of governmental benefits.
Finally, in Cole v. Richardson, 405 U.S. 676 (1972), a controversial two-part oath was
upheld, by four of seven justices, as essentially a "positive" oath in its entirety. The
majority was untroubled by the requirement that Massachusetts public employees prom-
ise to "oppose" the forcible or illegal overthrow of government, viewing it as merely
supportive of the required promise to "uphold and defend" the Constitution. Justices
Douglas, Marshall and Brennan disagreed, with Justice Douglas observing that the oath
"requires that appellee 'oppose' that which she has an indisputable right to advocate."
Id. at 689.
578. 389 U.S. 258 (1967). See supra text accompanying notes 167-69. See also
Reed v. Gardner, 261 F. Supp. 87 (C.D. Cal. 1966), relying on Elfbrandt in striking
down a Medicare provision denying benefits to all members of organizations required to
register under the McCarran Act.
G. Communists and the First Amendment: The Law as of 1968
As the 1960's drew to a close, the era of concern over Communist
subversion of American society was essentially over. For virtually
every term in nearly two decades, the Supreme Court had con-
fronted cases involving some aspect of the national crusade against
Communism, rendering multiple rulings on the extent of the consti-
tutional rights of an American citizen to advocate the forcible over-
throw of the government, to be a member of the Communist Party,
and to refuse to answer questions concerning such advocacy or mem-
bership. The most libertarian position the Court adopted was with
respect to civil and criminal penalties attached to membership in the
CP; the Court allowed "active" membership to be punished, but
would not permit a law to stand that punished anything less.
With respect to civil penalties, such as ineligibility for government
employment or state bar membership, resulting from failure to an-
swer questions pertaining to advocacy or membership, the law was
less clear. The Court had begun, in the mid-1960's, to employ strict
judicial scrutiny more consistently in freedom of association cases,
but the less liberal HUAC and bar admission cases of the late 1950's
and early 1960's had not been overruled. In addition, a strong pres-
ence was still felt on the Court by Justices who believed that com-
pulsory disclosure was permissible even in contexts in which sanc-
tions for membership or advocacy itself would not be.
Regarding punishable advocacy itself, nothing had changed; Den-
nis was still good law, albeit modified by Yates. The Scales decision
of 1961, upholding the constitutionality of making "active" CP
membership a crime, rested firmly on Dennis' shoulders. While the
years following Scales brought nothing but greater "liberalism"
from the fabled Warren Court, was there clearly a reason to believe
that by the end of the decade, the Court would have overruled the
Dennis decision of 1951, or at least have reached a different result, if
a new Smith Act conviction were brought before it for review?
From the Dennis Court itself, only the dissenters, Justices Black
and Douglas, remained. Would they have been joined, in the late
1960's, by Abe Fortas, who had succeeded Arthur Goldberg in
1965? By Thurgood Marshall, who had replaced Tom Clark in
1967? By Chief Justice Warren or Justice Brennan, each of whom
had voted against the government in "loyalty" cases at nearly every
opportunity since joining the Court in 1953 and 1956, respectively?
Despite their voting records, neither the Chief Justice nor Justice
Brennan ever wrote or joined an opinion which called the basic con-
stitutional premises of Dennis and Scales into question, despite the
fact that Justices Black and Douglas were doing so on a continual
basis. In fact, Justice Brennan had indicated some agreement with
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the government's constitutional position in the SACB case,579 and
shown meaningful sympathy for the government's position in
Robel."8°
It was also possible, but obviously less likely, that even one or
more of the "conservative" Justices of the late Warren Court era
might have joined an opinion at variance with Dennis. Justice
Harlan had authored the liberalizing Yates opinion, but had also au-
thored the Scales opinion, in which Justice Stewart joined. None of
the other votes cast in cases decided subsequent to 1961 were a clear
indication of how a Justice would have voted in Dennis itself. Many
of those votes, however, on the constitutionality of laws imposing em-
ployment disabilities on Communists,581 arguably implied a concur-
rence with the fundamental precept of Dennis that (active) members
of the CPUSA posed a sufficiently serious danger to American soci-
ety to justify legislation that would otherwise violate the first amend-
ment. Justices Harlan, Stewart, and White had generally been part
of the "conservative" bloc in those cases. Then again, none of those
later cases dealt with laws making seditious advocacy a crime.
Then came Brandenburg.
IV. MODERN TIMES: BRANDENBURG AND BEYOND
A. Did Brandenburg Change the Law?
The case of Brandenburg v. Ohio,582 decided in 1969, produced, as
pure dictum, a wonderful restatement of the clear and present dan-
ger test in the course of resolving a remarkably easy constitutional
dispute.
The actual speech which led to the conviction of Brandenburg, a
Ku Klux Klan leader, under the Ohio Criminal Syndicalism Statute,
can barely be said to have contained any incitement. The Supreme
Court might well have decided the case with a minimum of discus-
sion, on the simple grounds that the speech in question, while mildly
threatening, was surely within the protection of the first amendment.
Instead, the Court focused solely on the Ohio statute, striking it
down as overbroad on its face without ever uttering the word
"overbroad."
579. CP v. SACB, 367 U.S. 1, 191 (1961) (Brennan, J., dissenting in part).
580. U.S. v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 271-72 (1967) (Brennan, J., concurring in the
result).
581. E.g., Robel, 389 U.S. 258; Keyishian, 385 U.S. 589; Efbrandt, 384 U.S. 11;
Aptheker, 378 U.S. 500.
582. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
The facial overbreadth approach, which in its extreme form totally
bypasses the facts of the case and simply considers plausible hypo-
thetical applications of a statute, had been used to an ever greater
extent in civil rights cases of the preceding decade,5 83 although the
doctrine had yet to be fully explicated. 84 In Brandenburg its use was
wholly appropriate and virtually free of difficulty, as the rare una-
nimity of the decision attests. The Ohio Act made it criminal to ad-
vocate the "necessity. . .of violence. . . as a means of accomplish-
ing . . . political reform." The infirmity of such a statute, once one
accepts the use of the facial overbreadth approach, is clear: it may
be applied to mere abstract advocacy, which is constitutionally pro-
tected speech, as well as to punishable incitement. That is the princi-
ple of Yates, fully consistent with Dennis, and that was all the Court
needed to say in Brandenburg."
But the Court, in a brief per curiam opinion, said more. It said
that decisions subsequent to 1927-citing only Dennis at this point-
[H]ave fashioned the principle that the constitutional guarantees of free
speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy
of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is di-
rected to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to in-
cite or produce such action.5 85
The use of the word "imminent" as a necessary ingredient in the
formula, not only with respect to either the speaker's intent or the
natural tendency of the speech (whichever the Court meant by "di-
rected to inciting"), but also qualifying the nature of the requisite
probable response, is striking. If "imminent" is given its usual mean-
ing (as likely to happen without significant delay), and if this was
truly meant to be a first amendment rule for all seditious seasons,
then Dennis has to have reached a "wrong" result. Yet the Court
appended to its apparently momentous formulation the following
footnote:
It was on the theory that the Smith Act ... embodied such a principle and
that it had been applied only in conformity with it that this Court sustained
the Act's constitutionality. Dennis ... That this was the basis for Dennis
was emphasized in Yates . . ., in which the Court overturned convictions
for advocacy of the forcible overthrow of the Government under the Smith
Act, because the trial judge's instructions had allowed conviction for mere
advocacy, unrelated to its tendency to produce forcible action. 87
583. E.g., Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969); Cox v. Louisiana,
379 U.S. 536 (1965).
584. That explication came in Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973).
585. Accord, Linde, "Clear and Present Danger" Reexamined: Dissonance in the
Brandenburg Concerto, 22 STAN. L. REv. 1163, 1164-67 (1970); H. KALVEN, supra note
9, at 122 ("Nothing in the case offered an occasion for rethinking basic doctrine.")
586. 395 U.S. at 447 (emphasis added).
587. Id. at 447-48, n. 2. One scholar has suggested that the citation of Dennis in
Brandenburg "must be disingenuous, unless it represents some equivocal reservation that
the Brandenburg standard does not apply to secret political conspiracies aiming at over-
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The remainder of the brief majority opinion, aside from its myste-
rious citation of a string of libertarian decisions ranging from
Stromberg to Robel, does nothing but underscore the simple and un-
controversial basis for the decision: the distinction between abstract
advocacy and advocacy of action, introduced as a constitutionally-
influenced product of statutory interpretation in Yates but now
firmly, yet unsurprisingly, ensconced in the first amendment. The
word "imminent" reappeared once in the opinion, but needlessly, as
the Court observed that "[n]either the indictment nor the trial
judge's instructions to the jury in any way refined the statute's bald
definition of the crime in terms of mere advocacy not distinguished
from incitement to imminent lawless action."588
Eighteen years after Dennis, Justices Black and Douglas continued
to stake out positions to the left of the rest of the Court in their
Brandenburg concurrences. Justice Black was succinct, and hopeful.
"I join the Court's opinion," he said, "which, as I understand it, sim-
ply cites Dennis . . ., but does not indicate any agreement on the
Court's part with the 'clear and present danger' docfrine on which
Dennis purported to rely. 589 Justice Douglas wrote at greater
length, expressing his opposition, with Justice Black, to the use of
any clear and present danger test, and criticizing its "free-wheeling",
"twisted and perverted" use in Dennis.590 To him, the constitutional
dividing line was not the line between abstract advocacy and incite-
ment, but that between "ideas and overt acts."' 1 Quoting from Jus-
tice Holmes' opinion in Gitlow v. New York, he asserted, with justifi-
cation: "We have never been faithful to the philosophy of that
dissent. 592
By the unnecessary but presumptively purposeful use of the word
"imminent" in restating the clear and present danger test, the Court
in Brandenburg took a highly visible step toward re-adopting the
Holmes-Brandeis theory of freedom of speech.593 Yet, as Douglas
throw of the government." Greenawalt, supra note 211, at 206. Also noting the inconsis-
tency between the Dennis result and the language of Brandenburg are Redish, supra note
372, at 1175; Torke, Some Notes on the Proper Uses of the Clear and Present Danger
Test, 1978 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 30 (1978); Linde, supra note 585, at 1167, 1186.
588. 395 U.S. at 448-49. Other commentators have agreed that the Yates standard
sufficed to invalidate the Ohio statute in question in Brandenburg. See, e.g., Redish,
supralr note 372, at 1175; Rabban, supra note 211, at 1351.
589. 395 U.S. at 450.
590. Id. at 454.
591. Id. at 456-57.
592. Id. at 452.
593. Prof. Kalven observed that "the gesture of the per curiam opinion, which is
recognized, in no truly difficult case had that rationale yet
prevailed." 4
B. The Supreme Court Post-Brandenburg (1) Cases Involving
Advocacy
In the two decades since Brandenburg, the Supreme Court has
rarely returned to the important issues raised in that decision, and
has shed little added light upon its meaning. One such occasion was
Hess v. Indiana,95 another brief per curiam opinion, in another easy
case. The case centered around a single statement made by Hess
during a college anti-war demonstration which had apparently
evolved into a mild confrontation with the police. During a moment
of retreat, it appeared that Hess was heard to say either "We'll take
the fucking street later" or "We'll take the fucking street again."
According to the evidence, Hess "did not appear to be exhorting the
crowd to go back into the street" and "was facing the crowd and not
the street when he uttered the statement." 590 The Court reversed his
conviction for disorderly conduct, addressing the state's "incitement"
rationale within a single paragraph:
At best, . . . [his] statement could be taken as counsel for present modera-
tion; at worst, it amounted to nothing more than advocacy of illegal action
at some indefinite future time. This is not sufficient to permit the State to
punish Hess' speech. [The Court then restated its Brandenburg "test", ad-
ding emphasis to the word "imminent".] Since the uncontroverted evidence
showed that Hess' statement was not directed to any person or group of
persons, it cannot be said that he was advocating, in the normal sense, any
action. And since there was no evidence, or rational inference from the im-
port of the language, that his words were intended to produce, and likely to
produce, imminent disorder, those words could not be punished by the State
on the ground that they had "a 'tendency to lead to violence.' ,,19"
customarily a warning not to make too much of the Court's action, suggests that it did
not regard what it was doing as especially important." H. KALVEN, supra note 9, at 123.
Professors Barrett, Cohen, and Varat report in their casebook, moreover, that they were
informed by "a reliable source" that "the case was regarded as easy in its result, and
[thus] very little attention was paid to what the opinion said." CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
CASES AND MATERIALS 1238 (E. Barrett, W. Cohen, & J. Varat, eds., 8th ed. 1989).
The meaning of the Court's language in Brandenburg has been much analyzed, and
frequently deemed uncertain. See, e.g., Rabban, supra note 211, at 1351-52; Redish,
supra note 372, at 1175-77; Greenawalt, supra note 426, at 650; H. KALVEN, supra note
9, at 233-34; Nathanson, supra note 459, at 162. Some commentators, however, have
had less difficulty finding clarity therein. See, e.g., Gunther, supra note 427, at 754
(1975); Comment, Brandenburg v. Ohio: A Speech Test for All Seasons?, 43 U. CHI. L.
REV. 151, 156-59, 164 (1975) (authored by Staughton Lynd); J. NOWAK AND R. Ro-
TUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 967-68 (4th ed. 1991).
594. As Prof. Rabban has observed: "The fact that the Brandenburg standard has
never been tested during a period of widespread intolerance exacerbates uncertainties
about its power, even if its logic is conceded." Rabban, supra note 211, at 1354.
595. 414 U.S. 105 (1973).
596. Id. at 107.
597. Id. at 108-09 (emphasis in original).
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Surely, the author of the Hess opinion meant to emphasize the
critical importance of "imminence" of danger as a prerequisite to a
valid conviction for incitement; that is the clear thrust of the first,
second, and last sentences in the quoted passage. But, as the third
quoted sentence indicates, here, as in Brandenburg, a less stringent
rationale for the result suggests itself: it cannot fairly be said that
Hess was advocating any action, presently or in the future. That be-
ing so, the decision, while commendably protective of speech that
conceivably could have been characterized as advocacy of action, ar-
guably did not put the Court's commitment to an "imminence" re-
quirement to a meaningful test.598 Notably, three Justices dissented
anyway, finding Hess' statement "susceptible of characterization as
an exhortation" to "more or less immediate" action. 599
No more instructive was the revisiting of Brandenburg by Justice
Stevens, who wrote for a virtually unanimous Court, nine years later,
in NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co.6"' The question was whether
an award of monetary damages against Charles Evers, imposed in a
civil suit arising out of an economic boycott of white merchants by
black citizens in Claiborne County, Mississippi, could validly be
predicated upon certain speeches made by Evers in 1966 and 1969.
In the words of Justice Stevens, Evers' speeches "generally contained
an impassioned plea for black citizens to unify, . . . and to realize
the political and economic power available to them." 601 "In the pas-
sionate atmosphere in which the speeches were delivered," however,
they might have been understood as threatening violent retaliation
against listeners who failed to uphold the boycott.602
Not surprisingly, the Court found that Evers' speeches were con-
stitutionally protected, and, accordingly, set aside the judgment
against him. Somewhat oddly, what seemed to matter to Justice Ste-
vens was simply that no violent acts occurred as a result of the
speeches in question. Thus, while reiterating the Brandenburg for-
mulation, he went on to say that if Evers' speeches "had been fol-
lowed by acts of violence, a substantial question would be presented
whether Evers could be held liable for the consequences of that un-
lawful conduct." But, no violence followed the 1969 speech, and the
violence of 1966 occurred "weeks or months" after Evers' speech.
598. Accord, Redish, supra note 372, at 1175-76.
599. 414 U.S. at 111 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
600. 458 U.S. 886 (1982). Justice Rehnquist concurred in the result. Justice Mar-
shall did not participate.
601. Id. at 928.
602. Id. at 927.
"When such appeals do not incite lawless action," concluded Ste-
vens, "they must be regarded as protected speech."603 Instead of fo-
cusing, as one might expect, upon (1) whether the speaker in fact
advocated any unlawful action, (2) whether any such unlawful ac-
tion was likely to occur, and (3) whether it was likely to occur immi-
nently, Justice Stevens appears to have been concerned only with the
question of whether any unlawful acts occurred as a result of the
speech. This would indeed be perplexing, if Claiborne did not involve
civil liability, thus making it essential to link the defendant's advo-
cacy to some compensable consequence. In any event, the opinion
adds little to our knowledge of the depth of the Court's commitment
to the literal wording of the Brandenburg formulation-except that,
thirteen years after its emergence, the Court continued to reiterate
that highly protective verbal formula.604
(2) Cases Involving Association
When the question of the validity of requiring prospective attor-
neys to disclose prior membership in subversive organizations re-
turned to the Supreme Court in 1971, four Justices adhered to the
libertarian view that had governed the issue in 1957. In Baird v.
State Bar of Arizona,0 5 Justices Black, Douglas, Brennan, and
Marshall united behind the position that the State had no power to
require a Bar applicant to disclose whether she had ever been a
member of the Communist Party or any organization that advocates
forcible overthrow of the government. Extending their reasoning in
the companion case of In Re Stolar,606 those four Justices applied
the teaching of Shelton v. Tucker" 7 in concluding that the state
could not require a disclosure of all organizations to which the Bar
applicant had ever belonged. Justice Stewart, concurring only in the
judgments, supplied the crucial fifth vote in each case. One problem
with the disclosure requirement, he explained in Baird, was that
mere membership could not be sufficient ground for disqualification.
Another problem, in his view, was that Arizona appeared prepared
to exclude Baird merely because of her beliefs. 60 8 Four Justices dis-
sented in each case, deeming inquiries as to "mere membership" per-
missible as a means of discovering "knowing membership
and. . .willingness to participate in the forceful destruction of
603. Id. at 928.
604. The "test" has also, on occasion been set forth, as such, in dictum. Texas v.
Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533, 2542 (1989); Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 188 (1972).
605. 401 U.S. 1 (1971).
606. 401 U.S. 23 (1971).
607. 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
608. 401 U.S. at 9-10; see also Stolar, 401 U.S. 23, at 31.
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government."6 o0
In a companion case, 610 however, Justice Stewart saw things dif-
ferently, and the outcome changed accordingly. New York required
Bar applicants to respond to a two-part question: the first part asked
about knowing membership in organizations advocating forcible
overthrow, while the second part asked whether the applicant had
shared the "specific intent to further the aims of such an organiza-
tion or group. '611 Justice Stewart, for the majority, found such an
inquiry acceptable. The question, he wrote, was "precisely tailored to
conform to the relevant decisions of this Court." Referring, ten years
after Scales, to that decision without any hint of disapproval, he
added: "We have held that knowing membership in an organization
advocating the overthrow of the Government by force or violence, on
the part of one sharing the specific intent to further the organiza-
tion's illegal goals, may be made criminally punishable.
61 2
Justice Black, joined by Justice Douglas, dissented, finding the
New York case indistinguishable from Baird or Stolar. He sug-
gested, moreover, that the present ruling was inconsistent with Bran-
denburg, because New York inquired about organizational member-
ship without specifying "that the organization's advocacy must have
been 'directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action' and
'likely to . . .produce such action.' "613 (This would obviously be a
rather difficult standard to meet, to say the least.) Justice Marshall,
in a separate dissent joined by Justice Brennan, appeared to agree. 61"
Thus, at least four Justices in 1971 appeared to take seriously the
notion that the Brandenburg requirement of "likelihood of imminent
harm" applied to all government regulation pertaining to subversive
organizations. The other five Justices, far less troubled generally by
what they deemed relevant official inquiry (as opposed to prohibition
or direct imposition of disabilities), obviously did not believe that
Brandenburg had changed the constitutional rules with respect to the
Bar admission process. For them, an inclination toward violent over-
throw was sufficient to disqualify a would-be attorney, regardless of
609. 401 U.S. 23, at 33-34 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
610. L. Students Civ. Rts. Res. Council v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154 (1971).
611. Id. at 165.
612. Id.
613. Id. at 184 (Black, J., dissenting).
614. Id. at 197. The 1971 bar admission cases are criticized in H. KALVEN, supra
note 9, at 574-86; and Comment, supra note 593, at 166-73. On compelled disclosure of
organizational membership generally, see Blasi, The Pathological Perspective and the
First Amendment, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 449, 497-98 (1985).
imminence of harm.
In 1974, a majority of the Court applied the principle of Yates to
an Indiana provision limiting ballot access to political parties willing
to file affidavits stating that they do not advocate forcible over-
throw. 15 The problem, in Justice Brennan's view, was that the re-
quired oath "embrac[ed] advocacy of abstract doctrine as well as
advocacy of action."6 6 Interestingly, Justice Brennan's otherwise
straightforward opinion appears to contain an obviously inaccurate
depiction of pre-Brandenburg case law; after quoting from Branden-
burg, he wrote:
This principle that "the constitutional guarantees of free speech and free
press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of
force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting
or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such
action" has been applied not only to statutes that directly forbid or pro-
scribe advocacy, see Scales . . ., Noto . . ., Yates . . .; but also to regula-
tory schemes that determine eligibility for public employment, Keyishian
* . .; Elfbrandt. . .; Cramp. . .; see also. . .Robel. . .; tax exemptions,
Speiser . . .; and moral fitness justifying disbarment, Schware .... 17
But of course the Brandenburg "imminence" requirement had not
been referred to in any of those earlier cases. Is it remotely possible
that Justice Brennan believed that Brandenburg had introduced
nothing new? Or did he simply wished to make it so appear?
V. HAS THE CONSTITUTIONAL TEACHING OF Dennis BEEN
DISCREDITED?
If the Supreme Court truly meant (and can be depended on still to
mean) its articulation of an "imminence" requirement in Branden-
burg to be taken seriously, then the conclusion seems inescapable
that Dennis has been effectively overruled, and indeed, Dennis has
been described as "obsolete." 18 But, as we have seen, the preceden-
tial foundations of the Brandenburg "test" are quite fragile, and it is
far from clear that the Court is committed to its application in genu-
inely difficult cases. Is it so clear that the "constitutional result" of
Dennis would-or should-be discarded today, if a "similar" case
could somehow arise? By my reference to Dennis' "constitutional re-
sult," I mean to focus upon neither the constitutional reasoning of
the Justices in 1951 (because the combination of (1) enormous def-
erence to Congress in the area of content-based regulation of speech,
615. Communist Party of Indiana v. Whitcomb, 414 U.S. 441 (1974).
616. Id. at 447. Four Justices, concurring only in the result, felt it unnecessary to
reach this issue. Id. at 451.
617. Id. at 448-49.
618. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 1082 (E. Barrett & W. Co-
hen, eds., 7th ed. 1985). Similarly, Prof. Kalven, writing in 1974, said of Dennis:
"[T]oday, after twenty years, it has no doctrinal significance in its own right." H.
KALVEN, supra note 9, at 190.
[VOL. 28: 1. 1991] Communists & First Amendment
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
and (2) a distortion of the once-paramount "clear and present dan-
ger" test seems so unlikely to recur today) nor the actual result of
the decision (because Yates casts enormous doubt upon the constitu-
tional sufficiency of the evidence against the CPUSA leaders con-
victed in Dennis). Instead, I mean to focus upon the overarching
constitutional principle of Dennis, as modified by Yates and rein-
forced by Scales, that the first amendment permits, at least under
certain circumstances, the punishment of present advocacy of forci-
ble overthrow of the government in the future.
A. Is Subversive Advocacy Within the Protection of the First
Amendment?
At least a few first amendment scholars have argued that the con-
stitutional protection of freedom of speech simply does not embrace
subversive advocacy. If they are correct, then presumably, so was
Dennis.
Such an argument might be based upon historical considerations.
Professor Leonard Levy, in a work not overtly designed to influence
modern constitutional decisionmaking, has persuasively set forth
substantial evidence tending to show that those who adopted the first
amendment were unlikely to have accepted the notion of an unlim-
ited right to criticize the government; 19 the crime of "seditious li-
bel" had deep roots in the common law of England, and few 18th-
century writers suggested that the concept was fundamentally illegit-
imate. However, direct evidence of what the term "freedom of
speech" meant to the Framers is virtually nonexistent. As Professor
Levy has written: "One searches in vain for a definition of any of the
First Amendment freedoms in the rhetorical effusions of [the] advo-
cates of a bill of rights. 62 ° While some have reached conclusions
contrary to those suggested by Professor Levy,62 1 the prevailing ap-
proach to first amendment interpretation appears to be implicitly in
accord with the words of Professor BeVier: "If history suggests that
619. L. LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS (1985).
620. Id. at 235.
621. Alexander Meiklejohn argued, relying on the writings of Madison and Hamil-
ton, that the first amendment does protect the right to advocate revolution. Meiklejohn,
What Does the First Amendment Mean?, 20 U. CHI. L. REV. 461 (1953). More recently,
Prof. Mayton argued, inter alia, that the treason clause of the United States Constitu-
tion, article III, section 3, by virtue of its requirement of an "overt act", bars a convic-
tion for seditious speech. Mayton, Seditious Libel and the Lost Guarantee of a Freedom
of Expression, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 91, 108-17, 136 (1984). Concerning the effect of the
treason clause, see also Auerbach, supra note 93, at 202-04.
the framers had no specific meaning in mind, however, it also per-
mits the conclusion that no particular meanings were deliberately
foreclosed, except perhaps a meaning that would permit prior licens-
ing restraints. ' 622 Thus, commentators have felt fairly free to rumi-
nate about pragmatic and philosophical reasons for extending or de-
nying special protection to speech,6 23 unconstrained by a need to
attribute such thoughts to the Framers.
The argument that subversive advocacy deserves no constitutional
protection was made as early as 1956, by Professor Auerbach, 24 but
was perhaps expressed best by Robert Bork in a 1971 article:
Speech advocating forcible overthrow of the government contemplates a
group less than a majority seizing control of the monopoly power of the
state when it cannot gain its ends through speech and political activity.
Speech advocating violent overthrow is thus not "political speech" as that
term must be defined by a Madisonian system of government. It is not polit-
ical speech because it is not aimed at a new definition of political truth by a
legislative majority. Violent overthrow of government breaks the premises
of our system concerning the ways in which truth is defined, and yet those
premises are the only reasons for protecting political speech. It follows that
there is no constitutional reason to protect speech advocating forcible
overthrow.
6 25
It is an argument possessing great force and logic. Can it be persua-
sively rebutted?
Attempts to justify constitutional protection of subversive advo-
cacy have been made. Professor Emerson, the first amendment
scholar whose views seem to most nearly approximate those of Jus-
tice Black, argued that extending freedom of expression "to all
groups, even those which seek to destroy it," was the only position
consistent with a basic affirmative theory of freedom of expression .
26
Reaching the same result with respect to the status of subversive
advocacy as presumptively protected speech, Professor Redish has
written: "If the first amendment means anything, it represents a
value judgment that the interchange of ideas, information and sug-
gestions is to be kept free and open, at least if the interchange
622. BeVier, The First Amendment and Political Speech: An Inquiry Into the
Substance and Limits of Principle, 30 STAN. L. REV. 299, 307 (1978).
623. E.g., Greenawalt, Free Speech Justifications, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 119 (1989).
624. Auerbach, supra note 93, at 186-89.
625. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J.
1, 31 (1971). Accord, BeVier, supra note 622, at 309-11; see also F. SCHAUER, FREE
SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 194-97 (1982), treating similar arguments with re-
spect, but stopping short of an ultimate conclusion.
626. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.
877, 909 (1963). See also T. EMERSON, supra note 9, at 160. For another "avowedly
absolutist" interpretation of the first amendment, holding that "[t]he central function" of
the guarantee of freedom of speech "is to keep open the possibility of correcting errone-
ous beliefs," see DuVal, Free Communication of Ideas and the Quest for Truth: Toward
a Teleological Approach to First Amendment Adjudication, 41 GEo. WASH. L. REV.
161, 258 (1972).
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presents no real threat of harm to society."62 In reaching this con-
clusion, Professor Redish emphasized "the value inherent in allowing
individuals to think and discuss freely," thus enabling people "to de-
velop their mental faculties to the fullest. '
628
But the most satisfying rebuttal to the Bork argument may have
been set forth by Professor Kalven:
If a man is seriously enough at odds with the society to advocate violent
overthrow, his speech has utility not because advocating violence is useful
but because the premises underlying his call to action should be heard. He
says something more than "Revolt! Revolt!" He advances premises in sup-
port of that conclusion. And those premises are worth protecting, for they
are likely to incorporate serious and radical criticism of the society and the
government.
62
Drawing a workable line between the "valuable radical prem-
ises-the criticism" and the "not-so-valuable" call to illegal action,
Professor Kalven went on to say, is a very difficult task.130 In har-
mony with that view, Professor Emerson argued that the punishment
of subversive advocacy inhibits "other participants in the political
process, on the border or near the position taken by those who have
been proceeded against," thus creating "an atmosphere hostile to all
open discussion."631
The extension of presumptive first amendment protection to sub-
versive advocacy is thus appropriate, and, contrary to Professor
Emerson's thesis, should not be limited by any artificial characteri-
zation of some action-oriented advocacy as "action" rather than
"speech." In his admirable zeal to construct (or explain) a system in
627. Redish, supra note 372, at 1165.
628. Id. at 1164. See also F. SCHAUER, supra note 625, at 195-96, addressing
arguments for protection of subversive advocacy based upon both "autonomy" and "ca-
tharsis" ("advocacy of illegal conduct may be less likely to lead to illegal conduct than
would prohibition of that advocacy"); Solum, Freedom of Communicative Action: A
Theory of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 83 Nw. U.L. REV. 54, 120-23
(1989).
629. H. KALVEN, supra note 9, at 120. Effectively augmenting Prof. Kalven's
point, Prof. Greenawalt has observed that advocacy of law violation "could be of signifi-
cant value for participants making political decisions. Bork does not really explain why
explicitly political expression that may contribute substantially to the operation of demo-
cratic political process can summarily be put outside the First Amendment because of
the nonparticipatory attitude of the speaker." Greenawalt, supra note 426, at 758-59, n.
418. See also F. SCHAUER, supra note 625, at 196, agreeing that "where words of incite-
ment are combined with words of criticism . . . such speech is covered by the Free
Speech Principle."
630. H. KALVEN, supra note 9, at 120.
631. T. EMERSON, supra note 9, at 126. "In short," he concluded, "no system of
free expression can neatly excise one form of expression, however noxious, and leave the
system unimpaired." Id.
which "expression" is never subject to suppression by government,
Professor Emerson wrote:
As the communication approached the point of urging immediate and par-
ticular acts of violence, it would come closer to being classifiable as action
... . Instructions on techniques of sabotage, street fighting, or specific
methods of violence are well into the area of action. A fortiori, . . . or-
ganizing groups to engage in acts of violence would fall within the action
category.
83 2
The characterization of words as "action" should be rejected primar-
ily because it is literally inaccurate, and because appropriate real-
world results may still be reached, albeit in a less theoretically
"pure" fashion, by conceding that freedom of speech, while pre-
sumed, is not absolute.633
The additional argument has on occasion been made that "clan-
destine utterance is not entitled to the same high level of protection
that must be accorded its open counterpart," and that this distinc-
tion justifies the conviction of the CPUSA leaders in Dennis.34 The
argument proceeds from the well-received Holmesian "marketplace
of ideas" metaphor, 3 and postulates that a speaker who declines to
compete in the open market is not deserving of first amendment pro-
tection because his speech potentially creates danger that cannot be
averted by "the antidote of public discussion." 36 The argument is
not without force, but is ultimately unpersuasive, and rests upon an
unnecessarily restricted view of the "marketplace" rationale. Subver-
sive expression may or may not pose a greater danger when commu-
nicated in secret, but there seems no inherent reason why purely pri-
vate communications should not presumptively be treated as
constitutionally protected speech. Moreover, an exception predicated
upon the "clandestine" nature of speech would necessitate the diffi-
cult task of deciding just how widely or publicly communicated one's
words need be to receive first amendment protection. Furthermore,
the argument would be stripped of utility as soon as the subversive
632. Id. at 125. See also Mendelson, The Clear and Present Danger Test - A
Reply to Mr. Meiklejohn, 5 VAND. L. REv. 792, 794 (1952), suggesting a constitutional
distinction between "discussion-words" and "force-words".
633. Compare Greenawalt, supra note 426, at 747, arguing that speech directed to
training others to commit crimes should not ultimately receive protection.
634. Mendelson, Clandestine Speech and the First Amendment - A Reappraisal
of the Dennis Case, 51 MICH. L. REV. 553, 557 (1953) [hereinafter Mendelson, Clandes-
tine Speech]. Accord, Mendelson, Clear and Present Danger - From Schenck to Den-
nis, 52 COLuM. L. Rv. 313, 330-31 (1952). Agreeing in principle with Prof. Mendelson
is Lusk, The Present Status of the "Clear and Present Danger Test" - A Brief History
and Some Observations, 45 Ky. L. J. 576, 604-06 (1957); Mr. Lusk nonetheless viewed
Dennis as wrongly decided because, inter alia, "the Court made no distinction in its
holding between open and secret speech," and because the jury had not been instructed
that clandestine speech was a prerequisite to conviction. Id. at 605, n. 115.
635. Abrams v. U.S., 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919).
636. Mendelson, Clandestine Speech, supra note at 555.
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advocacy was "publicly" voiced. In any event, it is by no means clear
that all of the advocacy for which American Communists were pros-
ecuted in the postwar era can accurately be characterized as
"clandestine". 3 7
Finally, any suggestion that association for the purpose of expres-
sion ought not to be protected, simply because it fits a legal defini-
tion of "conspiracy," should be rejected. The suggestion found ex-
pression, in the concurring opinion of Justice Jackson in Dennis,6 3 8
and that opinion has been the subject of thorough and persuasive
criticism elsewhere.6 39 In the words of Professor Filvaroff, "it is diffi-
cult to understand why-as Justice Jackson would have had it in
Dennis-an agreement to make a speech which exists only in the
defendants' minds is entitled to less protection than a speech which
has actually been delivered."640 If the conspiracy to speak is inchoate
at the time of prosecution, there is obviously a problem in punishing
the conspiracy if the speech itself would only be punishable under
circumstances which have not yet come into being-such as circum-
stances posing a likelihood of imminent harm, in the words of Bran-
denburg.641 Moreover, despite the enhanced danger of combination
that justifies conspiracy prosecutions in general, a conspiracy to en-
gage in subversive advocacy (as opposed to a conspiracy to act) does
not necessarily pose a sufficiently cognizable danger to warrant a so-
cietal sanction. To quote Professor Filvaroff once again:
Just as conspiracy itself is an inchoate crime, so too is incitement, like most
other speech crimes. Thus, to charge a speech conspiracy is to load one
inchoate offense upon another . . . .A conspiracy to incite is thus an of-
fense twice removed from the substantive crime, an offense doubly distant
from the evil sought to be avoided.
6 42
637. Prof. Mendelson argued, to the contrary, that the advocacy which led to the
Smith Act prosecutions took place "only in a . . .network of secret underground 'study
groups' open only to carefully selected totalitarian party members. . . ." Id. at 556.
Such a characterization arguably ignores the Party's publications and public rallies and
speeches.
638. 341 U.S. at 572-76 (Jackson, J., concurring).
639. See, e.g., Filvaroff, Conspiracy and the First Amendment, 1972 U. PA. L.
REV. 189, 213-16 (1972).
640. Id. at 219. Essentially in agreement is Greenawalt, supra note 426, at 718, n.
273. If an agreement to speak is not protected, he wrote, "this would not appear to be a
simple product of the law of conspiracy, but of some sort of test of danger, which Jack-
son eschewed formulating in Dennis." See also Greenawalt, supra note 211, at 203.
641. Greenawalt, supra note 426, at 774; H. KALVEN, supra note 8, at 193; Na-
thanson, supra note 467, at 192.
642. Filvaroff, supra note 639, at 235. Prof. Emerson, characteristically, was more
blunt: "Conspiracy to engage in expression cannot constitutionally be made an offense."
T. EMERSON, supra note 9, at 410. Accord, Nathanson, supra note 467, at 192.
Resolving the question of Dennis' validity, therefore, cannot rest
upon a pronouncement that subversive advocacy, or association to
engage therein, is outside the protection of the first amendment.
B. Can the "Constitutional Result" of Dennis Be Justified by
the Danger Posed by Advocacy of Future Subversion?
1. What Was the Constitutionally Significant Danger?
In his plurality opinion in Dennis, Chief Justice Vinson suggested
that "an attempt to overthrow the Government by force, even
though doomed from the outset," was a constitutionally "sufficient
evil for Congress to prevent. ' '643 "The damage which such attempts
create both physically and politically to a nation," he continued,
"makes it impossible to measure the validity [of government sup-
pression of subversive advocacy, presumably] in terms of the
probability of success . . ... -" Governmental concern regarding an
attempt at forcible overthrow would, in an appropriate case, surely
be justified. Might any lesser danger justify suppression of
advocacy?
Only rarely, to my knowledge, has the suggestion been made that
something less than the danger of an attempted overthrow (however
remote) might possibly justify punishment of speech. 45 Most notable
is the argument, made by Gorfinkel and Mack in 1951, that "[a]
conspiracy to plan the overthrow of the government by force and
violence should be a sufficient substantive evil to justify interference
with speech that creates a clear and present danger of aiding or
abetting [or helping to bring about] that conspiracy.'6 46 Those com-
mentators raised the possible objection, however, that the Smith Act,
so analyzed, would add little or nothing to the existing crime of sedi-
tious conspiracy; at most, it would "[move] the line of defense one
step forward. 647 But to justify the creation of one essentially incho-
ate offense, on the ground that it may give rise to the danger that yet
another inchoate crime may result, is an unacceptably tenuous basis
for the suppression of free expression.
At a minimum, then, the danger that begins to justify governmen-
tal deterrence of subversive advocacy is the danger of an attempt to
forcibly overthrow the government.
643. 341 U.S. at 509 (emphasis added).
644. Id.
645. "Among the possible substantive evils in Dennis, for example, are successful
overthrow of the government (very great evil - very small likelihood), substantial unsuc-
cessful revolution (great evil - small likelihood), violent acts preparatory to revolution
(less evil - greater likelihood)." Greenawalt, supra note 419, at 717.
646. Gorfinkel & Mack, Dennis v. U.S. and the Clear and Present Danger Rule,
39 CALIF. L. REV. 475, 498 (1951) (emphasis added).
647. Id. at 501 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2384).
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2. How Great Must the Evidence of Danger Be to
Justify Suppression?
a. How Great Was the Danger in 1948?
It is beyond the scope of this article to comprehensively evaluate
the danger of attempted forcible overthrow posed by the American
Communist Party in the late 1940's.648 Moreover, in making such an
assessment with the benefit of hindsight, one may well fail to ade-
quately appreciate the contemporary reasonableness of the percep-
tion of potential danger posed by Party advocacy at that time. The
reaction to Dennis by the American press was apparently largely
favorable,649 and some legal scholars wrote approvingly of the deci-
sion as well.650 None of them suggested, however, that the CPUSA
posed an imminent danger to American internal security.
What does seem highly significant is the existence of contempora-
neous writings by commentators who, like Justice Douglas, were not
persuaded that the CPUSA posed any significant danger to Ameri-
can democracy in the mid-20th century.6 1 Particularly striking, in
this regard, is an article by Louis B. Boudin, debunking the notion
that either the Russian or Eastern European experience with Com-
munist takeover was at all likely to be replicated in this country.6 52
648. The task would likely prove difficult in any event. Writing in 1984, Steinberg
observed: "All government documents with relation to the CP remain classified." P.
STEINBERG, supra note 8, at 293.
649. M. BELKNAP, supra note 8, at 141-42. The majority of American citizens
probably supported the ruling as well. A survey taken in mid-1954 found that, in re-
sponse to the question, "How great a danger do you feel American Communists are to
this country at the present time - a very great danger, a great danger, some danger,
hardly any danger, or no danger?," a combined 43 % of respondents chose "a very great
danger" or "a great danger," while only 11% selected either "hardly any danger" or "no
danger." S. STOUFFER, COMMUNISM, CONFORMITY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 75-76 (1955).
650. E.g., Corwin, supra note 372; Richardson, Freedom of Expression and the
Function of Courts, 65 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1951); see also W. BERNS, FREEDOM, VIRTUE
AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 124 (1957); Gorfinkel & Mack, supra note 646; Wiener,
supra note 263.
651. E.g., H. CHASE, supra note 66, at 1-10, 27; Antieau, Dennis v. U.S. - Prece-
dent, Principle or Perversion?, 5 VAND. L. REV. 141, 144-47 (1952); see also J. L.
O'BRIAN, NATIONAL SECURITY AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 49-56 (1955). The same
judgment has, of course, been made in retrospect. E.g., T. EMERSON, supra note 9, at
115; D. CAUTE, supra note 78, at 187 ("The government took a sledgehammer to squash
a gnat."); P. STEINBERG, supra note 8, at 290. Also, see the discussion of the limited
official fear of the CPUSA in 1947 and 1948, in P. STEINBERG, supra note 8, at 59-61,
144. Steinberg also quotes President Truman, from a 1950 speech: "We know that the
greatest threat to us does not come from the Communists in this country where they are
a noisy but small and universally despised group." Id. at 187.
652. Boudin, supra note 347.
With respect to the Communist nations of Eastern Europe, Boudin
contended:
In all of those countries the governments which had existed prior to World
War II were destroyed by the German invasion; and the governments estab-
lished by the Germans were, in their turn, overthrown by the Russian ar-
mies. The Communist Parties of those countries had nothing to do with
these overturns, and were established in power by the Russian armies.053
Furthermore, Boudin continued, "none of those countries had ever
known real democratic government; and . . . in Czechoslovakia,
which had enjoyed democratic government for a short period, the
situation was sui generis."I 4 Finally, he observed, "coalition govern-
ment, the entering wedge which gave the Communists a leverage on
the government of which they were a part, . is utterly unknown
and actually impossible under our system of government."' u
As many a commentator has suggested,65 6 any dangers posed by
the Communist Party in America in the late 1940's almost surely
were not the product of the subversive advocacy (or the conspiracy
to so advocate) for which they were ostensibly punished. The Party
may have enhanced the dangers of foreign espionage and industrial
sabotage,657 and may even have amounted to a conspiracy to forcibly
overthrow the United States government,""8 but these were not (and
could not have been) the bases of the Smith Act prosecutions.
Therefore, there is reason to seriously doubt that Communist
653. Id. at 342.
654. Id. at 346.
655. Id. at 347. Boudin was, in large part, responding to the position espoused by
Justice Jackson in Dennis. Jackson, of course, had argued in Dennis that "the Commu-
nist strategem" - based largely on "infiltration and deception" - "outwits" statutes
like the Smith Act if a clear and present danger is a prerequisite to conviction. 341 U.S.
at 565, 567. Boudin properly retorted: "His criticism is in effect directed not only to the
'clear and present danger' rule, but against the kind of statute to which it was being
applied. But the defendants at bar were not convicted under a statute outlawing the
assumption of power by wit and cunning." Boudin, supra note 352, at 347.
656. See, e.g., M. BELKNAP, supra note 8, at 143; H. KALVEN, supra note 8, at
199, 254; M. KONVITZ, supra note 99, at 123.
657. Indeed, those dangers are arguably the only tangible ones to emerge from a
candid reading of so clearly an anti-communist tract as J. EDGAR HoOVER, MASTERS OF
DECEIT (1958); see especially id. at 271-87. See also H. CHASE, !isupra note 66, at 10,
and his comment, at 79, that "the record offers no evidence that laws abridging freedom
of speech and the like have in themselves curtailed the recruiting of spies and saboteurs,
actual or potential." Hoover himself, writing in 1958, conceded that the Soviet Union
had, by the postwar era, gone far in the direction of divorcing its espionage activities
from the CPUSA. J. EDGAR HOOVER, supra, at 274-75. "There is no documentation in
the public record of a direct connection between the American Communist Party and
espionage during the entire postwar period." D. CAUTE, supra note 78, at 54 (emphasis
in original). Accord, R. MORGAN, DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE: MONITORING DISSENT IN
AMERICA 45 (1980). See also J. EDGAR HOOVER, supra at 283: "The Communist Party
USA, has not reached the point where preparations for sabotage are vital to its future
plans."
658. The suggestion appears, e.g., in Rostow, supra note 352, at 224, but is ques-
tioned in H. KALVEN, supra note 9, at 199.
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Party advocacy posed any significant danger in America during the
postwar era.
b. How Should the Danger Be Evaluated?
The selection of a general approach to the formulation of constitu-
tional limits upon the regulation of subversive advocacy is an en-
deavor that has been central to the mission of many other thoughtful
articles, and is beyond the scope of this one. At least two prominent
scholars, in fairly recent works, have essentially embraced the Bran-
denburg test, but with important modifications, appropriately raising
questions about the scope and meaning of that test and persuasively
suggesting answers to those questions.6 59 While the "clear and pre-
sent danger" test, so designated, has survived Dennis in only one or
two very narrow contexts,66 ° Professor Redish has properly observed
that "many have viewed Brandenburg-and it is a view that seems
entirely correct-as simply a protectionist version of clear and pre-
sent danger." '' Equally prominent scholars, in the recent past, have
rejected the "clear and present danger" test as insufficiently protec-
tive of speech.
662
In the absence of a specialized rule, regulation of subversive advo-
cacy would, as content-based regulation of expression, presumptively
be governed by a strict standard of judicial scrutiny, requiring the
government to demonstrate a "compelling" need for the prohibi-
tion. 63 Indeed, as Professor Redish has suggested in presenting his
version of the "clear and present danger" test, such a standard "par-
takes of the compelling interest approach that ideally guides courts
659. Redish, supra note 372, at 1176-97; Greenawalt, supra note 426, at 756-62.
Prof. Greenawalt would reserve the strongest protection, however, for "public ideological
solicitation," and suggested a less stringent "probability" test for "private ideological
solicitation." See id. at 762-63. Prof. Redish, significantly, would "[replace] the universal
requirement of imminence with a flexible method of determining the level of immediacy
needed in each case." Redish, supra note 372, at 1181.
660. It has apparently remained the standard for assessing the legitimacy of judi-
cial orders holding speakers in contempt of court as a result of speech publicly criticizing
judges in connection with ongoing judicial proceedings. See, e.g., Wood v. Georgia, 370
U.S. 375, 384-85 (1962). See also Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976),
suggesting a similar approach to cases involving prior restraints in the form of judicial
"gag orders".
661. Redish, supra note 372, at 1185.
662. T. EMERSON, supra note 9, at 124; Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the
First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 910-12 (1963); Linde, supra note 577, at 1174-75,
1183-84. ("Legislation directed in terms at expression," according to Justice Linde,
"should be found void on its face." Id. at 1174.)
663. See cases cited supra at note 236.
in their interpretations of the First Amendment."'6 4 Properly utilized
and understood, the compelling interest approach requires a factual
showing by the government in support of its contention that the dan-
ger to which the law is directed is real. 65
By any of these measures, Dennis appears to have been wrongly
decided, in principle as well as in fact. 6
VI. WHERE Do WE STAND TODAY?
The Smith Act remains on the books, unused now for nearly three
decades. So, too, do various state statutes, some of which declare
that the Communist Party (or any "subversive organization", more
generally defined) is illegal within that state;66 7 some of which make
it illegal to be a member of such an organization; 6 8 and some of
which continue to proscribe advocacy of crime or violence as a
means of effecting political change. 69
Presumptively, a statute of the latter kind would be facially over-
broad, and thus unconstitutional, unless narrowly construed by the
courts of that state to reach no further than Brandenburg permits;
but there would seem to be no general impediment to arriving at
such narrowing constructions. Prohibitions of membership, if not
completely preempted by the Smith Act,6 70 almost certainly must be
narrowed to conform to the Scales distinction between innocent and
active membership. As so narrowed, however, these statutes would
also seem able to withstand constitutional challenge, unless the
courts are prepared to rule that Scales and its progeny have been
undermined by Brandenburg, with the result that only likely immi-
664. Redish, supra note 372, at 1182. The clear and present danger test, he went
on to argue, "provides somewhat greater guidance than a bare-bones compelling interest
test." Id. at 1183.
665. See cases cited supra at note 540.
666. Other commentators critical of Dennis, in addition to those writers whose
views have already been discussed or cited, include Koffier & Gershman, The New Sedi-
tious Libel, 69 CORNELL L. REv. 816, 840-44 (1984); Torke, Some Notes on the Proper
Uses of the Clear and Present Danger Test, 1978 B.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 28-29 (1978).
667. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 5-51-403 (1987); FLA. STAT. § 876.26 (1987) ("any sub-
versive organization"); MASS. GEN. L. ch. 264, §§ 16-18 (1970) ("subversive organiza-
tion"); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1266.2 (West 1983); TENN. CODE ANN, § 39-5-833
(1983).
668. E.g., FLA. STAT. §§ 876.02, 876.24 (1987); CAL. PENAL CODE § 11401 (Deer-
ing 1980); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14.115 (West 1986); MASS. GEN. L. ch. 264, § 19;
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.15 (McKinney 1980); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 1263,
1266.4, 1267.1 (West 1903); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-5-833 (1983).
669. E.g., FLA. STAT. §§ 876.01, 876.02, 876.03, 876.23 (1987); LA. REv, STAT.
ANN. § 14:115 (West 1986); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.15 (McKinney 1980); OKLA. STAT.
Am. tit. 21, §§ 1263, 1266.4 (West 1983).
670. See supra text accompanying notes 101-102. In light of the Uphaus decision,
the extent of federal preemption of state regulation of subversive organizations is a bit
unclear. Compare State v. Levitt, 203 N.E.2d 821 (Ind. 1965), with State v. Jahr, 114
N.J. Super. 181, 275 A.2d 461 (1971).
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nent danger can justify membership prohibitions. Such a result is
difficult to imagine, as a practical matter, and does not appear to be
the law in light of the post-Brandenburg decisions in Whitcomb
67
1
and the 1971 bar admission trilogy.
67 2
At the federal level, the Smith Act itself is facially overbroad as
written, but must be regarded as narrowed by Scales, with respect to
the membership clause, and by Yates (and Brandenburg?), with re-
spect to its prohibitions of advocacy. Only the state statutes outlaw-
ing the Party completely are clearly unconstitutional, under Scales,
if not pre-empted by federal legislation as well.
Might any or all of these prohibitions usefully be removed from
the statute books of our nation? Others have wondered, with justifi-
cation, whether these laws have truly contributed to our national se-
curity.173 To suggest that the statutes governing seditious advocacy
be repealed is probably to go too far, if Brandenburg truly limits the
reach of those proscriptions. But to make membership-even know-
ing, active membership--in any organization a crime does seem to
be a highly unnecessary restriction on individual freedom, given the
existence of valid statutory prohibitions of conspiracies to act ille-
gally.67 4 As others have suggested,675 membership prohibitions seem
more likely than conspiracy prosecutions to chill and inhibit political
association, yet give little marginal advantage. Moreover, there must
always be concern, under the first amendment, about setting (or tol-
erating) precedents that may prove difficult to isolate. In the words
of Justice Black: "When the practice of outlawing parties and vari-
ous public groups begins, no one can say where it will end.' 676
Prohibitions of subversive organizations, and of membership in such
organizations, ought therefore to be repealed.
In making that recommendation, I have no illusions. As Professor
(now Justice) Linde wrote, almost 20 years ago: "Rarely is there any
671. See supra text accompanying notes 615-17.
672. See supra text accompanying notes 605-14.
673. E.g., T. EMERSON, supra note 9, at 126: "Would the Smith Act make the
margin of difference between the Government of the United States continuing to operate
according to democratic procedures and its being overthrown by force and violence? It is
difficult to believe that it would."
674. Accord, Blasi, supra note 614, at 496-97: "In pathological periods, factfinding
processes cannot be relied upon to make discriminating judgments regarding the inten-
tions of persons who carry the stigma of any kind of affiliation with a highly unpopular
organization." See also T. EMERSON, supra note 9, at 128.
675. See, e.g., H. KALVEN, supra note 9, at 248-49.
676. Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Central Board, 367 U.S. 1, 145
(Black, J., dissenting).
political incentive to initiate and carry out an effort to repeal repres-
sive laws against unpopular and annoying forms of speech. It is a
quixotic undertaking, thankless and very likely futile. '6 77 It is, none-
theless, the right thing to do. For those who are reluctant to abandon
these statutory vestiges of more troubled times, perhaps the words of
the late Justice Hugo Black, writing in 1958, can provide the neces-
sary courage and inspiration:
The course which we have been following the last decade is not the course
of a strong, free, secure people, but that of the frightened, the insecure, the
intolerant. I am certain that loyalty to the United States can never be se-
cured by the endless proliferation of "loyalty" oaths; loyalty must arise
spontaneously from the hearts of people who love their country and respect
their government. I also adhere to the proposition that the First Amend-
ment provides the only kind of security system that can preserve a free
government-one that leaves the way open for people to favor, discuss, ad-
vocate, or incite causes and doctrines however obnoxious and antagonistic
such views may be to the rest of us. 678
677. Linde, supra note 585, at 1181.
678. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 532 (Black, J., concurring).
